

**SOVIET LEADERS
AND
MASTERY OVER MAN**

By the Same Author

The Psychology of Radio (with G. W. Allport)

The Invasion from Mars

The Psychology of Social Movements

Gauging Public Opinion (contributing editor)

The Psychology of Ego-Involvements (with M. Sherif)

Understanding Man's Social Behavior

Tensions That Cause Wars (editor)

The "Why" of Man's Experience

Public Opinion 1935-1946 (editor)

How Nations See Each Other (with William Buchanan)

The Politics of Despair

Reflections on the Human Venture
(with Charles H. Bumstead)

HADLEY CANTRIL

SOVIET LEADERS
AND
MASTERY OVER MAN

RUTGERS UNIVERSITY PRESS
New Brunswick New Jersey

321.6
C 232
C.2

Copyright © 1960 by Rutgers, The State University
Library of Congress Catalogue Card Number: 60-14204
Manufactured in the United States of America
by Quinn & Boden Company, Inc., Rahway, New Jersey

To George

UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES
CARNEGIE-MELLON UNIVERSITY
PITTSBURGH, PENNSYLVANIA 15213

PREFACE

"As the happiness or real good of men consists in right action, and right action cannot be produced without right opinion, it behoves us, above all things in this world, to take care that our opinions of things be according to the nature of things."

—Benjamin Franklin

"A man can do what he wants, but not want what he wants."

—Schopenhauer

"Soviet man is distinguished by a special, I would say, a state approach to all phenomena of life."

—Sobolev, Chairman of

Plenary Session of

Soviet Writers' Union (1959)

In trying to resolve the perplexing riddle concerning the way in which Soviet leaders view the nature of man, our problem is essentially that of discovering first of all what this "state approach" is to the phenomena of life and to what extent it corresponds with the wants, the urges, the aspirations and the general characteristics of human beings considered as a special form of living stuff in evolutionary history.

From Lenin on down, Soviet leaders have told man that he must and can create his own history by fashioning an

environment that will provide an increasingly good life for workers. These leaders realized early that a Marxian utopia was not an inevitable development of history but one that could be achieved only by ceaseless struggle, guided by a highly controlled and closely knit organizational machine which had to destroy whatever stood in its way, including, not only capitalism, but any characteristics of man likely to conflict with or weaken the precise objectives of the state as defined by the Communist Party.

"In equal combat, truth will triumph over error," Thomas Jefferson pointed out. He did not say flatly that "truth will prevail" as do many contemporary apologists for our way of life. The outcome of the combat in which we are now engaged with the Soviets will in the long run and in a basic way be determined by the validity of the assumptions made by the challenger and the challenged concerning the motivations and values of man and the ways these can best be realized, given the limitations and the potentialities of human beings.

The idealized goals which Soviet leaders have always held up to the "masses" are goals which, they believe, can only be achieved by following the one and only truly "scientific" ideology of Marxism-Leninism, an ideology it is the right and duty of the Communist Party to interpret according to the situation at hand. It is important here at the beginning to emphasize that Soviet leaders not only believe all this, but that they *must* believe this. There can be no room for doubt. Otherwise the whole superstructure so far created and within which they have worked their way to the top would begin to crack and fall apart, leaving them not only powerless but, perhaps much worse from a personal point of view, subject to the ridicule of their contemporaries and of history. Rarely

does any individual, particularly anyone who has espoused a cause and become its spokesman, dare to admit that he was wrong.

Furthermore, it is clearly in the interests of Soviet leaders to minimize the increasing similarities and to maximize the differences of the human situation developing in complex industrial states which face many common problems and are likely to face more and more common problems with further technological developments.

It is obvious that the logic and reasoning of Soviet leaders cannot be understood in terms of traditional Western concepts. If we are to understand and get a feeling of the assumptions made by Soviet leaders concerning the nature of human nature, it is imperative that we divest ourselves as much as we can of our own assumptions, be honest with ourselves, and take a fresh look. And to do this, to view the nature of man as it may be viewed by Soviet leaders, we must muster sympathy and compassion. Otherwise it is all too easy to indulge in the sarcasm, the smug comparisons with Western freedoms, and the optimism which so characterize much current thinking and writing in this area.

Because of the close relationship between means and ends, the placement of assumptions in a particular chapter here is sometimes somewhat arbitrary, as is the ordering of various assumptions within chapters. In the first four chapters, I am including a notation of which assumptions are explicitly and openly made and which seem implicit in the thinking and behavior of Soviet leaders. I am doing this essentially for two reasons: first, some of the assumptions rather self-consciously taken by leaders are not the sort they apparently care to publicize; and, second, there is little doubt that Soviet leaders are by no

means aware of many of their assumptions, so that we must try to ferret them out indirectly and make the best guesses we can without trying to read too much into all their actions and policies, since opportunism and indifference doubtless play their roles.

In formulating this report, I have used many approaches and a wide variety of sources. I have studied Soviet dictionaries and encyclopedias to find out the official meanings given words; the system of compensations, honorifics, and punishments used among both youth and adults; the way in which Soviet leaders handled important events and communicated them to their own people as well as to the outside world (such as the downgrading of Stalin, the Hungarian revolution, the demotion of Malenkov, Molotov, Zuchov, etc.). I have looked into Soviet elections to study the functions they may serve the state; have studied the propaganda bulletins put into the hands of agitators; the image the Soviet systematically builds up in its press and radio of the West; the multifarious ways in which Communist morality is inculcated from the cradle to the grave; the rules and regulations of the Young Pioneers, Party organization for children, and of the *Komsomols*, Party organization for young people; the function of organized Soviet education at all levels; Soviet law; Soviet psychology; Soviet literature and belles lettres; speeches and statements by Khrushchev. I have read dozens of books and articles written about the Soviet Union and the Soviet people which reflect the circumstances under which the Soviet regime came to power and has since maintained itself; I have had conferences with many knowledgeable people who have lived for some years in the Soviet Union and whose impressions deserve respect. I visited the Soviet

Union in the company of two other psychologists and two experienced observers of the Soviet scene.

From these and other sources I have tried to piece together the conclusions that emerge concerning the view Soviet leaders seem to have of the nature of man as they appear to a Western social psychologist at this point in time. The question is essentially, "How do Soviet leaders perceive man?" For the way people perceive things is bound up with the way people act to carry out their purposes, and, in turn, the quality and range of their perceptions are dependent on their purposes and actions.

I should stress here that I am concerned with the assumptions of Soviet *leaders* and not with the assumptions of those who, in their professional life, would in Western democracies be professionally concerned with the characteristics of human nature: psychologists, psychiatrists, philosophers, social and political scientists. For all of these people must, of course, in the Soviet Union tailor their inquiries to fit the pattern provided by those who wield absolute power. This book differs, then, from such excellent studies as Vernon Venable's *Human Nature: The Marxian View* (1945), which analyzed the writings of Marx and Engels, and Raymond Bauer's *The New Soviet Man* (1952), which traced the shifting assumptions of Soviet psychologists.

While the conclusions derived are stated here somewhat categorically, they have in no instance merely been dreamt up according to any preconceived notions. Each has been suggested by some type of evidence or observation, and an illustration or elaboration of each conclusion is given in the text. It has seemed best to make as many differentiations as appeared reasonable, so nuances would not be lost

and various emphases would be visible. The sections dealing with the validities and invalidities of the assumptions perforce stem from my own interpretation, but an interpretation which I personally feel is justified by the evidence we have so far concerning the characteristics of man and the way these are or are not accommodated in current Soviet society.

Perhaps what I have come up with is obvious. In defense I can cite Oliver Wendell Holmes's statement that what we need is less inquiry into the abstruse and more thought about the obvious. Those people who are knowledgeable about Soviet affairs will doubtless find little here that is new to them. But it is my hope that those who are sophisticated concerning Soviet behavior will feel this attempt to systematize from a psychological point of view information they already have may give less well informed readers some insights and better understanding. It is taken for granted that if this study or any part of it is read in the Soviet Union or reacted to by faithful Party members, it will be ridiculed, criticized, and many of its conclusions vigorously denied.

Since I am certainly no "expert" on Soviet affairs, I am indebted to the many people who are such experts in one way or another and who have so generously given me their advice and counsel. Among these are Frederick Barghoorn, George Counts, Louis Fischer, Philip Mosely, Melville Ruggles, John Scott, and Robert Tucker. For research assistance and translations, I am most grateful to Ivan and Marea London, Ina Schlesinger, Anita Navon, and Mark Neuweld. Vera Dunham has shared with me her insights from Soviet literature and provided the translations included here of recent Soviet novels and poetry. The two psychological colleagues, Henry A. Murray and

Mark May, with whom I went to the Soviet Union in November of 1958, were stimulating companions indeed, and I learned much from their observations. The hospitality shown us by many Soviet psychologists during our visit was most generous. I am again indebted to my colleague Lloyd A. Free for his encouragement and counsel. This study was done under the aegis of the Institute for International Social Research and made possible by an endowment from the Rockefeller Brothers Fund with the assistance of grants from The Research Council, Inc.

H. C.


Princeton, N. J.

May, 1960



TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE	vii
INTRODUCTORY NOTE	xvii
1 THE GOALS OF MANIPULATION: Assumptions concerning the Relationship the Masses Should Have to the Party	1
2 THE RATIONALE OF MANIPULATION: Assumptions concerning the Nature of Man	21
3 THE RATIONALE OF MANIPULATION (<i>Continued</i>)	40
4 THE PROCESS OF MANIPULATION: Assumptions concerning the Methods of Guiding the Masses	56
5 TROUBLES ENCOUNTERED: The Weaknesses of Some Assumptions	82
6 ACCOMMODATION AND RELAXATION	116
7 HOW THINGS STAND	137
EPILOGUE	151
NOTES	159
INDEX	171



INTRODUCTORY NOTE

In view of the well-known accomplishments of the Soviet Union to date, the position it holds as a great power, and the fact that nearly a billion people, or one third of the world's population, now live in areas dominated by the Communist Party, it is appropriate to remind ourselves here at the outset of the state of affairs in Russia just prior to the Bolshevik revolution.

Russia was then largely a land of peasants emerging from feudalism with a wide and nearly unbridgeable gap between the tiny minority of privileged and educated people and the great masses. Russian statistics for 1913 estimate that 80 per cent of the population was peasant, with only about 17 per cent of the people classified as "workers." Almost 65 per cent of the population was illiterate and the industrial capacity and industrial know-how in Russia was meager. The country was, Lenin said in 1917, "one of the most backward in Europe."¹

Philip Mosely gives us a sketch of the situation at the time of the Bolshevik seizure of power which was, as he says, "really many revolutions bound up in one."

It was a revolution of most of the peasants against the landlords. Only two generations separated the peasants of 1917 from their grandfathers who had been serfs, practically slaves, before 1861. Even though Russia had made important strides toward social adjustment during those fifty-odd years, there was still a deep and bit-

ter gulf between the former serfs and the former serf-owning class. The grievances of the peasants were magnified by a rapid growth in their numbers, accompanied by a very slow growth in productivity and by overcrowding on the land. . . . Russia's factory workers, though few, were concentrated in a few strategic centers, denied any effective protection by trade unions, and embittered by arbitrary control and exploitation. Russia's middle class was small in numbers and too weak to lead a revolution on the classic Western pattern. The intelligentsia, estranged from the imperial regime, was united only in believing that a revolution—some revolution—was necessary. The autocracy was strong enough to prevent the growth of new democratic institutions and parties but not enlightened enough to lead the country in a thorough-going reform from above, to make a fundamental reversal of policy sharp enough to make the revolution pointless by eliminating the basic grievances of the people.²

Furthermore, Russia and her people had been humiliated by a constant series of military setbacks. As Stalin noted in 1931, "She was beaten by the Mongol khans. She was beaten by the Turkish beys. She was beaten by the Swedish feudal lords. She was beaten by the Polish-Lithuanian nobles. She was beaten by the Anglo-French capitalists. She was beaten by the Japanese barons."³

After the Bolsheviks obtained control, many "sound" observers said that the revolution could not possibly last. Even Lenin himself, writing in 1918 shortly after he came to power, stated that "it is the absolute truth that without a German revolution we are doomed."⁴

In 1835, the perceptive de Tocqueville wrote the observation so often quoted but relevant again here.

There are at the present time two great nations in the world, which started from different points, but seem to tend towards the same end. I allude to the Russians and the Americans. Both of them have grown up unnoticed; and while the attention of mankind was directed elsewhere, they have suddenly placed themselves in the front rank among the nations, and the world learned their existence and their greatness at almost the same time.

All other nations seem to have nearly reached their natural limits, and they have only to maintain their power; but these are still in the act of growth. All the others have stopped, or continue to advance with extreme difficulty; these alone are proceeding with ease and celerity along a path to which no limit can be perceived. The American struggles against the obstacles that nature opposes to him; the adversaries of the Russian are men. The former combats the wilderness and savage life; the latter, civilization with all its arms. The conquests of the American are therefore gained by the plowshare; those of the Russian by the sword. The Anglo-American relies upon personal interest to accomplish his ends and gives free scope to the unguided strength and common sense of the people; the Russian centers all the authority of society in a single arm. The principal instrument of the former is freedom; of the latter, servitude. Their starting-point is different and their courses are not the same; yet each of them seems marked out by the will of Heaven to sway the destinies of half the globe.⁵

The rivalry between two powers foreseen by de Tocqueville was spelled out in no uncertain terms by the Soviet dramatist Konstantin Simonov in an address made in 1946

and published two years later. He stated: "A most ferocious ideological struggle between two systems, between two world outlooks, between two conceptions of the future of mankind has been, is being, and will be waged in the world."⁶

The two "world outlooks" and the "two conceptions of the future of mankind" obviously involve two very different conceptions of the nature of man and the purposes for which societies exist. In view of the demonstrated achievements of the Soviet Union as guided by the Communist Party elite, "it behoves us" as Franklin said, "to take care that our opinions of things be according to the nature of things." A sanguine and complacent attitude that we are entirely right in our own conception of man and that Soviet leaders are entirely wrong may prove very shortsighted indeed.

**SOVIET LEADERS
AND
MASTERY OVER MAN**

11/11/11

11/11/11

11/11/11

1 THE GOALS OF MANIPULATION

Assumptions concerning the Relationship the Masses Should Have to the Party

The concern of this volume is with the *psychological* goals that Soviet leaders are striving for, the pattern of beliefs, loyalties, and behavior that they would like to inculcate in the masses of people. Obviously in very large measure, the political and economic aims of the Presidium depend for their ultimate success on the ability of Soviet leaders to create what they regard as the necessary and proper relationships between themselves and the masses.

In this chapter are listed what appear to be some of the major assumptions Soviet leaders make as to what this necessary and proper relationship should be. The differentiation—sometimes a subtle one—between assumptions that are *explicit* and those that are *implicit* may be useful in accounting for the “duplicity,” “dissimulation,” and “double-talk” often noted by Western observers in describing Soviet behavior. For, as will be seen, some of the implicit assumptions by no means correspond precisely to those that are more open and aboveboard. But from the

point of view of Soviet leaders, what apparent contradictions there may be to outsiders are quite deliberate and must, to them, form a general, congruent outlook.

1. That, while individuals live in and identify with states or nations, these are essentially instruments of the Communist Party and their citizens are to be organized and manipulated according to Party goals. (*Explicit*)

While orthodox Communist doctrine holds that the state will eventually wither away, the assumption is made that the Party will be "everlasting." "The Party has stronger foundations than the State organs. It arose and exists not as a result of obligations of a legal order. Its development was called for by circumstances derived from political concepts, and mankind will always be in need of moral factors." ¹ (Khrushchev, February, 1958)

2. That the fulfillment and maximum development of the individual and his potentials are possible only in a socialist, collective society not bounded by class or national lines; that this represents the only true humanism and that this is an inevitable development. (*Explicit*)

In discussing "socialist culture," the *Short Philosophical Dictionary* states that "socialist culture . . . is above all genuinely a people's culture. . . . It should reveal the traits of Soviet people, people of a new type, in all the grandeur of their human worth and thus help educate in Soviet people the best human qualities." ² Describing "cul-

ture," the same source notes that "Marxism-Leninism for the first time scientifically solved the problem of culture and its sociohistorical content, establishing the dependence of human spiritual activity upon the material conditions of life of society and the character of the social and state structure," pointing out that culture has a class character and a national character. Under capitalism, within each national culture there are two cultures: one is that of the exploiter; the other is that of the exploited, led by the working class and its international party against bourgeois nationalism.

In its discussion of "morality," the *Great Soviet Encyclopaedia* says:

The arguments of the bourgeois moralists pertaining to humanism, love of mankind and so forth, are summoned to hide the fact that in reality the bourgeoisie regard the worker as an inferior being, as a simple means of production which is discarded like trash when not needed. While hypocritically preaching "eternal" virtues in moral writings for the people, the bourgeoisie in fact, by their own form of life, cultivate self-interest and egoism, idleness and dissoluteness, venality and cruelty, misanthropy, falsehood and treachery.³

A standard Soviet dictionary defines "political internationalism" as "a proletarian policy, having as its aim the union of workers of all nationalities in a combined struggle for the overthrow of power of the exploiting classes."⁴ And the same dictionary in its definition of "democracy" quotes Lenin as follows: "In bourgeois countries, democracy exists only in form. The Soviet revolution gave an unprecedented impetus to the development

of democracy . . . socialist democracy (for the workers) as distinguished from bourgeois democracy (for the exploiters, capitalists, and wealthy)." ⁵

A Soviet educator writes that "Soviet patriotism is the conscious, purposeful, and active love for the socialist motherland, based on a deep understanding of the superiority of the Soviet regime over every other non-Soviet regime." ⁶

3. That an individual is to be regarded essentially as a productive unit, no more and no less. Production is, of course, for the state. (*Implicit*)

Many students of Soviet affairs have pointed out how the Party is attempting to turn everyone into a "functionary" without regard to the development of the individual's personality. And it should be emphasized again that when Soviet leaders speak of the individual as being a "servant of the State," they mean that he is thereby to become a servant of the Party in its cause.

In official decrees and the barrage of propaganda that surround him, the Soviet citizen is told over and over again that his duty is to work for the State. University graduates, for example, are allocated to certain jobs and obliged to work at these jobs for two years following graduation. Thereafter they have some choice, but a choice that is extremely limited in any Western sense.

When we visited the Bureau of Labor Psychology at one of the psychological institutes, we found that the central and only theme for research was that of increasing productivity for the State. The individual worker himself

was always referred to as a "producer" whose efficiency was to be improved. There was little mention of individual welfare or happiness as such.

4. That the natural relations among people correspond to Communist morality because Communist morality conforms to the laws of nature and of society. (*Explicit*)

This assumption is exemplified by a statement of a prominent Soviet educator:

In contrast to the hypocritical and blasé bourgeois morality, the morality of the Soviet man, proclaiming the principles of solidarity, mutual aid, devotion to the general welfare, faithfulness to duty, etc., is in full concordance with the factual relations among people, is the correct expression of these relations.⁷

5. That individual morality must always be equated with Communist morality as defined in terms of Party goals; that what is "true," "right," or "just" in the mind of the individual must be so judged relative to the goals and next steps needed in the process of creating the Communist society; that morality, truth, ethics, etc., are therefore relative and not absolute. (*Explicit*)

The pitch here is given by the familiar statement of Lenin, made in 1920, that "our morality is entirely subordinated to the interests of the class struggle of the proletariat." A broadcast from Moscow in July of 1955 re-

mindful people again of Lenin's admonition, quoting him in these words: "Everything that contributes to the building of a Communist society is moral, everything that hinders it is immoral." ⁸

All individual behavior, then, is to be judged in terms of whether it is good or bad according to whether or not it will help build the Communist State and continue the revolution. For the revolution is still far from complete; there is a big job ahead with constant new goals. Thus the Party functionary who is trained and indoctrinated always asks himself what is good in terms of the Party and never asks himself what is good or true in terms of any standards comparable to those used by individuals in Western democracies.

Statements by two leading Soviet educators reassert this assumption: "Communist morality is morality of a new, higher type. The struggle for the construction of Communism is its basis. To be a moral person means to build Communism actively, to give all your strength and energy to the building of a Communist society. . . ." ⁹ And: "Communist morality is expressed in the union of norms, demands, and rules perfected by the Soviet socialist society, regulating the activity and the behavior of the people." ¹⁰

An article by a Soviet writer states that "morality is not given man from above; its standards are historically laid on the basis of the material life of the people, on the basis of their social existence. Whatever their existence, such will be their consciousness, and therefore their morality. . . . Soviet patriotism is the principal, determining feature of the entire world outlook, and moral countenance of Soviet man." ¹¹

In a discussion of the "criterion of truth," the *Short*

Philosophical Dictionary says that, "only Marxist philosophy provides human cognition with a genuinely scientific criterion, making it possible to distinguish truth from error and to verify each truth correctly and precisely. Such a criterion is human practice, the practical productivity of people, the industry and revolutionary activity of the masses."¹² And in the discussion of "morality," the *Great Soviet Encyclopaedia* states that "moral principles and standards of behavior, just as what is understood by good and evil, are not eternal and changeless but depend on the economic attitudes of a given society. The morality dominant in a given society changes with the base out of which it arose and disappears with the liquidation of that base."¹³

The development and maintenance of Communist morality from time to time require that hatred be instilled, nourished, and directed, and may furthermore require that people have an enemy and be made to fear that enemy. Two prominent Soviet educators write, for example, that "one must learn not only to hate the enemy but also to struggle with him, in time to unmask him, and finally, if he does not surrender, to destroy him. . . ."¹⁴ The enemy to be hated, however, is not a matter of private judgment. The enemy, whether domestic or foreign, is whomsoever the Party wills.

6. That what the individual regards as his personal goals and what the Party elite regards as social goals must be completely overlapping so that what is personal is also social and what is social is also personal. In this way, then, the individual can achieve a sense of personal independ-

ence and freedom that do not conflict with Party goals.
(*Explicit*)

Every effort must be and is made to keep individualism from developing as "individualism" is understood in Western democracy. "Individualism" is always defined and thought of by Soviet leaders in terms of "the-individual-as-a-member-of-a-collective."

Only in these terms can the Soviet definition of "freedom" be understood. If the word "freedom" is looked up in the standard Soviet dictionary, the definition is given as "*the recognition of necessity*."¹⁵ (The dictionary also gives the derivation of this definition as stemming from Engels and approved by Lenin.) A person is free, then, to the extent that he understands why the Party line is right. A trained Communist, therefore, examines everything from the point of view of abstract ideology and theory, and there is no place in his way of thinking for individual phenomena. Hence for this trained and thoroughly indoctrinated Communist, individual inconsistencies with Communist stereotypes are hardly even seen, and, if seen, are not accepted.

The word "humanity" has ceased to be a symbol of a collection of hundreds of millions of single human beings and becomes for Soviet leaders an abstract mass category with service to the State replacing individual gains or development as man's primary incentive.

In discussions of individual and social goals, the Russian word *ideiinost* appears over and over again, a word referring to the whole complex of ideological allegiance and high principledness. In all indoctrination toward this ideological allegiance the task is to make the masses realize the necessity of the jobs they are

assigned, identifying personal goals with social goals. In a discussion of the "remnants of capitalism in the consciousness of people," the *Great Soviet Encyclopaedia* states:

Soviet people are characterized by a socialistic attitude toward labor and social property, industriousness and discipline, a high degree of trueness to Party idea and principle, and an understanding of the paramount importance of social interests and of the necessity for conscious subordination of personal interest to social interest.¹⁶

This theme is repeated over and over again in slightly different ways in the writings of prominent Soviet educators. Here are a few examples:

The meaning of a collective for children or youth and the part it should play from an educational point of view consists of this: the collective removes the individualistic, small property psychology and creates the psychology of a collectivist who is conscious of being a member of the socialist community; at the same time it is just in the collective that the individuality of each pupil is most clearly revealed.¹⁷

A sense of duty is the need to obey strictly the norms of Communist morality. When knowledge of definite moral norms has changed into conviction and when their observance has become a need which in turn changes into deeds and actions, then it is possible to say with confidence, that with this person the sense of duty

is highly developed, that it has become a character trait with him.¹⁸

The ultimate goal of education is to reach such a level of consciousness, that pupils will receive the demands of Soviet society as if they were their own.¹⁹

While teaching his pupils to obey the "rules for pupils," the teacher must make them understand that these are demands made by society. . . . This develops the habit of independent activity as well as the feeling of collectivism . . . thus when one individual member of the group commits a misdeed, the whole group should be blamed for it and should be made to feel responsible. . . . The children must be taught to subordinate their personal interests to those of the collective.²⁰

The teacher must always remember the general, overall goal of Communist upbringing: the goal is to bring up the future builders of Communism and all educational methods must aim at this continuously. . . . As Communist norms of morality never require a human being to perform an action which is contrary to his human dignity and individual rights, it is permissible to use compulsion when necessary.²¹

We must first form in the pupils Communist opinions and convictions. The pupils must end by having these convictions and also the capability to put them to use. As the pupils fulfill the demands of teachers and see the positive results of this, the children become convinced of the usefulness and reasonableness of

these demands. Thus the demands made on children by teachers, parents, or by the children's collective, once they become "realized" in the children's minds, turn into convictions.²²

In the activities of the Young Pioneers, every effort is made to make children feel that the Party goals as suggested by the senior leader are the children's own ideas. This is accomplished not so much by actual direction of work as by tactful suggestion, tactful criticism. The overall aim is, of course, to make each child feel that he is *independently* active in the interests of society so that he will harbor no conflicts between personal and social goals.

The task of the *Komsomol* youth organization is similar, a goal set by Lenin in his address to them in 1920: "We must arrange each and every job, no matter how dirty and hard, so that each worker and peasant looks at himself and says: I am a part of the great army of free labor and can myself construct my life without landlords and capitalists; I can establish a Communist system."²³

In this whole process of instilling personal and social goals which are completely overlapping, *criticism and self-criticism* serve the important function of cementing collective norms in the minds of all individuals as the sole guide of what is right and wrong, good and bad. In discussing "criticism and self-criticism," the *Short Philosophical Dictionary* states that this is "the principal method of exposing and overcoming errors and shortcomings in the activity of Marxist parties and other workers' organizations. In Soviet society criticism and self-criticism is one of the most important motive forces of development. Criticism and self-criticism is the way of bringing the masses into the building of Communism."²⁴ Any

individual who violates the Party line, no matter how humble or how high his position, is subject to public censure, and the only way he can save himself is through the public confession of his errors. Self-criticism is meant to destroy any vestige of the sense of individualism.

From this point of view, the "participation" of an individual in a larger group is extremely limited according to any Western democratic standards. Neither the child, the youth, nor the adult is allowed to participate in the formulation of goals: he merely learns goals and must obey rules, but every effort is made to convince the child, the youth, and the adult that these goals are *his own goals*. What freedom exists is confined solely to choices of how to carry out Party goals.

(When riding in a Soviet jet plane, the writer noticed the picture of a worker prominently displayed, and underneath was the caption: "For the Party, from the Heart.")

7. That all the loyalties of all individuals must lead to and stem from the Party and must override all other loyalties; that an individual must have no conflicts or inconsistencies in his loyalties, beliefs, or ideas; and that, therefore, such inconsistencies and conflicts cannot be tolerated. (*Explicit*)

A consistent and explicit aim of the Soviet regime has been to destroy or to prevent the formation of any loyalties or identifications that would interfere with the development or the maintenance of unquestioning loyalty to the Party itself. Loyalties must be kept consistent, and per-

sonal identification must be judged entirely in terms of Party standards. There must be continued deliberate and systematic efforts to break all ties and bonds between individual facts as they may be experienced and the general and repeated ideology used to interpret life situations.

One of the rules of the Communist Party states:

A member of the Party does not have the right to hide an unsatisfactory state of affairs, to let incorrect actions go by which hurt the interests of the Party and the State. He who hinders a member of the Party in carrying out his obligations must be severely punished, as an infringer of the Party will.²⁵

A prominent Soviet educator declares:

. . . the parents are responsible for their family before society and before the law. . . . They must understand that they did not bring their child into the world just to make their family happier. He is a future citizen, a future man of action and a future combatant who is developing under their supervision. Your activity in society and in your work must also be reflected within your family, which should see you in your political role—your role as a citizen—and not separate it from your role as a parent. Your children should know that you have a part in society. They should be proud of you, of your success and of the services you have rendered to society.²⁶

Any form of liberalism thus becomes incomprehensible to a trained Communist who lives by one all-embracing ideology in an atmosphere of declared war on all other

ideologies. A Communist must therefore be vigilant and must suspect fraud in all members of the bourgeoisie. A true bourgeoisie can only be bad or worse, and any gradation of his character in a different direction is inadmissible. And, of course, the Soviet citizen must be taught that it is the very nature of the capitalist system to pursue imperialistic and warlike aims.

Lenin stated years ago, "My words were calculated to evoke hatred, aversion and contempt . . . not to convince but to break up the ranks of the opponent, not to correct an opponent's mistake, but to destroy him, to wipe his organization off the face of the earth."²⁷ Just before Stalin's death an editorial in the official organ of the Soviet teaching profession declared that "love of one's socialist motherland is linked inseparably with hatred of her enemies. It breeds in the hearts of Soviet youth abhorrence and contempt for slavery and oppression, for the dark forces of reaction, for all enemies of progress, civilization and democracy."²⁸ It is little wonder then that all Party decisions and policies are said to be "unanimously" approved and that there is only contempt for any system of majority rule.

Concerning the slogan of "peaceful coexistence," a close student of Soviet affairs points out:

. . . [this] does not mean that Communism has resigned itself to the prospect of living alongside the capitalist countries for all time. The Communists believe beyond all doubt that sometime or other capitalism will be superseded by socialism throughout the world. Coexistence refers only to the period of time between the rise of the first socialist and the disappearance of the last capitalist country. . . . According to the Soviet

view, the principle of peaceful coexistence must not be transferred to the ideological field. Sovietism will therefore never tolerate the continued existence of another philosophy within its own sphere of influence, in the sense of any final arrangement.²⁹

Thus the psychological reality world within which Soviet leaders live is one which they deliberately create and desire to be completely different from the psychological reality world of the democratic West. And they stake their future on this difference.

8. That the Communist Party microcosm must be reinforced at all costs; that any ideas inimical to it must be eradicated; that all impacts, all group affiliations must be directed and controlled; and that otherwise people apparently "have a tendency" to revert to more congenial, natural behavior. (*Implicit*)

In creating and maintaining a Communist morality and common loyalties consistent with Party ideology, Soviet leaders have obviously become skilled in the business of selecting and restricting both the input and the output of information. Psychologically this has the effect of creating a microcosm within which the illusion of choice can be maintained and within which the individual citizen gets maximum reinforcement of Party directives through the apparent validation of these by the consensus of the leaders.

All Soviet leaders have realized that Communist ideas cannot be built up automatically in the individual, but

must be continually reinforced with all manner of propaganda and control. If the Party or the people are to have any contact with outside non-Communist groups, these groups must be "used"; otherwise Soviet citizens or groups will themselves be "used" to the advantage of the outside groups.

The changing function of censorship should be noted under this heading. During the twenties and thirties, the chief function of censorship seemed to be to tame people, especially to tame the colorful figures needed to carry out the revolution. The idea was to eradicate the birthmarks of the past and everything that was inimical to the revolution. But as previously indicated, the present function of censorship seems to be primarily that of preventing the wrong kind of public opinion from developing.

In keeping the Soviet microcosm tightly knit, the centralized regime is careful to control both the size and the nature of the various highly stratified groups within the total society. It is interesting to note, for example, that many groups taken for granted in the United States would be inconceivable in the Soviet Union: alumni groups of graduates from universities, as well as all professional, worker, or social groups not directly controlled by the Party. No matter what group an individual may be a member of, he is first and foremost taught to be loyal to the regime. For example, when the Young Pioneer is admitted to that organization, he makes the following solemn promise: "I, a Young Pioneer of the Soviet Union, in the presence of my comrades, solemnly promise to love my Soviet Motherland passionately, to live, learn and struggle as the great Lenin bade us, as the Communist Party teaches us."⁸⁰ No matter what subject a

student specializes in at the university, he is first and foremost meant to be trained in political education.

Parents are admonished that their children are entrusted to them by the State for proper care and upbringing, and that if family life for children does not produce desired results, parents will be called on the carpet. The growth of boarding schools in Soviet education seems, among other things, to be a deliberate plan for separating children from the family and thus having them reared entirely by the State.

Nothing seems to be too private for the State to concern itself with. In an article in *Komsomolskaia Pravda* appearing in 1958, a reader asked whether marriage troubles were too private to be aired at *Komsomol* meetings. The answer given was, "Oh, no, in a socialist society private affairs are the concern of the whole society." And the paper went on to emphasize that a free person is nothing by himself.³¹

In the overwhelming majority of Soviet novels, individuals are almost automatically characterized according to the particular function in which they serve the State, the particular stratum they are in. While this is, of course, a propaganda device, it must not be overlooked that such novels may in many cases express the real convictions of the writers. And in view of the social authority Soviet literature enjoys, this schematic view of human nature, running like a red thread through Soviet literature, can have considerable influence in shaping opinion.

9. That non-Communists anywhere in the world will always be a threat to Communism, since consciousness is de-

terminated by socioeconomic conditions and if these are not all uniform according to Marxist-Leninist theory, then there are potentially dangerous deviations in the consciousness of individuals. (*Implicit*)

Since Communists do believe that the individual character is determined by socioeconomic conditions, they must also therefore believe that there is always danger to them and to their system as long as any form of capitalism or non-Communist system prevails.

In this sense, Communist leaders are prisoners of their own ideology. And in this sense they cannot genuinely accept coexistence as a goal but only as a tactic or strategy.

10. That the individual must recognize that the end always justifies the means and that the end is always dictated by the Party elite. (*Explicit*)

This well-known view was long ago enunciated by Lenin in his familiar precept that a good Bolshevik must be prepared "to resort to all kinds of tricks and ruses, to employ illegal measures, secretiveness and concealment of truth" whenever necessary to achieve Party goals.³²

Article IV of the "Catechism of a Revolutionist" states that "to him [the Revolutionist] whatever aids the triumph of the Revolution is ethical; all that which hinders it is unethical and criminal."³³ As indicated earlier, "truth" is judged in terms of what is most likely to be effective without any concern for consistency or human suffering.

It should be pointed out that this particular strategy is

taken full advantage of by Soviet leaders in their utilization of freedom of communication in countries where it exists and in diplomacy and international trade practices. Communist propagandists and negotiators pay lip service to non-Soviet ethical standards in so far as this may help them achieve the basic aims they have in mind.

11. That if people are to work together, there is need for common goals. (*Implicit*)

This simple but highly important assumption seems definitely one continually in the minds of Soviet leaders. Sometimes the common goal is intense nationalism, sometimes a war psychology. At the moment, the common goal seems to be to overtake and surpass capitalism, particularly in the United States. It should be noted in passing that except in unusual circumstances there is seldom any "common goal" toward which the people in Western democracies are self-consciously working.

12. That the legitimate needs of people include only wholesome satisfactions and do not encompass the whims and luxuries of bourgeois society which are so wasteful to that society. (*Explicit*)

This has become a familiar theme with Khrushchev. In his speech to the Twenty-first Congress he stated, "When we speak of satisfying the needs of people, we have in mind not the whims and desires for luxury but the healthy requirements of a culturally developed man." ³⁴ In an

interview with three Americans in 1958, Khrushchev pointed out that the American system is wasteful and inefficient and that America will never catch up with the Soviet Union in science because capitalism wastes the talent of its people.³⁵

Such are some of the major assumptions concerning the goals that Soviet leaders are striving for in their manipulation of people. In the next chapter we consider some of the reasons why they feel such goals are attainable.

2

THE RATIONALE OF MANIPULATION

Assumptions concerning the Nature of Man

Whether or not Soviet leaders will achieve the goals that they are striving for in their manipulation of the masses will of course depend in large part upon the validity of their assumptions as to what human nature "is" and can become. In this and the next chapter we shall spell out in some detail what these assumptions appear to be.

It has seemed best to make differentiations as fine as possible rather than to err on the side of lumping too much into more general categories. The subtle nuances in the thinking of Soviet leaders must be understood if we are to account for what often appears to be the subtlety and deviation of their behavior.

1. That the characteristics and traits of human beings can be transformed in desired directions. (*Explicit*)

When the Bolsheviks came to power after the October Revolution, they determined to transform society. They

thereby set themselves the task of transforming people—their moral attitudes, their characteristics, and their intellectual qualities.

Early in the nineteenth century, following the French Revolution, Russian revolutionaries began to talk about the “new people”—the belief that under Socialism and Communism the new man would develop entirely new characteristics and values: individual motives and selfishness would be abolished and men would live for the social group alone.

The theme of creating a “new Soviet man” has been stressed incessantly ever since. In 1927 a leading Soviet educator stated that “the over-all task of Soviet education is to change the character of the Russian people.”¹ A leading Soviet psychologist has recently written, “It is possible to develop all socially indispensable characteristics of the personality in every type of person.”²

The theme was echoed by Khrushchev in his speech to the Twenty-first Party Congress:

It is the function of all ideological work of our Party and State to develop new traits in Soviet people, to train them in collectivism and love of work, in proletarian internationalism and patriotism, in lofty ethical principles of the new society, in Marxism-Leninism. To attain Communism, the most just and perfect society, in which all the finest moral traits of free man will unfold to the full, we must bring up the man of the future today. . . . What are our principal tasks in the coming seven years? . . . In the ideological field—to intensify the ideological and educational work of the Party, raising the level of Communist consciousness of the

working people, particularly in the rising generation, training it in the Communist attitude toward work and in Soviet patriotism and internationalism, overcoming the survivals of capitalism in the minds of people and fighting against bourgeois ideology.⁸

A crucial aspect of this assumption is that the conformity of human nature to the true Communist model will not be attained until Communism wins throughout the world or until the carriers of the "remnants of capitalism" in human nature die a natural or violent death or are completely re-educated.

2. That human beings are rather simple creatures; there is no need to have much respect for them or much awe of their complexities and capacities. Nearly all people are like children in that they need to be led and can be led by the hand, being conditioned to ask no questions about where they are going. (*Implicit*)

The view of human nature held by Soviet leaders is an odd and dangerous blend of utopianism and cynicism. In their official utterances, Soviet leaders are optimists who seem to think that man can do anything. But in actual practice these same leaders play on all of man's weaknesses and seem to regard him as a pretty poor creature indeed. After a thorough review of the way in which the official line of Soviet psychology regards the nature of man, an American expert on the Soviet concluded:

. . . nothing is more striking than the insistent endeavor to empty man of all inner springs of action, to visualize human nature as motivationally inert. Man is "hollow." He has no wishes, instincts, emotions, drives, or impulses, no reservoir of energies of his own. No motive is allowed to intervene between the stimulus emanating from the environment and the person's reflex response.⁴

From my own observations in the Soviet Union and the observations of the two psychological colleagues with whom I traveled, it was apparent that the Soviet people were in general treated quite primitively by the regime. For example, what the psychologist terms "cognition" ("the process of knowing") is not allowed to be a part of the total cycle of life activities, but is utilized by the state only as and when it is needed; for there seems a clear realization that knowledge in and of itself can bring about an imbalance in an individual's strivings and aspirations if it is not tied to some controllable and realizable activity. One is reminded of the statement in Ecclesiastes that "for in much wisdom is much grief: and he that increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow."

Marxism-Leninism has clearly become an ideology to be defined and interpreted by Party leaders alone. The implicit role of leadership is interestingly revealed by the use of the word *rukovoditel*—a compound noun, uniting two roots: *ruka*, meaning "hand," and *vodit*, meaning "to lead," the word then means "by-the-hand-leader." Every person in an authoritative position is a by-the-hand-leader; thus the Party is the sum total of these leaders. In a factory or collective farm both the technical

manager and the Party official would be *rukovoditel*, but the Party man would be more so.

3. That the overwhelming majority of people cannot be expected to know what is good for them or how to achieve what is good for them and must, therefore, be guided and controlled by a select elite. (*Explicit*)

Differently stated, this assumption is that it is in the nature of man to require guidance and that without proper guidance man deviates from the desirable.

Ever since Lenin's dictum that the Party is the "vanguard of the people," the voice of the Party has been considered the "only true" voice of the workers. A *Pravda* editorial of July 6, 1956, repeated Lenin's statement that "The Communist Party has been, is, and will be the sole master of the minds, the voice of the thoughts and hopes, the leader and the organizer of the people in their entire struggle for Communism." Khrushchev told the Twentieth Party Congress that "the indispensable and decisive condition of all forms of transition to socialism is the political leadership of the working class by its advanced detachment." ⁵

This assumption, of course, finds its way into all official publications. For example, an article on "The Popular Masses" in the *Great Soviet Encyclopaedia* says:

The Communist Party is the collective organizer and leader of the popular masses, the guiding, directing force of the Soviet people in the struggle for Communism. . . . The strength and might of the Com-

munist Party consisted and consists in its indissoluble bond with the people, in the richness and inexhaustibility of its collective experience, in the wisdom of its collective leadership.⁶

A visitor to the Soviet Union is struck by the frequency of the differentiation between "we" and "they" that crops up in conversations—"they" referring to the leaders and "we" referring to the people.⁷ For example, a professor of psychology, after showing a group of American psychologists some dilapidated laboratories, said, "But *they* are going to give *us* a new building in two years."

In a discussion of public opinion as a subject for social science research, a Soviet social scientist has recently written that—

Public opinion, in our time, is directed by various classes and their organizations. The primary class organizations are political parties, created to guide popular opinion in any given directions. . . . Participation by the Party and mass organizations is a *sine qua non* of a healthy socialist public opinion.⁸

4. That by and large people are incapable of making political decisions and acting effectively on them. (*Explicit*)

Following an earlier revolutionary, Peter Tkachev, Lenin set the line which has been held since: that the ordinary person is incapable of making decisions; since people are lazy, they discuss things forever, and they do

little to get things done in any organized or effective way. Hence, Lenin created the idea of the Party as being the vanguard of the proletariat.⁹

5. Unless and until people are politically developed and, even then, unless and until people have a sense of how their own political action can effectively bring about the desired goals, there is no craving for political liberty, no sense of political responsibility, but, on the contrary, the desire and need for guidance, protection, etc., to achieve immediate goals and needs. (*Implicit*)

It should perhaps be pointed out here again that we must never underestimate the dramatic success of the Soviet Union.

Americans and others in Western democracies tend to assume that all people have a thirst for political liberty, and it is therefore sometimes difficult for them to conceive that this assumption may be a myth and that there are people who do not want the particular form of freedom that characterizes Western democracies. In the Soviet Union the word "liberty" includes freedom to avoid political responsibility. Freedom in the Soviet Union is defined as the recognition of necessity.

Marx and Engels appeared to make human beings the center of the stage in contrast to the ideologies of their time. They clearly recognized that the basic needs of people must be satisfied. And so the Russian revolution was "correct" for the situation at the time: Bolshevik leaders "had to" put an end to imperialistic capitalism to do away with war; they "had to" form a politburo, because of the re-

tarded political development and sense of helplessness of the people; they "had to" adopt an autocracy to do away with backward economic development; they "had to" adopt revolution instead of evolution; and they "had to" put up an iron curtain for their own protection.

Ever since the revolution, the Soviet regime has been strong because it has been primitive and dogmatic. Its appeals are essentially to a backward, not to an advanced, people, and one must clearly recognize that the emphasis made on "people" in general rather than on the "individual" does have great appeal, especially in underdeveloped areas where the individual person identifies himself with the "people" the Communists are talking about.

Soviet leadership, extending as it does to almost all areas of life, can give people a sense of freedom from responsibility and prevent the anxiety that often prevails in democracies when freedom of choice is relatively unlimited, but brings with it a great personal responsibility, together with a frequent sense of frustration if action to reach desired goals proves ineffective.

While the Soviet citizen may well know that his personal freedom is limited, this will cause no particular rebellion in him *if* he senses that the leadership is on "his" side, working for "his" welfare, and *if* he sees in his own experience a trend toward the improvement of his lot.

"Freedom" for the Soviet people seems to be defined operationally in terms of improving society and utilizing nature through the application of science. Within this context the patience and the relative contentment of the Soviet citizen with a system that confines and restricts him in a way that would be unbearable to most people in a Western democracy becomes more understandable. In-

dividuals identify themselves with the efforts of the "people" or the "State." They tend to view themselves and to talk about themselves as more or less important cogs in a big machine, a machine which, in its turn, is playing an important role in some worthwhile, over-all plan. In this effort, the individual is more willing to take on the role he is assigned and in the process can believe that it is an important personal responsibility. It is rather comparable to the feeling an American would have in time of war or other crisis when he gets a sense of self-satisfaction by playing some required role; or it is the feeling an individual may have when playing as a member of a football team or a member of an orchestra, or working as a member of an important government research unit. In such situations, instead of a sense of frustration, there is actually a sense of accomplishment and importance: one does not feel thwarted or compelled, but useful and worthwhile.

Except for a few intellectuals and other sophisticated minorities, freedom for self-expression and freedom for personal development as we would understand these concepts do not appear to be a major concern. One encounters individuals who have been deprived of all freedom, who have suffered or been set back for years in their own personal development, but who still apparently quite sincerely justify or excuse the treatment they have undergone by the State in a way which to us is surprising and shocking. Communist terror in many instances impresses people much less than we like to think. It is perhaps sobering to recall how Christianity survived and spread in spite of the terrorism to which early Christians were subjected.

The "Palace Revolution" that occurred in 1957 when

Malenkov *et al.* were ousted is a good example of the apparent distance between the "we" and "they" earlier differentiated. If there appears to be no harmful implication for people ("we") from shifts in top personnel among the "they," there appears little disturbance below. In discussing this particular incident, an American observer wrote:

The masses of the Soviet people were, without preparation and with precious little explanation, told that their leadership had been bitterly divided, that the "monolithic unity" of the Party hierarchy was a fiction, that their foreign minister for a long period (Molotov) had not worked for peace, and that Malenkov was a murderer. And they took it all like lambs. Or, if they did not take it like lambs, they shut up.¹⁰

It should also be noted that since people in the Soviet Union have had no political experience, training, or involvement, even if some of them should dissent (such as students or intellectuals or factory managers), they would have little conception of how to undertake effective political action as we know it.

6. That only the Communist elite are capable of guiding the masses scientifically, since only the elite have the appropriate understanding of how to interpret Marxism-Leninism. (*Explicit*)

Since Marxism-Leninism is "the science of sciences," all policies of the Party must be based on it. For scientific

objectivity is possible only when the approach is from the point of view of dialectical materialism. All else is called "pseudo objectivity."

In a speech made at a congress of Rumanian Party members as reported in the *New York Times* of June 23, 1960, Khrushchev pointed out quite clearly that Communist leadership must be "skillful and flexible." "We live in a time when we have neither Marx nor Engels nor Lenin with us," said Chairman Khrushchev. "If we act like children who, studying the alphabet, compile words from letters, we shall not go very far. Based on Marxist-Leninist teaching, we must think for ourselves, we must thoroughly study life, analyze the present situation and draw conclusions that are useful to the common cause of communism."

Only those who have mastered the science of Marxism-Leninism can correctly understand the social forces at work. In a discussion of "law," the *Short Philosophical Dictionary* states that "the knowledge of the laws of society allows the Party to see not only the present but also to predict the future."¹¹ And the article points out how the Communist Party has used its knowledge of economic laws to prepare and organize the masses to overcome the outmoded bourgeois-landowner regime in Russia.

The special mission that Soviet leaders believe they have can be better understood if we remind ourselves that for centuries many Russian intellectuals have believed that Great Russia had a messianic role to play in world history. Dostoevski expressed the view in one of the late entries of his diary:

. . . the Slavophile doctrine, in addition to that assimilation of the Slavs under the rule of Russia, signi-

fies and comprises a spiritual union of all those who believe that our great Russia, at the head of the united Slavs, will utter to the world, to the whole of European mankind and to civilization, her new, sane and as yet unheard-of word. That word will be uttered for the good and genuine unification of mankind as a whole in a new, brotherly, universal union whose inception is derived from the Slavic genius, pre-eminently from the spirit of the great Russian people who have suffered so long, who during so many centuries have been doomed to silence, but who have always possessed great powers for clarifying and settling many bitter and fatal misunderstandings of Western European civilization. Now, I belong to this group of the convinced and the believing.¹²

7. That the characteristics of human beings are largely determined and rooted in socioeconomic situations and that these situations must be so manipulated and controlled by the elite that they will affect the consciousness of individuals in desired ways. (*Explicit*)

In a discussion of "character," the *Great Soviet Encyclopaedia* points out that political and moral convictions arise out of social and economic conditions, and on the basis of these political and moral convictions an individual sets his goals in life. The psychic properties of men are thus socially determined, just as behavior is determined by social and practical conditions. All goals, demands, and needs of the individual are reflections in man's consciousness of the objective social world.¹³ (The fact that the

leaders of the Bolshevik revolution were themselves members of the intellectual middle class and moved by forces other than socioeconomic determinants is a repudiation of Marxism that has often been noted.)

In a discussion of the concept of "idea," the *Short Philosophical Dictionary* states that "the character of any idea is determined by the social system and the conditions of man's material life."¹⁴ This official view is reflected in an article on perception by a Soviet psychologist: "Consciousness is transformed into a 'material' force inasmuch as, by possessing the masses and arming them with the knowledge of objective laws, it increases their power over nature, raises the productivity of their labor, enables them to participate in the transformation of the world."¹⁵

Hence human action must be "goal directed," since goals appear in man's consciousness, not as arbitrary and chance manifestations of any individual "will," but as necessary reflections of objective needs which arise as a result of the development of social production.

In a book entitled *The Characteristics of Man* two Soviet psychologists write:

. . . the conscious "will" activity of the personality reflects social reality. But as social reality is historically changeable, so does conscious will activity change together with the change in social needs. A qualitative difference can be detected between the consciousness and will of people of different social-economic formations. In capitalist society, "will" is needed by a person to subjugate another person, in capitalist society purposefulness is directed toward acquisition of the best piece of the social pie. The "will" of a Soviet person, a person whose consciousness is imbued with socialism,

is directed above all toward the achievement of society's welfare. The struggle for the affairs of society becomes the meaning and aim of the life of the individual. . . . That is why Soviet society, striving to develop a new character in people, people who will be capable of overcoming any difficulties and obstacles, pays attention mainly to the ideological Communist education of the broad masses of the toilers and of the growing generation.¹⁶

In its discussion of "morality," the *Great Soviet Encyclopaedia* states that under capitalism "together with the thirst for private property and money goes the war of everyone against everyone. Each individual is placed in a hostile relationship to others and to society as a whole. The same rule also characterizes relations among bourgeois states."¹⁷

Since human consciousness and awareness tend to lag behind socioeconomic conditions and changes (symbolized by residual religious beliefs and vestiges of behavior characteristic of bourgeois society and of capitalism), behavior that is to be acceptable must be politically defined, created, controlled, and enforced. This is a major task for Soviet leaders and especially for Soviet educators.

The assumption that the masses must be controlled and directed appears almost as an obsession throughout official pronouncements and material that clearly follows the Party line.

8. That since human motivation is determined by broad socioeconomic conditions (except for the simple recogni-

tion of basic needs), any other considerations of human motives are outcroppings of "idealism," "historical idealism," or are "pseudo scientific." Hence, there follows a denial of the importance of the uniqueness of the individual due to genetic factors, to personal feelings or anxieties stemming from his unique personal history, as well as a denial of the value satisfactions associated with independence, with the capacity to make decisions concerning what goals should be pursued, a denial of personal development and emergence, etc.

There is also a denial that people within Soviet Communist society have different world outlooks, since they all live within the same socioeconomic framework. (*Explicit*)

There is opposition to all attempts to account for human behavior and its motivational roots on any level except by socioeconomic determinism. This point of view is clearly rationalized by Soviet psychologists and psychiatrists who must perforce think and work within the officially prescribed framework. Hence they neglect and disregard problems that involve personal choice, personal aspirations, personal fears and anxieties which are bound to arise in the course of the unique personal history and because of the unique genetic structure of each individual, irrespective of the kind of sociopolitical environment (Communist or non-Communist) within which a person attempts to carry out his purposes.

Any search for human motives not based on socioeconomic determinants is, as indicated, branded as some kind

of "idealism." Typical comments by a Soviet writer criticizing American psychiatry and psychology go as follows: "Any open manifestation of historical idealism is deeply foreign to the progress of scientific knowledge . . . the center of contemporary Freudianism is the U.S.A. which, as is well known, is also the center of world imperialism." ¹⁸ The *Short Philosophical Dictionary*, in its discussion of "Freudianism," has this to say:

A reactionary idealistic trend widespread in bourgeois psychological science. . . . Scientific psychology, however, definitely rejects the Freudian concept of the unconscious and treats consciousness as a property of matter, of the brain. . . . Freudianism and "neo-Freudianism" are now in the service of imperialism which utilizes these "teachings" on the subjection of consciousness to the "sub-conscious," for the purpose of justifying and developing the basest and most repellent instinctual tendencies.¹⁹

In discussing psychotherapy with an American visitor, a Soviet psychiatrist said, "We don't go digging into each personality to find out about the world outlook because the world outlook of Soviet people is uniform." ²⁰

The adaptability, flexibility, and capacity to meet new and changing conditions that non-Communist psychiatrists and psychologists would regard as signs of maturity, mental health, and the intelligent and purposeful use of personal freedom are both misinterpreted and misunderstood. Soviet authorities accuse Western psychotherapists who aim at such behavioral criteria of mental health as trying to make people tolerant of an oppressive bourgeois society and submissive to its injustices.

9. That the aspirations of people can be so manipulated that they will fit into the long-range goals of the Party according to the role people are required to play at different periods or in different generations to achieve the ultimate goals that the Party elite has in mind. (*Explicit*)

Party tactics and Party strategy are shifted according to what the leaders are convinced are the requirements of the times. Such shifts are not in any sense regarded as confessions of failure or defeat, but as necessary operations to benefit the Party as it moves inexorably, according to the view of the leaders, toward a Communist future and the demise of all non-Communist governments. If the behavior of Soviet leaders occasionally baffles some Western observers, the reason is, in part at least, that the specific immediate intentions of leaders who follow their own highly pragmatic moral code are not fully understood in terms of long-range goals and expectations.²¹

A review of the bulletins distributed periodically to local Party agitators over the last thirty-five years reveals the changes of Party goals and problems as situations change—all changes made with the consistent aim of increasing identification with the Party and increasing production.

10. That *pravda* (which in translation is a combination of "truth" and "justice") can be officially defined, imposed, and transmitted to all individuals whose beliefs and actions will be determined accordingly. (*Implicit*)

This assumption means that there needs to be no individualism, no personal changes of goals and aspirations

with experience or with the seasons of life, etc. It is a denial of the fact that the abstraction of "truth-justice," like any other abstraction, has meaning to a person only when that abstraction refers to and is consistent with personal experience. Hence, values can really become personal in the Soviet Union only for those who accept a textbook definition of *pravda*. (And this leads to hypocrisy, distrust, careerism, servility, irresponsibility, lack of imagination, fakery, etc., with respect to actions and loyalties.)

This assumption means implicitly that individuals will not be seriously troubled if there is an inconsistency or lack of harmony in their experience between what "is" and what "ought to be" or "is said to be," if there is a gulf between the ideal and the reality. The result is that an observer in the Soviet Union can notice a kind of mild schizophrenia among many members of the citizenry. The bifurcated attitude toward the United States is an example. The regime urges the people to catch up with and surpass America at the same time that America is excoriated in so many respects.

It is perhaps significant that in discussions with many dozen Soviet psychologists, there was no mention of such problems as adjustment, inferiority feelings, aspirations, frustrations, worries, dreams, etc. When we asked about this, the uniform answer was that "we are concerned only with the positive." The psychologists we met, furthermore, either failed to see or refused to recognize that they saw the extent to which an individual himself assigns meanings and significances to the "objective" world around him, including not only material things but events and people.

We have already pointed out the systematic attempts

made to minimize individuality and to guide behavior through the manipulation of the environment that is being "incorporated" into the individual. Those who do not exhibit proper effects of this indoctrination are cast off as "black sheep" who may appear in every family.

11. That since all truth is "scientific," there is no personal truth and no lasting, eternal truth. (*Implicit*)

In its discussion of the topic "eternal truths" the *Short Philosophical Dictionary* states:

. . . the fondness for "eternal truths" is particularly prevalent among those who try to prove that because separate eternal truths exist, the history of mankind also contains eternal truths, an eternal morality, an eternal justice, etc. . . . Dialectical materialism has refuted the metaphysical theory of "eternal truths," and has created the only scientific theory of how to recognize scientific truths.²²

This implies, of course, that *pravda* (truth-justice) can change its meaning according to the interpretations and rationalizations that Party leaders give to the science of dialectical materialism at any particular time.

3 || THE RATIONALE OF MANIPULATION (*Continued*)

We continue here the listing of assumptions concerning the basic characteristics of human beings, and especially some of the limitations of human nature which encourage the belief in the malleability of man.

1. That the satisfaction people obtain from spontaneous action based on their own personal and independent value judgments can be successfully throttled, contained, and controlled; that spontaneous action is meaningful and permissible only when initiated by the Party; that the Party, therefore, is to set the boundaries within which joy, love, compassion, charity, etc., are to occur. (*Explicit*)

This important assumption essentially denies the value quality inherent in *spontaneous* experience. In operational terms, this means that essentially an individual must have Party or State permission in order to get a content for many of his deep emotions and feelings.

2. That what urge there is for self-development and self-expression can be channeled into Party norms, and

that it is tactically important to instill the conception that personal development is possible only within a Socialist-Communist society. (*Implicit*)

The implication here is that work or labor is a goal in and of itself; that goals of work are to be set only by the Party; that there is nothing an individual should want to work *for* outside of Party goals and Party-imposed identifications.

It is perhaps worth noting that the constant use of the word "toilers" and "toiling masses" has a grim connotation. Webster defines "toil" as "to harass or weary with exertion; to overwork. To accomplish by great labor; to get or effect with effort. To exert strength with pain and fatigue, especially of the body, and with continued effort; to labor taxingly. To proceed or advance with laborious exertion or with much effort or strain." Appearing as frequently as it does in the Soviet Union, the word seems implicitly to deny the pleasure that can be obtained from work if one is participating in something one likes and if one is working with any sense of love or individual purpose.

In talking with people in the Soviet Union, our own small group was impressed with how little these people have to look forward to except a somewhat better standard of living. Otherwise, they all seemed very much in a groove, especially the young people if one compared them to young people in our own culture with their aspirations and dreams. In the Soviet Union it is completely outside the realm of possibility that a university graduate should be allowed to seek the particular job he wants and to move from one job to another according to his interests.¹

It is noteworthy that there is not a single college or university of a "liberal arts" type in the Soviet Union, and it seems highly unlikely that any such development will occur within the foreseeable future—in itself a denial of the notion of self-government for its own sake. Education must be practical and in the interest of the State.

3. That there is no need to take into account the creative role of an individual, the notion that a goal is a signpost pointing to other goals, or that individual living is a process, a development with emergences. New ideas concerned with people and with the relationships among people are to be initiated only by official directive. (*Implicit*)

There is a denial that once basic needs are satisfied, there will be the development or emergence of other potentialities and desires on the part of human beings. For example, an assumption of the current educational reforms is that the vast majority of people will be satisfied with standardized and relatively brief education and that there will be little desire of individuals to pursue knowledge for its own sake.

The emphasis is on the restraint, the harnessing, and the directing of human feelings rather than on the desire of the individual to express himself, to have creative experience, and to make choices.

This means that there is a failure to take into account the insatiability of human needs and aspirations, the idea that one goal always leads to another and that there will never be anything regarded as an "ideal" society or era.

4. That people can be manipulated; ideas can be "sold"; opinions can be implanted; aspirations can be created or repressed. (*Implicit*)

A number of factors in the history of the Communist regime have built up a belief in the plasticity of human beings and the conviction that they can be manipulated. One obvious and sometimes unappreciated factor is that the Soviets were revolutionaries in a very backward society. This gave them the advantage of being able to apply organizational and other techniques borrowed from more advanced societies to a backward population which was very vulnerable and completely inexperienced in methods of achieving political independence. Another factor to remember is that the Bolsheviks were intellectuals, but intellectuals who were ruling rather ignorant masses of people. Hence they almost inevitably acquired a contempt for the "mass" of mankind.

And since Soviet leaders have been remarkably successful in manipulating their own subjects, they have rather "naturally" acquired a belief that Communist morality can be instilled more or less universally. They bolster this belief with the assumption that there are no important internal forces for personal development that they need to worry about or to respect, hence relieving themselves of any limitations on the extent to which transformation can occur. Hereditary factors are assigned only a minor role in the confident belief that learning by conditioning can create the desired uniformity and guided morality. The new educational program, for example, presupposes that after two years of manual labor, former

students will be so conditioned that the great majority of them will not aspire to higher education.

5. That human beings can be sufficiently disciplined so that they will not deviate from the goals set by the Party elite. Also that human beings must become and can become self-conscious concerning Communist goals and therefore must and can be made to practice conscious discipline. (*Explicit*)

One finds over and over again statements to the effect that the severest discipline of the toilers is indispensable for the successful solution of the grand tasks of building a Communist society.

And of particular importance is the assumption that discipline for Soviet citizens, young and old, is *conscious* and *voluntary*.

If people are properly educated in the spirit of "Communist morality," this morality will serve as a necessary check on the masses in the absence of terroristic control; people who are so brought up will be ready to take their place in the labor force without complaint. The inculcation of conscious, voluntary Communist discipline in the masses thus becomes the major responsibility of propaganda, agitation, and education.

In his speech to the Twenty-first Party Congress, Khrushchev stated:

The higher the consciousness of the masses, millions strong, the more successfully will the plans of Communist construction be carried out. That is why ques-

tions of the Communist training of the people, particularly the younger generation, are acquiring extraordinary importance. . . . Everybody will have to fulfill within a definite time and in a definite order his work function and his social duty.²

A significant reflection and elaboration of this assumption is found in an article entitled "Developing Conscious Discipline" by two Soviet educators.³ They write that "permanently disciplined behavior is the highest quality of Communist morality." Particularly noteworthy is their discussion of initiative as a cardinal characteristic of Communist discipline. Initiative they define as "not just blind obedience but as an independent search for the best way to fulfill a command." They continue that the correct organization of the teaching process will lead to the conscious subordination of the pupil and that this is the "first and most important trait of Soviet discipline."

The extended discussion of "independence" and "initiative" by these authors sounds strange and twisted to anyone who is used to considering these concepts from the point of view of Western democracy. But their discussion of these character traits must be emphasized, for they are at the heart of the matter. "Independence and initiative," they write, "mean the display of the greatest self-denial and the readiness and ability to obey an order absolutely whatever the obstacles and dangers." These educators point out that it is particularly easy to inculcate this type of conscious and voluntary discipline in young children and that the "natural desire" of small children to do things for the collective must be constantly exploited by the alert teacher.

A review of the organization and work of the *Komsomols*

stresses the need for this conscious, voluntary Communist discipline more frequently and more insistently than the need of any other quality. Discipline for what? For the building of the "new society," a society without war, slavery, exploitation, oppression, poverty, ignorance, idleness, selfishness, or individualism. The goal is always described in the most general and glowing terms. The *Komsomolite* will be a "good" member in so far as he is a "good" follower and willingly submits to the "iron discipline" necessary to achieve this new society.⁴

6. That conscious deviation can be handled and that it is unimportant in the scheme of things if some creative, "independent" people are forced to become secretive. (*Implicit*)

The implication is that any such effects of policy need be taken into account only when they become widespread enough to be potentially dangerous to Party goals, as in Hungary, East Berlin, Poland. In the meantime this danger can be controlled by allowing a certain amount of expression and criticism.

For example, in March of 1959 part of the diary of a young Soviet writer (Golovinsky) was published in *Komsomolskaia Pravda*. This young man had been removed from a position of leadership in the *Komsomol*. His official trial was pending. He had been defeated and demoted, but in the published diary he says something very telling of the scars and special hardships that conscious deviation from the standard and all-encompassing collectivism brings about:

I feel frightening emptiness, solitude and pain, pain, almost organic pain some place inside. . . . I must fight a big fight for the big man in me. . . . I understood an even more important thing—the repulsive essence of a lie. . . . My main defect is that I short-change myself on little things. I stopped tending my inner life. . . . The other deadly defect is the absence of biting truthfulness in relation to other people and to oneself . . . the training of the will, firm discipline. . . .⁵

7. That there is no source of personal discontent other than poverty or socioeconomic conditions. (*Explicit*)

As a distinguished American psychiatrist has pointed out, “the psychoanalyst challenges an implicit Soviet assumption that the major source of human discontent lies in poverty and in economic and political inequities. . . . The analyst knows that no form of economic or political organization is free of guile or of responsibility for the neurotic betrayal of man’s aspirations.”⁶

8. That deviations from the idealized Soviet man (such as the wrong habits of work or living, careerism, religious leanings, bourgeois nationalism, etc.) are not due to any inherent characteristics of human nature but are due to “vestiges of capitalism” or “bourgeois ideology” still lingering in consciousness. (*Explicit*)

People in the Soviet Union are products of Soviet society, and according to Soviet theory, aside from certain family

influences, people should be what Soviet society has made them. But there are constant deviations from the theoretically prescribed expectations, and these must somehow be explained away. This is most frequently accomplished by using some form of the argument that "vestiges of capitalism" still have not been fully eradicated.

In its discussion of "The Remnants of Capitalism in the Consciousness of the People," the *Great Soviet Encyclopaedia* states:

Remnants of private property-minded bourgeois ideology and psychology: views, ideas, habits of work, traditions and prejudices inherited from capitalistic society. . . . These remnants find their expression in such phenomena still prevalent on a certain scale such as an unsocialistic attitude toward labor and social property, the violation of Soviet lawfulness and the rules of socialist community, careerism and a bureaucratic attitude toward the needs of the laborers, bourgeois nationalism, unscrupulousness in way of life, religious prejudices, etc. . . . The presence of remnants of capitalism in the consciousness of members of a socialistic society is accounted for by the fact that in Soviet society, as in every other, changes in the consciousness of people lag behind changes in their economic position, lag behind changes in the social way of life: old, out-of-date ideas, views, habits, traditions continue to exist a certain time even when the conditions which engendered them have fundamentally changed. The tenacity for life of the remnants of capitalism in the consciousness of Soviet people is furthered also by the presence of the capitalist camp which tries to revive

and support these remnants for their subversive purposes. The remnants of capitalism in the consciousness of people is a force which impedes the advancement of Soviet society toward communism.⁷

The admission that there are certain characteristics of man which keep cropping up and cannot be eradicated without constant vigilance and systematic effort implicitly denies, among other things, that there is any basic desire of people to have something tangible which they can call their own, not necessarily owning a factory or a whole apartment house, but possessing something much more modest that would serve the important psychological function of giving an individual a sense of personal independence and the opportunity to experience more fully the consequences of action based on personal choice.

9. That there is no need for people to form any groups or participate in any social organizations except those prescribed and controlled by the Party. (*Implicit*)

The Communist Party is aiming for "collective" action, not community action which binds people together with love and affection. A "community" cannot be superimposed; it requires participation and the choice of goals and the courses of action to be taken to achieve those goals and a consequent ego-involvement in the whole procedure. This, obviously, is something that would be dangerous to let loose.

As an example of the way in which Soviet leaders keep an eagle eye on organizations to see that they do not

develop any autonomous goals of their own, we may cite the conclusions of an American scholar who made a careful review of the *Komsomols*:

Beneath all the demands, including the frequent exhortations to spontaneity and initiative, lay this principle: nothing, no matter how conducive it was to the enthusiasm, vigor, size, or influence of the Komsomol, could be tolerated if it appeared to present the slightest impediment to control by the Party chiefs. . . . Why? Because behind those proposals lurked the possibility that the League might assume an intermediate directing function, might become a "Young Communist Party," guiding broader mass organizations which would embrace the bulk of youth. . . . The Party insisted that the Komsomol must itself be a "mass" organization—"mass" in the sense that it must be as large as possible, consistent with the maintenance of Party control; and "mass" in the sense that it must be too large and too loose to develop a cohesiveness and a mind of its own.⁸

10. That people have no need of religion or of any belief in God. (*Explicit*)

This well-known tenet of Marxism-Leninism was illustrated in *Pravda* which published on February 17, 1960, a letter in which a Soviet professor of theology indicated why he had decided that religion and science were incompatible. The professor wrote that after studying the history of the Bible, the history of science, the way in which religion was used in the interests of capitalism, etc., he

had concluded that the "negation of religion is the only true way."

11. That the consciousness and the characteristics of individuals in bourgeois and capitalist societies are inevitably in conflict between different members of such societies, since individuals must identify themselves with one side or the other in the productive process. (*Explicit*)

The assumption is that in the socialist state there is need for only one party since there are only two occupational groups—the peasants and the workers—and these are in a very friendly alliance with each other. In the bourgeois world, however, there is need for more than one party, because in bourgeois society there exist several classes at war against each other. It is therefore clear that Soviet democracy is more democratic than bourgeois democracy in spite of having only one party. The so-called political democracy and parliamentary methods of bourgeois societies are considered a sham, since workers are seldom elected to parliament and parliamentary debates are essentially a struggle between rival groups of capitalists.

Soviet leaders therefore feel that the leaders of Western democracy are motivated almost entirely by their class interests and that "American rulers," for example, cannot help but have hostile intentions vis-à-vis the Soviet government.

This view is generally maintained in the Soviet press and radio which tend *not* to refer to "people" of any nation as reprehensible, militaristic, imperialistic, etc., but reserve this criticism to the "ruling circles" of a nation.

12. That people in non-Communist societies cannot be and are not charitable; that what passes as "charity" in non-Communist societies is essentially a ruse to fool workers and keep them submissive and happy. (*Explicit*)

The *Great Soviet Encyclopaedia* defines "charity" as "help granted hypocritically by representatives of the dominant class in societies of exploiters to a certain fraction of the disinherited sectors of the population in order to deceive the workers and to divert their attention from the class struggle." ⁹

13. That individual differences are determined largely by a person's place and role in society and by the productive process, and that differential rewards are to be determined accordingly. (*Explicit*)

There is somewhat of a dual approach to the problem of individual differences: one being ideological, the other realistic and practical. It is the firm belief of Soviet leaders that under Communism the new man will develop entirely new characteristics and values—individual motives and selfishness will be entirely abolished and men will live for the social group alone. However, to be practical in the period of transition from socialism to Communism, only Communist Party members and Party workers can be expected to react in the truly Communist way. These people are expected to love work for its social usefulness, to do gladly and cheerfully any work that has to be done. They are expected to live only for the good of the collective or the society, to disregard personal desires, to fear

no difficulties and hardships, and to be free from all personal ambition. All this is embraced by the concept of *partiinost*—the “party attitude.” Other members of society in the meantime have to be handled more realistically. Although they are also urged to love toil for its own sake and to live for the collective and abandon personal desires, it is acknowledged that they still need individual incentives; hence the call for the individual material participation of the workers and peasants in the results of their work through various incentive systems.

Deviations from the characteristics that human nature is supposed to have are explained away by the class to which an individual belongs with the supplementary notion that such an individual may be influenced by the “vestiges of capitalism.”

From the point of view of Soviet leaders, the different characteristics of human nature exhibited by people stem from the diverse economic-social conditions in which these people find themselves. In a capitalistic society, each of the existing, separate classes or social groups has certain character traits typical for the overwhelming majority of individuals in any given class. While allowance is made for some distinction and individuality and dissimilarity of character of specific individuals within the framework of each group or class, there is the clear belief that the *principal* character traits of members of every class or group are more or less the same in the majority of cases. Some of the groups thus differentiated in a capitalist society, together with their characteristics, are:

Aristocracy—contempt for work, haughtiness, light-mindedness, wastefulness.

Bourgeoisie—practicality, excessive personal ambition, ruthlessness, mercilessness, lack of broader ideals, avariciousness, cruelty.

Petit bourgeoisie—cautiousness, suspiciousness, industriousness, irresoluteness, vindictiveness, superstitiousness.

Intelligentsia—indecisiveness, sentimentality, nervousness, impetuosity, lack of discipline, individualism.

Proletariat—magnanimity, courage and steadfastness, generosity, perseverance, unselfishness, industriousness, discipline.

Lumpen proletariat—servility, cynicism, nervousness, corruptness, instability.

It appears that this schematization of the "typical" traits people have according to their class affiliation not only is a matter of theory but has considerable influence on the practical activity of the Party and on its propaganda. Hence the idealization of members of some groups and the defamation of members of other groups. The belief of Communists in the validity of such characterizations seems to range from the absolute and naïve acceptance of such a differentiation by some, an acceptance which allows for no individual exceptions, to a more flexible view of the more refined and sophisticated Communists who regard the division as a mass phenomenon, suitable for theoretical, propaganda and political purposes but having no complete validity for an analysis of the individual members of each group. In any event, however, whether "naïve" or more "refined," confirmed Communists consider the principle of such a division as proper and the general characterization of members of each group as correct. Hence to cast doubt on any of these

"models" of human nature is regarded by the faithful as a kind of heresy. The differentiation of individuals into these different groups with their accompanying characteristics is most faithfully reflected in the approved Soviet literary output.

It should also be noted here that there is little emphasis given in Soviet psychology to the study of individual differences as there is within psychology in democratic states where individuals are important *per se*.

Such are the apparent threads in the fabric of assumptions that constitutes the view of Soviet leaders about man. In the next chapter we proceed to an examination of the assumptions concerning ways and means for manipulating people.

4 THE PROCESS OF MANIPULATION

Assumptions concerning the Methods of Guiding the Masses

The process of indoctrination in the Soviet Union is never haphazard but, on the contrary, is self-consciously systematic. It is guided by skilled, able, and highly disciplined Party members whose effort is devoted to the building of Communist morality and who have enormous resources at their disposal, including the whole machinery of education and all mass media of communication together with the Party apparatus and the multifarious groups and organizations it penetrates and controls.

In this chapter we review what appear to be the psychological assumptions on which the methods of indoctrination are based. Once again we call attention to the differentiation between explicit and implicit assumptions, since the twisting and accommodation of implicit assumptions and the resulting discrepancy between them and the more open and publicly stated assumptions as they are translated into programs and pressures may help to account for what we have described as the mild schizophrenia that characterizes many citizens of the Soviet

State. In this condition individuals behave and believe as they feel they should and at the same time try to behave and believe in ways more congenial and "natural" to them.

1. That Party goals cannot be achieved if any personal independence is tolerated; that the Party aim is to create "self-guided" helpers of the State; that "discipline," "initiative," "freedom" are all to be defined and thought of within this context and that all of them refer to what is "necessary" as "necessity" is defined and dictated by the Party; that a particularly useful method of breaking down personal independence is the systematic use of humiliation. (*Implicit*)

If a person looks at things in a different way from that of the Soviet leaders, then that person is looking at things incorrectly. And if he is looking at things incorrectly, he must be appropriately treated until he has the proper view of reality. (It was significant to note, for example, how often Soviet psychologists and Pioneer leaders used the Russian equivalent of our word for "treatment" in describing what we would have ordinarily called "education.")

Individual feelings, of course, divert personal energy and effort from the achievement of common major social goals and such undirected personal feelings are to be regarded as signs of weakness or lack of self-control. In the Soviet view, the truly independent and autonomous individual is one who willingly submits to and accepts the collective will as expressed by the Communist Party. As

indicated earlier, the only truly free individual is the one who recognizes necessity.

In this connection a subtle distinction is drawn by the Soviets between "independence" and "self-standingness." Students, Young Pioneers, and *Komsomol* members are indoctrinated to be "self-standing," but never "independent." A "self-standing" individual is one who will be a "self-guided helper" of the Party and the State.¹ "Every *Komsomol* member is obliged to fulfill irreproachably the decisions of the Party," states one of the rules of the *Komsomol* organization.² A review of the punishments, the honors, and the codes of the Young Pioneers emphasizes that the individual member's enthusiastic approval of group norms must become the major motivation for that individual.

It is appropriate here to refer once more to the discussion of "initiative" by two prominent Soviet educators. Initiative, they write, is "a discipline not of simple obedience, but a discipline linked with the effort to obey the order, direction, or command received in the best possible way and, even more than that, linked with the readiness always to do your duty without waiting for an order or a reminder but showing 'initiative.'"³ When asked about this conception of initiative, a former Communist official said that this would certainly be believed by most people who are what he called "primitive" Communists, meaning individuals in a Communist society who have not developed very far. He went on to say that he and other Communist colleagues of his who were high Party functionaries would not have disagreed with this statement in the way a Westerner would have disagreed with it, but would have disagreed because the word "command" would for them have been superfluous, since they

themselves would know what was "necessary." Hence, for advanced Party members, initiative is an independent search for the best way to fulfill the Communist revolutionary goals which are known to them. For everyone, "initiative" must always be "directed initiative."

When a group of Soviet psychologists were asked in Moscow to give us some examples of what they regarded as motives, they cited in offhand fashion "the realization of one's social obligations; the desire to get a certain position in certain groups; the desire to win a prize from the State or from some valued collective group." In reporting on his experiences at a Soviet boarding school, a former student said:

. . . the invasion of privacy was complete—every thought and act of each student was the active interest of everyone else and especially of fellow brigade members. It was stressed that privacy, or egocentrism as it was called, was a vicious transgression of Communist morality; whereas "collectivism," or the total submergence of individuality and the repudiation of private thought, was the ideal. It was the ideal each student must strive for and for which he, in collaboration with the authorities, must drive his fellow students.⁴

If an individual's expression or behavior deviates too far from Party interests and accepted standards, ways are frequently devised to humiliate him, to break down his individuality, but at the same time presumably to allow him to re-create an individuality more in accordance with group norms and, in so doing, regain his self-esteem and respect. For example, a prominent Soviet educator has developed what is known as the "middle-of-the-room tech-

nique" to humiliate individual students, and this is now used in some of the boarding schools. Here the offender is put in the middle of the classroom and surrounded by his comrades. His crime is then publicly proclaimed, and his comrades are invited to comment and to criticize. After he gets a chance to say something, the collective then decides on the appropriate punishment. The director of one school in which an American visitor saw the technique used told her that grown-ups had to be present at such a session, since children often tended to be too hard on their comrades.

All Soviet children are expected to exhibit perfect conduct in the school, that is, to obtain the top mark of "5" for conduct if for nothing else. If conduct is not perfect and a student drops to "4," he is very likely to be put on probation and, if his conduct does not improve or if it drops even further, he may be expelled. Gold medals for graduating students are given to those who are perfect in everything, but it is noteworthy that the second highest honor, the silver medal, will not be awarded unless the student has been perfect in conduct, which means that he has demonstrated among other things the proper attitude toward the regime.

While Soviet educators indicate that they do not believe in humiliating anyone but only in "shaming" them into better behavior, the dividing line between these two feelings is undoubtedly a difficult one for the individual being "shamed" to distinguish. (Webster's dictionary defines "shame" as "to excite in [a person] a consciousness of guilt, impropriety, or unworthiness; to cover with reproach or ignominy; to bring into contempt." It defines "humiliate" as "to reduce to a lower position in one's

own eyes, or in the eyes of others; to injure the self-respect of; to humble, mortify.")

2. That once ideas and opinions are decided upon "objectively" by the Party, they are no longer a subject for discussion. (*Implicit*)

When the ideology has been officially interpreted by the leaders, all aspects of living which it encompasses take on an official direction, goal, or ethic and are no longer a subject for public discussion or for scientific investigation.

According to the Soviet view, human consciousness is "the distinctive capacity of human beings to respond to and to regulate their behavior by signals. Man is basically a signal-receiving animal. And since it is the State which calls the signals, an appropriate name for this theoretical new species of Soviet humanity would be 'state-directed man.' " ⁵ Along with this goes the assumption that any interpretation can be introduced or implemented by a profusion of different organs emitting the same verbal signals—the press, radio, various party and state organizations and set-ups, such as the people's courts, military brigades, brigades for Communist toil, etc. The familiar analogy that the leaders of the Party are like an individual who is playing an organ and can pull out various stops necessary to get a theme across is not too far-fetched.

All inquiry concerning human nature and social life in the Soviet Union is carefully supervised and directed by the Party. There is practically no such thing as sociology, social psychology, philosophy, political science, etc.,

as we understand these disciplines in the West. Scientific method as related to any scientific area is essentially defined as the concrete application of dialectical materialism to that science as interpreted by the leaders. Hence many types of empirical research pursued in democratic areas are completely forbidden. For example, when the subject of public-opinion surveys was brought up in a discussion at the Institute of Philosophy in Moscow, there was violent objection to such undertakings because opinions are only "subjective" and do not reflect the "objective" environment. A part of this general assumption is, of course, that individuals can soon get over changes in the Party line and will not be permanently disturbed by what may appear to others as the inherently capricious change that so often occurs—in other words, again, that individuals can learn to accept as personal goals what the Party decides are personal goals.

3. That since the characteristics of individuals and the goals they accept are and must be learned, the proper education of the masses at all levels and in all forms is of the utmost importance to the Party. The chief aim of Soviet education is to inculcate Communist morality. (*Explicit*)

It is worth noting that in Russia there is no single word for "education." Instead, there are four Russian words with four different meanings: (1) "systematic influence on the development of a child"; (2) "systematic influence on the development of a society in some respect"; (3) "the process of assimilating knowledge, instruction, enlightenment"; (4) "the combination of learning received as a

result of systematic education." The first definition clearly refers to the inculcation of morality, especially in children; the second definition is what we would call "indoctrination."

The decisive role in the formation of individual character clearly belongs to education. The specific tasks and methods of education are worked out through the Minister of Education and are mandatory for all teachers and pupils. The ends and goals of education in the Soviet Union are clear-cut and present no problems. They are "agreed on." The only problem is how best to do the teaching.

While the aims of Soviet education are listed in various ways at various times, the following four general goals are the most emphasized: (1) to build the Communist State in the Soviet Union and to march directly and swiftly to fulfill the apocalyptic vision and attain the radiant summits of Communism; (2) to overtake the United States; (3) to extend Communism throughout the world; and (4) to create the new Soviet man.

It should be pointed out that if we understand the basic assumptions of Soviet leaders, the Soviet educational system and its goals are highly appropriate. And from the point of view of the basic assumptions made by Soviet leaders, education is subject to constant critical scrutiny with an eye toward its improvement. And, of course, education is supported with enormous resources much greater than those proportionately provided for education by any Western democracy.

With respect to the new educational program, there is the clear assumption that the habits and goals trained into people, inculcated into them in childhood, will become the official goal and model toward which they strive

for the rest of their lives. The effort is to teach people the necessity and the value of work. The whole aim of the educational reform is to prepare people psychologically for a life of work.

An American authority on Soviet education, commenting on the "theses" adopted on November 12, 1958, by the Central Committee, pointed out:

. . . education received the attention of the Soviet Press far beyond anything seen in the United States at any time in the history of our public schools . . . the central object of the reforms proposed is the cultivation in the young of the elements of Communist morality. The Central Committee has been disturbed for years over the failure of the new Soviet man to appear—a man passionately devoted to the motherland, to the Party, and to "our cause," a man who protects public property as if it were his own, a man who regards labor in all its forms as a "matter of honor, a matter of glory, a matter of valor, and heroism," a disciplined man who "fears no obstacles and is able to overcome all obstacles." The total educational system which will emerge from the "theses" may be far more challenging than the system which has excited so many Americans.⁶

4. That since every individual's interest should coincide with the interest of the State, civil law with trial by jury, etc., is irrelevant and unnecessary in a Communist society, the whole authority of the State apparatus should be opposed to an individual accused of misdemeanor or crime,

and the individual must be nursed or cajoled back to conformity and usefulness. (*Implicit*)

Here are two relevant statements about Soviet legal thinking by outside observers:

In what is now known as criminal, administrative or constitutional law, the parties are the State on the one hand and individuals on the other, two parties admittedly unequal with each other. At the basis of their relationship is not equality, but authority on one side and submission on the other. In addition, the idea underlying their relationship is that their interests coincide, and are not conflicting. In other words, the relationship between the State and the individual is lacking in both the elements which make law possible and necessary: equality and conflicting interests.⁷

In Russia every factory has its own "soviet" or committee, a sort of self-governing body through which the workers express their desires and needs. . . . And here is the frightening thing: if a committee decides that a certain person within its jurisdiction is a parasite, meaning that he is not earning his way or working as hard as he should, it can banish him to another territory within its boundaries. There is no appeal to any judicial tribunal, for the law courts have no jurisdiction whatsoever in these cases.⁸

5. That an individual's thought and action are guided and molded by language and words and that, therefore, no

inconsistencies or conflicts of meanings can be tolerated.
(*Explicit*)

Party leaders and workers in all phases of Soviet life must constantly be highly self-conscious of the decisive, continuous, and directed influence of language so the proper character traits will develop in Soviet people. Through the control of information and news, a self-consistent influence must be exerted on character formation.

The most systematic account of the function of language has been given in the Soviet Union by psychologists who have elaborated Pavlov's conception of language as the "second signal system." For example, in the book called *The Characteristics of Man*, two Soviet psychologists write:

It is impossible to conceive of material or moral-political interrelations without that most important means of "inter-people signalization," i.e., speech. That is why continuous influencing of the second signal system in the process of relations between people is of decisive influence for the formation of universal, generalized associations, which define the stereotyped traits of behavior as well as, in particular, the flexible, creative relations of the person to external conditions. That through speech signals, a person acquires behavior norms and is guided by them in various life situations. The signals of the second signal system . . . play the part of starting mechanisms of behavior. At the same time, second signal connections determine the direction and manner of self-regulation of behavior, corresponding to the external demands and to the system of relations which is in the process of formation.⁹

6. That fear is an effective means of social control and should be deliberately used when necessary. (*Implicit*)

As is well known, a variety of ways have been devised in the Soviet Union to instill fear in the individual and to pressure him into conformity and obedience. So many people apparently are afraid in the Soviet Union that when a citizen resorts to denial, outright lying, or claims of ignorance, his behavior is considered perfectly understandable and normal by most other citizens.

7. That since the consciousness of the masses is so significantly affected by the meanings and interpretations that reach them, all material that may be seen or heard by the masses must be carefully screened and directed so there are no inconsistencies or conflicts. This is to be done through propaganda, censorship, and Party control of literature, mass media, etc. (*Explicit*)

In order to achieve Party purposes and to create the new Soviet man, it is essential that the Party protect all individuals at all ages from all competing, hostile, and alien influences. This precept was laid down in unequivocal terms by Lenin in 1905:

The principle of Party literature consists in the fact that not only may literature not be an instrument of gain for individuals or groups, but also in that it may not be an individual matter at all. It cannot be independent of general proletarian activities. Down with non-Party writers! Down with literary supermen! Lit-

erature must become a part of proletarian activities in general; it must become a wheel and a screw of the single great social democratic mechanism which is driven by the vanguard of the whole working class. Literature must become a component part of organized, planned, unified social democratic Party work.¹⁰

Lenin's view is clearly reflected over fifty years later in the official justification given by the Soviet Minister of Culture for the decision not to publish *Dr. Zhivago*: "Our publishing houses publish literature that helps to build a new world, a new society which we call the Communist society. If the work is written on a plane that is not useful for our society and has no use for our society, why should we publish anything of that nature?"¹¹

The main purpose and duty of Soviet censorship is to prevent the formation of public opinion as distinct from official opinion that is superimposed on the public by the Party monopoly of mass communications media. The whole pattern of current controls over communication, including person-to-person communication, seems actuated mainly by a desire on the part of Soviet authorities to prove that life in the Soviet Union is better in every way than it is in the United States and other "bourgeois" countries. Although this purpose is well known to students of Soviet affairs, it is a factor of such major importance that it should be mentioned here. Recent illustrations of this theme include the refusal to permit Vice President Nixon's Boeing 707 jet plane to fly beyond Moscow; the playing down almost to a point of non-existence of President Eisenhower's receptions abroad during his trips of December, 1959, and March, 1960.

Soviet literature in general is so restricted in its dimen-

sions and has such a singleness and immediacy of purpose that it can be likened to American commercial advertising. The various Communist writers' leagues and presses are essentially advertising agencies. The job of the Communist writer or journalist is to ballyhoo Communism as effectively as possible; he is a huckster and his product is an advertising blurb.

The Soviet rewriting of history textbooks is a well-known phenomenon which should be mentioned here as a reminder and by way of an example. Professor George Counts, with tongue in cheek, recently asked a Soviet educator why the Soviet history used in the tenth grade had been withdrawn from Soviet schools for the second semester of the academic year of 1955-1956. The answer of the educator was that it had been decided that "the history textbook was too abstract for the tenth grade." But after the text was rewritten in the summer of 1956, it was, of course, reintroduced. In the new edition the chapter on the great patriotic war had only one mention of Stalin, giving the date of his death. The previous edition in the same chapter had around fifty mentions of Stalin's name.

8. That if people's loyalties to the Party are to be created and sustained, all contacts and participations that individuals have as members of groups or publics must be so arranged that they will always be guided by and go through the Party. (*Explicit*)

The Soviet Union has been so organized that contact with the public can be made only through the Party.

The Party jealously guards its role as the only dispenser of ideological truth on which it has a monopoly. Any challenger of this official truth, any revisionism of the official ideology as it is interpreted at the moment must be destroyed.

9. That people must, however, have a sense of their own freedom and their own participation in creating their own standards and that this can be accomplished if the Party carefully rations such participation and channels and directs decisions. (*Implicit*)

We have referred earlier to the standard definition of freedom as "the recognition of necessity." An example of the way in which "freedom" is rationed and channeled is contained in an article discussing the question of whether or not young people should be encouraged to argue about the burning issues of the day. The article concludes that such discussions should be held since young people will argue on such issues anyway. The author points out that it is better to hold "planned discussions" with young people which will lead them to "correct" conclusions, and refers to Lenin's statement to the effect that the idea-content of a discussion is determined not by the theme or the program but by the framework of the discussion imposed by trained leaders.¹²

The new emphasis on "comradely courts" is apparently an attempt to increase the sense of participation and social criticism and to create the impression that people are setting their own standards. In his report to the Twenty-first Party Congress, Khrushchev said:

The time has come to pay more attention to the comradely courts which should be concerned mainly with the prevention of various types of infringements. They should handle not only questions of production but also questions of day-to-day living and questions of a moral character, facts of incorrect behavior on the part of members of the collective which permit divergence from the norms of public order.¹³

The right to send a case to the comradely courts belongs to the administration of the enterprise or office involved.

In this same vein a certain amount of criticism of official action is allowed and even encouraged to be published. This acts as a safety valve, doubtless in some cases corrects abuses and violations, but serves primarily to give the impression of public participation and of democracy.

10. That an individual can be given the illusion of choice or of having made his own decision if he is conditioned to give himself orders that have been set by the Party but have, through conditioning, been so learned and accepted by the individual that he will then essentially tell himself what to do and why. (*Implicit*)

"Self-discipline," we have pointed out, means for the Soviets adjusting one's own purposes and identifications to the Party and completely accepting Party values; it does not mean individual spontaneity or the individual assumption of responsibility on the basis of his own personal choice.

Experiments are going on in Soviet educational psychology to study how a child may be taught to verbalize a command to himself. If the child learns effectively enough a command he is taught by others, then he will subsequently carry out the learned act with a feeling that he is doing this voluntarily on his own and not on the order of the authority who taught him.¹⁴

11. That since individuals do want a sense of participation in the direction of their living, they must therefore be allowed and encouraged to participate in the discussion of Party decrees, goals, etc., even though these decrees and goals have been fixed in advance. This sustains the illusion of choice and the illusion of participation so important to the masses. (*Explicit*)

In its discussion of "Communist education of the Workers," the *Short Philosophical Dictionary* states: "by bringing the broad working masses into the government of the country, the Soviet State is educating the builders of Communism in the feeling of responsibility for the fate of the country, developing independence and initiative in them, and forming active fighters for the triumph of Communism."¹⁵

An editorial entitled "The Communist Party—The Organizer and Inspirer of the Building of Communism in the USSR," appearing in *Kommunist* in February, 1956, stated:

In the development of the creative activity of the masses it is of enormous importance to have them par-

ticipate in the discussions on and the solution of the most important problems of economic development; i.e., the Party and the government should turn directly to the people. The Soviet people consider the building of Communism their own most urgent and private affair; they participate actively in the working out of the plans for the economic development of the motherland and fulfill these themselves, accomplishing heroic deeds of labor, competing among themselves for the fulfillment of the plans ahead of time.¹⁶

In his report to the Twenty-first Party Congress, Khrushchev said:

In recent years the Party has systematically submitted the more important questions of Communist construction to nationwide discussion. . . . The meetings of working people in the Party conferences and congresses showed that our Party and the entire Soviet people unanimously approved the control figures and enthusiastically agreed to the Seven Year Plan of the majestic program of Communist construction in our country. [Stormy applause.]¹⁷

While the restriction of choice to the affirmation of a single proposition, set of decrees, or slate of officials to be "elected" may quite naturally strike any democratically oriented person as an absurdity, it should be emphasized that the well-organized and intensive propaganda of the regime for the holding of "discussions" or for getting out the vote apparently actually does give most Soviet citizens the feeling that they are participating to some extent in decisions, in the direction of their own destinies, and

that they are not merely having policies crudely imposed upon them.

12. That the Party must take care to create symbols and methods of participation which will bring about and sustain allegiance to the Party; that elections, demonstrations, the use of honorifics are effective means to this end. (*Implicit*)

Soviet leaders have devised what is probably the most systematic, studied, and highly publicized system of honorifics ever known in history. There is a long list of honors available to individuals, to collectives, and to institutions. While this is well known, it deserves underscoring for its psychological importance. Among other orders are: the Order of Lenin, the Order of the Red Star, the Order of the Red Banner, the Order of the Labor Red Banner. In many instances, those who receive such an honor will get up to two-thirds increase in monthly pensions, special educational privileges for their children, etc. Furthermore, these privileges can, in some instances, be inherited.

Anyone who has observed the celebration in Red Square on November 7 will have been impressed by the fact that nearly all people in the square are participants in the demonstration, that few are spectators. This and comparable demonstrations are in effect devices whereby people can renew their oath of allegiance to the regime, even though it is well known that many of the demonstrators are under orders to participate. The standard Soviet calendar for 1960 lists the following days for commemoration, among many others. It should be noted how "pur-

positive" these special days are in terms of building the Communist society.

Day of Soviet Army and Navy	Feb. 23
International Woman's Day	Mar. 8
Day of International Solidarity of Toilers	May 1
Day of the Press	May 4
Day of the Radio	May 7
Day of Soviet Youth	June 26
Day of Metallurgy	July 17
Day of the Navy of the USSR	July 31
All-Union Day of the Railroad	Aug. 7
Day of Construction	Aug. 14
Day of the Air Fleet of the USSR	Aug. 18
Day of the Miner	Aug. 28
Day of the Tankists	Sept. 11
Day of the Birth of the <i>Komsomol</i>	Oct. 29

A further function of elections is that of providing an opportunity for agitation for close Party identification and allegiance.

13. That individuals will never really understand, identify with, or get satisfaction from any ideology unless they can experience in their own living the consequences of acting according to that ideology; that only in this way will the ideology become strongly and meaningfully embedded in consciousness; that only in this way will individuals be able to get a sense of pride, responsibility, confidence, and courage. Hence, the Party must devise, supervise, and control a variety of organizations to accommo-

date people of all ages and occupations within which they can participate effectively and get a feeling that they are achieving goals which they themselves set. (*Explicit*)

This vitally important precept was emphasized by Lenin in 1920 in a passage continually cited:

Without labor, and without struggle, book knowledge about Communism, obtained from Communist brochures and other writings, is absolutely worthless for it would continue the old gap between theory and practice. . . . The generation which is now fifteen years old and which in ten to twenty years will live in a Communist society must so conceive the aims of learning that every day in every village, in every city the young should actually perform some task of social labor, be it ever so small, be it ever so simple.¹⁸

In his speech to the Twenty-first Party Congress, Khrushchev carried on Lenin's theme:

Inculcation of the Communist ethic must be tied up with accomplishing the tasks of Communist construction. We have learned not only theoretically, but also from great life experience, the deep truth of scientific Communism that revolutionary practice plays a decisive role in changing the conditions of life and the views of people. Life—our Soviet reality—is the best training school, the most exacting teacher. A book of knowledge of Communist theses, knowledge divorced from life, is worthless. Upbringing must, above all, be organically linked with life, with production, with the

practical activity of the masses. The Party makes labor education of all the people, the development of a conscious, Communist attitude to work, the focus of all its educational activity. . . .¹⁹

And the same point is emphasized by leaders of the various organizations set up by the Party to orient people in all walks of life. Here, for example, is a statement taken from the textbook for senior pioneer leaders:

The leader in the consultation with the teacher must direct and organize public opinion of the Pioneer collective, help children orient themselves, and judge correctly the deeds of a comrade and adopt just and expedient resolutions. But the acquired knowledge must be applied in practice, in life, in toil for the happiness of society; Communist consciousness is really strong and meaningful only then, when it is expressed in practical Communist affairs, in Communist toil. And what is Communist toil? "Communist toil," said V. I. Lenin, "is unpaid toil for the benefit of society, toil undertaken not for absolving a definite duty, but voluntary toil, toil undertaken from the habit of working for the good of all, toil as a need of a living organism." ²⁰

14. That if the present is to have significance and meaning, it must be connected to hopes for the future and be seen as part of the future; that hopes must therefore be constantly created and manipulated. (*Implicit*)

From Lenin on down, Soviet leaders have regarded ideas as realities, believing that ideas are just as real in terms of their possible effect on the lives of people as is anything material that can be seen or heard or felt. In spite of the masses' ideological objections to "idealism," the assumption is further made that the masses will use these ideas as guiding stars in their daily living.

In a discussion of the recent educational theses, an American authority on Soviet ideology has stated:

Throughout the history of the Soviet regime the leadership has justified all policies by the Bolshevik version of the Marxian apocalypse—a vision of the swift coming of a domestic and world order which will surpass immeasurably in plenty, justice, fraternity, and beauty all that has gone before in human history, etc. . . . It is this vision which supposedly gives a kind of spiritual meaning to the Seven Year Plan and that is expected to inspire teachers to prepare the younger generation to work for and to live in the earthly "paradise" where each will receive "according to his needs."²¹

15. That people obviously aspire to greater material rewards and comforts and that these must be met as rapidly as possible. (*Explicit*)

It would probably be safe to say that, while the preservation of peace is the basic aspiration of most Soviet people, their second greatest aspiration is to live like Americans. Perhaps it would be more correct to say that the Soviet people, or at least the great majority of them who rather passively accept the official ideology, wish to

enjoy the comforts, luxuries, and conveniences and services which they associate with American material culture without at the same time experiencing the unemployment, high cost of medical care, racial prejudices, and other negative features of American life, as these are depicted in their news media. One could almost say that the goal of Soviet people is "Americanization without capitalism."

16. That individuals should be rewarded according to their use to the State; that privileges, rank, power, etc., should be decided accordingly and that all rewards should have this symbolic function. (*Implicit*)

It is essential to note that the most important type of reward in the Soviet Union is one that has clearly visible symbolic significance and all the atmosphere that goes with the "status seekers" in a growing and mobile society—automobiles, paid vacations, summer houses, honors, and prizes. Behind all of this, of course, is the attempt on the part of the regime to make those people who are presumably contributing to Party goals feel that they are appreciated, needed and important.²²

Nevertheless, of course, rank and income in the Soviet Union are very closely associated. When an American tourist asked a Soviet citizen whether or not money was the most important aspiration of most Soviet people, the citizen replied, "Money is the most important thing anywhere."

With respect to the intellectuals, particularly the scientists who are so important to the Party's purposes, the assumption seems to be that if the regime pours enough

money and favor on them, this elite group will be content.

We should also make note here that status in the Soviet Union is much more related to power than it is in the United States.

And finally, as many observers have pointed out, there is a very wide range of, and rigid differentiation of people into, various social classes within the Soviet Union. And the trend in this direction, incidentally, is not following Lenin's prediction that there would be less and less differentiation within the socialist state.

17. That all human behavior that is "decent" is to be equated with Communist morality and that any human behavior that is "indecent" is to be labelled non-Communist or bourgeois morality. (*Implicit*)

It is significant to notice in the many discussions of Communist "morality" that this term is used to describe the practices of individuals in almost any modern culture that would universally be associated with "decency"—virtues such as cleanliness, thoughtfulness of others, sobriety, healthful and moderate living, good working habits, fair play, faithfulness to family members and friends, affection for children, industry, etc.

By contrast, individuals in Western society are often described as the reverse of the Soviet man. But this is, of course, not the fault of the individual himself, but the consequences of the demoralized life he must lead because of his surroundings: he is compelled to work to achieve only a meager standard of living; he is not interested in socially useful labor and improving the con-

ditions of society as a whole because he must be so interested in getting what he can for himself; he is so preoccupied with material gains that he has no spiritual values; if he is poor or sick, he is abandoned to his fate, etc.

As everyone knows, the course of Soviet indoctrination has not always had smooth sailing. Sometimes storms have been violent and dramatic, and all the world has eventually learned of them; at other times only knowledgeable observers of the Soviet scene have sensed smaller waves of discontent. In the next chapter we review the weaknesses apparent in some of the assumptions concerning the nature of man that may have caused some of the troubles.

5 || TROUBLES ENCOUNTERED

|| The Weaknesses of Some Assumptions

In this chapter we shall try to point out some of the psychological factors which appear to lie behind certain difficulties Soviet leaders have run into in their gigantic effort to transform the nature of millions of human beings. There appears to be a fundamental weakness in a system which claims that socioeconomic conditions are the determinants of human characteristics but at the same time finds itself obliged to continue so vigorously its protective guidance and its systematic indoctrination within the Soviet orbit where, presumably, "correct" socioeconomic relations obtain even if they are not yet perfect. Sometimes the assumptions of Soviet leaders appear to be invalid; at other times they seem inadequate. In either case they place limiting conditions or lend false emphases to operations that must sooner or later be remedied to avoid severe or lasting trouble.

1. Soviet leaders have to believe what they believe. Their assumptions therefore filter out much that they do

not want to perceive and may blind them to certain conditions that they should notice in their own interests.

Soviet leaders are essentially prisoners of their own ideology and of their own prejudices. If they questioned their beliefs, they would lose their position, their reason for being. They cannot afford not to believe what they do—for example, that capitalism cannot work, that capitalism thrives on exploitation and war, that capitalism cannot evolve into something else, and that Western leaders are basically hostile.

Hence, in so far as Communist leaders may be impressed by what they see or learn of the Western world, they may be expected only to reassert more forcefully their own beliefs and prejudices.

The ideology is needed by Soviet leaders so they can define and justify their power, so they can have a weapon to use against all enemies and heretics, so they can be provided with a homogeneous base. If Soviet leaders allowed any other ideology, they would destroy their own claim to a superior ideology and lose their effectiveness both among their own people and among underdeveloped nations. Like an inverted pyramid, the Soviet Union would topple if the top were much disturbed.

Leonhard reports that "in conversation with people from the West an official who is wrestling with the severest internal doubts will stubbornly, and apparently with complete conviction, defend the official party line."¹ In discussing what had oppressed him about the Soviet system, about his doubts and unpleasant memories, he says he resisted and suppressed these as much as he could "because they did not fit in with the picture of the world that had been inculcated in me, and because I did not

want them to interfere with my beliefs, my activities and my hopes." ²

Soviet leaders still apparently sincerely draw a distinction between the "ruling circles" and the "people" in Western democracies. For example, in a study of the Soviet propaganda image of the West, Ivan London noted that even at the height of the "hate American campaign," all stories of bestiality, etc., of American soldiers still carried the implication that the American people themselves were "fun loving, sociable, and industrious." ³ And one recalls Khrushchev's statement after visiting the United States to the effect that most of the American people were friendly and wanted peace with the clear implication that some individuals were still capitalistic warmongers, etc. In an editorial appearing in February, 1955, *Pravda* states: "In capitalist countries the interests of the government and the wishes of the people are two completely different matters." ⁴ In its article on John Dewey, the *Great Soviet Encyclopaedia* says: "In Dewey's opinion, any means are good for the bourgeoisie and their leaders which strengthen the position of capitalism and forestall social revolution. In pedagogy Dewey advocates methods of instruction which would aid in the education of energetic and enterprising defenders of capitalism imbued with the spirit of servility to capital and hatred for Communism." ⁵

2. Although Soviet ideology is generally accepted, even after forty years of indoctrination acceptance seems to be without real conviction or enthusiasm, and it cannot be said that the ideology has taken hold on people in such

a way that it would carry on undisturbed if controls were removed.

We should point out first that there seem to be two kinds of ideology in the Soviet Union: one, the accepted and the practiced ideology; and, two, the theoretical and rationalized ideology. This second kind of ideology people do not take too seriously. This fact was recognized in the decrees of the Central Committee of January 10, 1960, in which it was stated, "The main defect in Party propaganda still remains its separation both from life and the practice of building of Communism."

The prescription offered in the decrees for curing the defect consisted largely of more intensive propaganda, the use of certain new techniques, and other means. There was nothing in the prescription that indicated a recognition of the reasons for the basic difficulty faced, which is, simply stated, that people tend to react unfavorably toward the imposition by the state of rules that tell them what they should be like. It is notable that people seldom seem to be converted to Communism *after* Communism gets into power.

The danger facing Soviet leadership is not an imminent revolt to destroy the system, but rather a passive and apathetic attitude of its citizens toward it. The revolutionary élan has largely disappeared and may almost completely evaporate before long; the "spiritual" and psychological values and enthusiasm that revolutionary ideals provided will be forfeited in the increasing preoccupation with economic goals, catching up with the United States, etc.; hence, the concern of the true believers for the apathy they see.

With ideology gone, only the naked power of the leaders would remain, and then under any regime the goal would become that of staying in power possibly by creating crises, "threats to peace," in order to keep public opinion unified around some common goal. Winston Churchill remarked that "the doctrine of Communism is slowly being separated from the Russian military machine. Nations will continue to rebel against the Soviet colonial empire, not because it is Communist, but because it is alien and oppressive." ⁶

An insight into the situation that confronts Soviet leaders can be obtained by brief résumés of two recent Soviet novels. The harshness and cruelty of the conflict between the young generation and their parents and the helplessness of parents in handling adolescent children who defect is vividly portrayed in a 1959 novel, *Honesty*, by G. Medynsky. In the story, the son of a good and healthy home has been arrested for assault and battery. The mother is dumbfounded, and, in trying to explain to herself how this could happen, she says, "I am afraid of everything because I don't know anything. Why is it that I don't know anything any more?" She continues, "They keep saying the parents are guilty." She hints that the trouble is with a system which has increasingly failed to provide and support youth with emotional, intellectual, and moral standards—a system which is supposed to mold people properly but doesn't. From her point of view, the son had always been a "good" boy.

He never as much as permitted himself to smoke in my presence or to swear. He was a nurse to the younger ones, my baby sitter and my helper. Every summer he

went to camp and was always awarded prizes for exemplary behavior and for sports. He joined the *Komsomol*. And precisely as a member of the *Komsomol*, he was drawn into the evil business. Why? . . . Why was I different? . . . Wait, wait, why is it that I didn't steal and cheat? And how did we grow up? We were raised in the time of famine. But we lived with the revolutionary spirit, we lived in a lofty way. And we attended *Komsomol* meetings. And the meetings were interesting. Not a single problem was brushed over, neither pertaining to our way of life nor to our work. . . . We examined everything from every possible side. And we decided everything according to our soul and according to our conscience. That was the beauty of it. Why, then, did my son fall under bad influence? All his life he was in our hands. But the moment he detached himself from us, he fell.⁷

In other words, young people who were raised during the revolutionary struggle in which they participated were good because they were equipped "inside," and not because their goodness was imposed on them by society.

During the public trial of the youth and his fellow bandits, one onlooker blames "the vestiges of capitalism." Another voice says,

Remnants, remnants! . . . Why do they exist? And how long will they exist? And why are the carriers of these remnants precisely the very youngest whose parents already were raised in our own Soviet period? Didn't they go to our schools, read our literature, listen to our radio? Weren't they members of our society? So why did all this bypass them?⁸

The first part of the novel ends with the youth sentenced to three years of labor camp, but there is a postscript by the editorial board indicating that the board is working with the author on the second part of the story, inviting readers to send in their reactions and promising that the youth will be saved, come what may and will be guided back into the fold. The most significant part of the postscript says that anyone who wants to be saved can be saved—saved by Soviet society. (It is interesting that this official view implies some sort of free choice as to whether or not a person wants to be saved.)

Another recent novel, *August Again*, by Nina Ivanter, tells how a young man rejects parental values because he feels they are merely handed down automatically and cannot become personal values one can use as guides. He finds himself living in an expanding moral vacuum as he struggles privately to work out a set of values.

In this story the hero, Boris, is a high school graduate, a good boy but stubborn. Boris greatly admires and loves his father, who is a high Party official. A new family moves into the neighborhood, and Boris discovers that the man of the family was an old friend of his father's. But the men do not speak to each other and the son, unable to get any information about the situation from his father, quarrels with him, is thrown out of the house, and goes to see the new neighbor. It turns out that Boris is even the namesake of the man, who had returned from a concentration camp in Siberia to which he had been committed during the Stalin regime. The son learns that the elder Boris had been sent away after being denounced at a Party meeting years ago. He assumes that his father denounced his old friend, but the friend assures him that this was not the case and that no defense or words from

the father could have helped him in the circumstances, and he urges the son to return and apologize to his father. The son is shocked and lets it be known that even if his whole family had had to suffer, his father should have spoken in favor of his old friend. When the boy asks the elder Boris why he and his father are not friends again, the man replies:

It's not me. It's he. He thinks I blame him. But no one can, no one has a right to blame him. Believe me, my friend, he could not have done a thing at the time. One man couldn't do anything. It was necessary that the Party, the Party itself put everything in order. This I knew even over there. I believed in it. . . . And the Party did. And now listen to me: there isn't a man in the world who has the right to accuse your father. Remember this, please.

So the young man returns to ask his father for forgiveness: "I shouldn't have done that," he says. "There isn't a person who has the right to accuse you."

"There is," the father replies. "There is such a person. I myself." The son resumes a family relationship with the father, but the new relationship is no longer based on respect but on pity.⁹

3. The assumption that advances in material standards of living will themselves be sufficient to reconcile people to controls (to "unfreedom") is not a tenable assumption; many people rebel if they cannot themselves participate in defining what *pravda* ("truth" and "justice") refers to.

A serious weakness of the point of view of Soviet leaders is the implication of their "materialistic" philosophy that the psychological world of an individual (his value system, his "spiritual" side) is not sacred and that if it gets in the way, it must be destroyed. Soviet ideology holds that "materialism" is the sole creator and determinant of an individual's outlook on life; it gives no recognition to the possibility that there are individual purposes characteristic of human beings and that any society will be ultimately successful only in so far as it enables people to carry out these purposes successfully.

As we have seen, the Soviet man is supposed to become the embodiment of all possible virtues—a goal which seems clearly incompatible within an atmosphere which attempts to control the moral impulses of man in accordance with the daily necessities that the Party may have in mind. The point was made by Milosz in his *The Captive Mind*:

The stage of fully realized Communism is the "holy of holies." It is Heaven, one dare not direct one's eyes toward it. Yet if one dared to visualize that Paradise, he would find it not unlike the United States in periods of full employment. He would find (granting the alleviation of fear, which is improbable) the masses living physiologically, profiting from the material achievements of their civilization. But their spiritual development would meet an insuperable obstacle in a doctrine which considers its aim to be the liberation of man from material cares toward something which it, itself, defines as sheer nonsense.¹⁰

In decrees described as "Central Committee proposals for economic incentives to increase the material interests

of the workers in production," approved in June, 1959, there is an appeal to "workers, collective farmers, the Soviet intelligentsia, and all working people of the Soviet Union to give more self-sacrificing work toward the task of overcoming the difficulties."¹¹ A close student of Soviet affairs gives it as his impression that—

. . . the reform idea with which it (the U.S.S.R.) has been operating under the leadership of Khrushchev does not envisage the new period as one of a new "un-binding" of society. . . . The regime, it would appear, looks to a rise in the material standard of consumption as a means of reconciling the Russian people to unfreedom in perpetuity. But it is very doubtful that a policy of reform operating within these narrow limits can repair the rupture between the state and society which is reflected in the revival of the image of dual Russia. . . . It goes on attempting to square the circle, to make the system altering it. This is the dilemma of Russia today. In 1857, when the post-Nicholaeian reform period was still in the incipient stage, Herzen wrote in his paper *Kolokol*: "The government corrects this or that particular situation, but the principle, the idea out of which all our radical abuses spring, remains untouched."¹²

The desire to push away from materialism and to avoid enslavement to the god of work with its dehumanization in personal terms is also shown in the parts of the diary of the young *Komsomol* leader (Golovinsky) who notes that work cannot be a self goal.

Work, especially creative work, is wonderful. But I find a talented engineer-inventor repulsive who lacks

the ability to enjoy the rain, the rowing in a boat, wandering aimlessly around, chess or music; the laughter of children in the garden, or fishing, an argument about *War and Peace* or a boxing match, an encounter with a new and original person or the accomplishments of microbiology. Instead he possesses an extraordinarily developed ability to draft more and more perfect details of various harvesting combines. These combines will bring much bread to him too. This means that he himself will have more food, suits, rooms, and he will enlarge his opportunity to design even more perfect combines. But in this case he himself is simply a detail of these combines and *not a person*.¹³

It is interesting to speculate, incidentally, as to why the official organ of The Young Communist League would publish excerpts from this diary, since Soviet newspapers do not publish an account of something just because it happens, but because some purpose will be served. The most plausible explanations seem to be that Soviet officials feel they "must" publish certain self-expressions to give some lip service to freedom and that the publication of such a document will at the same time serve as a warning to others. Undoubtedly the passages published from this diary were carefully selected.

Some of the consequences of the imposition of a uniform, state-defined ethical standard revealed themselves significantly during the period of 1955 and 1956 when rigid censorship was removed from Soviet literature. From the end of the war until this period the main output of Soviet literature consisted either of endless and shameless eulogies of Stalin or of foreign political invectives or ballads about the glories of factories and the *Kolkhoz*; the theme of individualism in any shape or form was left

out of Soviet novels and poetry. But during the rather miraculous, if temporary, free period of 1955 and 1956, individualism returned as a recurring theme. Significantly, for example, the verb "to go" turned up in the first person—"I go" or "I am going," thus reflecting an individual acting on his own. The word "half-truth" appeared. Also during this period the importance of personal "time" appears—the idea that "a minute has gone by—how dare I leave it empty." In other words, people were no longer marching collectively but one by one, all alone, and the restless poet stalked out into the night with the knowledge that the official textbook truth was dead, in full awareness that he might not find his own personal truth and with fear that he might mistakenly accept some half-truth, some half-measure. Characteristically, the theme of many poems during this period was the theme of personal integrity.¹⁴

For example, in a long narrative poem, *Station Winter*, published in October, 1956, the poet Evtushenko wrote:

. . . Let us think about big things and small
 So as to live deeply,
 not in some which ever way.
 That which is great cannot cheat us.
 But people are apt to cheat greatness.
 I don't want to justify impotence. . . .
 Yes, truth is good, but happiness is better.
 Though, just the same, there is no happiness
 without truth.¹⁵

In another poem published during this same period, the poet Kirsanov invents a new heart since hearts in the Soviet Union have turned to stone. He writes:

Everywhere stores were offering
Hearts out of tin or rubber,
To be blown up, with a button to press,
Squealing hearts, and stuffed hearts
With inscriptions "for good luck."
Lies in the form of hearts were sold
Shamelessly. . . .¹⁶

The poet then expresses his longing for the possibility
of an individual to play his own creative role:

I long for audacity
in thought
sound
color
I long for an idea
born out of exaggeration
I want that everything
should seem
like first love
that we should
be satiated
with faith and trust
so that we should
no longer live
like petitioners
behind numb doors.¹⁷

In submitting the blueprint to the authorities for a
new type of heart, the poet gets mixed up with all kinds
of red tape, stalling, hypocrisy and obstacles. Significantly,
one Party comrade tells him "without directive, no
thoughts should be born."

4. Since very little privacy of life or of expression is condoned, there is a loneliness, the generation of a "double-self," a distrust and suspicion among many people, especially intellectuals and youths.

A distinguished British philosopher has pointed out:

. . . in Communist practice the personal is subordinated to the functional to a point at which the defence of the personal becomes itself a criminal activity. . . . The state is then compelled to perform the functions of a church (for which by its nature it is radically unfitted) and its efforts to do so will produce, the more rapidly the more wholehearted they are, a crisis of the personal.¹⁸

Djilas contends that while forms of discrimination, such as race, caste, nationality, etc., "may crush a human being physically . . . ideological discrimination strikes at the very thing in the human being which is perhaps most peculiarly his own."¹⁹ He continues:

. . . a citizen in the Communist system lives oppressed by the constant pangs of his conscience, and the fear that he has transgressed. He is always fearful that he will have to demonstrate that he is not an enemy of socialism, just as in the Middle Ages a man constantly had to show his devotion to the church. . . . In the Communist system, insecurity is the way of life for the individual. The state gives him the opportunity to make a living, but on condition that he submit.²⁰

In a survey of the cultural trends in the Soviet orbit, one analyst describes a *Kollektiv* as:

. . . a conglomeration of isolated, lonely, mutually suspicious individuals whose only alternative to futile martyrdom was humiliating dissimulation. How difficult it was to wear a mask may be gauged from the long list of outwardly loyal citizens who were "unmasked" for trifling deviations from standard formulae.²¹

A private individual in the Soviet Union cannot undertake to initiate social change. This is the role of the Communist Party. Since individual loyalties are measured in terms of Party loyalty, there is an unusual amount of distrust and suspicion as contrasted to trust and confidence between and among individuals in the Soviet Union. This may, incidentally, be one of the contributing factors for what Barghoorn has called "Soviet technomania" which enables an individual to pursue his love of learning and study and at the same time escape from the reality of daily life and struggle into a world of applied science.

5. Unless a person has completely identified with the Party and is willing to follow its instructions without hesitation, he cannot achieve a sense of personal dignity and worth if he is being constantly humiliated.

While this is somewhat of a "self-evident" truth, which anyone can test in his own experience, it is worth noting here in passing. It runs through Imre Nagy's report *On Communism*:

What sort of political morality is there in a public life where contrary opinions are not only suppressed but punished with actual deprivation of livelihood; where those who express contrary opinions are expelled from society . . . the leaders have made virtues of self-abasement, cowardice, hypocrisy, lack of principle, and lies . . . an atmosphere of suspicion and revenge is banishing the fundamental feature of socialist morality, humanism; in its stead, cold inhumanity is appearing in public life.²²

6. Propaganda slogans and controls are abstract, boring, and difficult to apply on an individual basis since the "masses" are individuals with their own unique experiences and characteristics. Soviet indoctrination by its very nature cannot be the "heart-to-heart business" the 1960 propaganda decrees say it should be.

In his *Brave New World Revisited*, Aldous Huxley writes that "in all the world's higher religions, salvation and enlightenment are for individuals. The Kingdom of Heaven is within the mind of a person, not within the collective mindlessness of a crowd."²³ And one has the feeling that in the Soviet Union people are not given the opportunity to behave like real human beings, but, instead, are admonished to be somewhat like actors, of more or less skill, playing their expected stylized role as human beings.

Yet in most of their living, human beings are relatively unencumbered by the need to be consistent in terms of any established set of abstractions. People are primarily concerned with their own personal problems and are in

general not able to connect them to the larger abstractions of an ideology; hence, the frequent report that Soviet citizens are suffering from sheer boredom, are starved for new sensations as a result of the endless routine of political indoctrination they encounter in the press, the radio, the theater, and literature.

There is also a lack of consistency between the experiences people have had or are having in Soviet society and the intellectual abstractions being taught them in which they are supposed to believe or which they must give the impression of believing or of praising in order to gain acceptance or promotion, even though, in so doing, they lower themselves both in their own estimation and in the estimation of their peers.

This inconsistency or contradiction may be further differentiated psychologically into two types: first, an inconsistency between the "positive" symbols (such as "proletariat," "collective," "Soviet democracy," etc.) that are supposed to describe what is good, laudable, and workable *and* the facts of life as they are experienced; and, second, an inconsistency or contradiction between what "negative" symbols ("the West," "bourgeois democracy," "individualism," "private property," etc.) are supposed to stand for and the way people learned from experience that these "negative" forces are by no means the cause of the shortcomings of Soviet life.

If living were only a matter of *reacting* to a fixed environment, of being conditioned to it, then Soviet materialist ideology would work. But as soon as we bring in the idea of choice, of new satisfactions, of the desire to experience what an individual senses potentially is out there in a changing environment, together with the fact

that individuals themselves participate in the creation of their own environment through their own choices and efforts—when we consider all this, then straight conditioning or adjustment to conditions imposed by those who engineer things the way they think “best” is bound to fail. For such a conception denies many of the most important characteristics of man. This was exemplified after the Hungarian revolt in a conversation the writer had with a Frenchman, who said, “Up to the Hungarian revolt, it looked as though we were headed for Orwell’s 1984, ‘Big Brother,’ and the like. But the Hungarian revolt put up a wall and man bounced back to what he apparently is—an 1848 revolutionary, wanting to express himself.”

In analyzing the Pasternak incident, a reviewer of Soviet literature pointed out:

[Pasternak’s] objection to Marxism or indeed to any doctrine proclaiming to provide a total explanation of the historical process and a program for the transformation of society is that life is far too complicated and mysterious to be embraced by any theory or system. No such system, he says, can claim to be “scientific,” least of all Marxism, which, as he puts it, is not “self-possessed or balanced enough to be a science.” “When I hear people talking of reshaping life, it makes me lose all self-control and I fall into despair. Reshaping life! People who can say that have never understood the least thing about life. They have never felt its breath, its heart—however much they may have seen or done. They look on it as a lump of raw material which has to be processed by them and ennobled by their touch.”²⁴

The defensiveness of the Soviet position was reflected in a *Pravda* editorial appearing on October 20, 1956, castigating Polish writers. It particularly went after a Mr. Florcak and quoted him as saying, "Talk with the West should be conducted along different lines than hitherto. The universal proletarian is an obsolete concept. Now we have to think of the universal human being." They also cite Florcak's favorable comment of a visiting Belgian journalist who said, "The case we must take up is ultimately to enrich the human being." *Pravda* calls all this "cheap jauntiness," a "jargon."

As indicated in an earlier chapter, when Soviet leaders think about man, they think about him as a productive unit, not as a person who is a member of the human race. The individual must clearly assume the role of being a servant of the state. In the January 10, 1960, decrees of the Central Committee there is a clear statement that the measure of the success of propaganda is the extent to which it gets "concrete production results." The decrees further state:

. . . oral and printed propaganda still lack concreteness and purposefulness. Often it has an abstract and purely educationist character. It stops at general appeals and slogans. . . . The taint of grayness, dryness, and of insufficient expressiveness at times lies on the speeches of propaganda; they do not stir the audience and readers. . . . The propagating of the ideas of Communism should be close to the people and understandable. It should be a heart-to-heart business, reaching the mind and heart of every Soviet man and awakening in him the brightest and noblest thoughts and sentiments.

The pattern of life imposed on the Soviet people by Soviet leaders inevitably goes against the grain of all except those who are devout Communists. The indoctrination of intolerance cannot be effective unless and until unquestioned faith is instilled.

7. Independent thinking regarding social and interpersonal relationships is stultified by Party control—among the people at large, among social scientists, among the humanists.

James Thurber once noted that “speculation when cramped by certainties is eased of its wonder and its warmth.” By imposing rigid political boundaries on all speculation and imagination concerning man’s goals and social relationships, Soviet leaders have cramped and confined much of what would appear to us to be the “normal” activities of inquiring minds.

No original social thinker is likely to develop in the Soviet Union outside the top Party hierarchy because of the definite necessity for people to impose self-censorship. In commenting on the middle-aged intellectuals in the Soviet Union, one observer has pointed out:

. . . unlike their elders, they have had to make their arid journey without the support of a personal set of values, without even a brief or remote memory of an unsullied past, in short, without the basis for an independent identity that could stand up against their engulfing contemporary environment. . . . These men are largely going through empty motions . . . they

have lost much of their confidence in the importance of their position and the significance of their acts.²⁵

Philosophy, psychology, the social sciences, history, etc., in the Soviet Union have made few important discoveries or contributions in the past few decades because of these limitations of the freedom of inquiry and freedom of thought. These fields of investigation are assigned practical problems for solution, and what "discoveries" are made must be within the framework of Communist ideology. What would be regarded as the proper subject matter for such disciplines as sociology, ethnology, social psychology, clinical psychology, etc., which deal with man's relationship to man are essentially put under the heading of "history" where problems are handled according to the accepted ideological line. In visiting Soviet colleagues our small group of psychologists was impressed by what seemed to us the lack of any really free psychological inquiry: problems seemed to be set by a small group of individuals in power who have proved thoroughly reliable, and funds are given accordingly to such programs. When asked about this method of deciding on research problems, the leading psychologists said that Soviet psychologists always try to look for what is common between them, what they can agree on; they do not seek differences. In this sense, investigators seemed to us closer to medieval theologians than they do to their counterparts in the West, who have a variety of theoretical approaches and contend vigorously for these in friendly discussion.

In spite of the fact that the range of inquiries that social scientists can safely undertake is officially prescribed, social scientists were recently vigorously criti-

cized in the decrees of the Central Committee of January 10, 1960.

. . . many shortcomings in Party propaganda work are explained by a certain lagging by workers of social sciences as compared to the practices of Communist construction and ideological work. . . . They do not show a courageous and creative approach to life and to the experience of the struggle of the masses. They work out topical, theoretical, and practical questions weakly and are frequently imprisoned by obsolete and barren problems . . . many chairs of social sciences at higher educational establishments are still linked too loosely with the life of Party organizations and do not always help in ideological work in an active and creative manner . . . the social sciences can fulfill their tasks only if they are organically linked with the practice of Communist construction and ideological work.²⁶

Between the Party functionaries and the masses of the people is a conservative, connecting group which serves as the administrative link: the managers, teachers, etc. This group seems to be conservative for two reasons: first, because they are the individuals most fearful of change, and, second, because they are the people who, if they have to make decisions themselves, are likely to be most lost and anxious because of their habitual reliance on the commands of the Party functionaries.

For most Soviet writers the problem is, of course, to know the margin of error beyond which they must not go: the sincere and conscientious writers have striven to suppress their inclinations and strait-jacket their talent, sacrificing their artistic souls to the cause.

The result of all this seems to be appropriately described by Tucker's concept of "the image of dual Russia"—the Soviet functionary "has a role and self-identity in official Russia, but also a hidden unofficial existence and identity. He is 'two persons in one man,' as a character of Dudintsev's [*Not by Bread Alone*] expresses it. There are 'two sides—the hidden one and the visible one.'" This theme runs through much of the literary material produced in the period of the "thaw" of 1955 and 1956, as for example, in Yanshin's story of "The Levers," published in 1956, which Tucker summarizes as follows:

It introduces us to a group of persons conversing informally in a room of the administration building of a collective farm. Out of their quiet uninhibited talk unfolds a picture of the farm as an utterly run-down institution where the peasants earn only a mere pittance, where there are no more cows, where the planning of crops remains a jealously-guarded prerogative of district officials, etc. They comment acidly about the district Party boss who, while knowing all this, pretends that it is not so and repeats catch-phrases about "animal husbandry growing from year to year," the steady upsurge of the peasant's "welfare" and so on. Then, suddenly, the meeting is called to order, and it transpires that this group of persons composes the collective farm's Party organization. A metamorphosis of personality occurs: "their faces all become concentrated, tense and dull, as though they were preparing for something which was long familiar to them but nevertheless ceremonial and important. Everything earthly and natural vanished and the action shifted to another world. . . ." The action has shifted to the world of

official Russia. The individuals have changed selves. Now they are acting and speaking in the capacity of representatives of official Russia, its "levers" in the countryside. They proceed to repeat the official catchphrases of the district Party boss, those very phrases which they have just been ridiculing. They pass the requisite official "resolution" and the meeting ends. The question arises: who are the people really? Yanshin leaves us in no doubt that the real selves are the unofficial ones.²⁷

The impression of a student of Soviet literature (Vera Dunham), after reviewing the outpouring of feeling during this free period of the thaw, is that for many of these writers—

. . . truth is extraordinarily personalized and there seems to be no truth more important than the one toward one's self. Directed inside, it is self-knowledge; directed outside it is justice and love. Into the latter is frequently squeezed the notion of not selling out under any circumstances and particularly of not being seduced by materialistic temptation. This state of communion in the double-self, extended into the family connection, becomes the highest good, the real love. But in the meantime, the transition into the double-self is alarming, and uncertainties are multiplied.²⁸

It is no wonder then that in much of Soviet literature, the family seems to be squeezed between these two images: the image that the State upholds of the family as a feeder of healthy human resources contrasted with the private image of the family as a shelter against State demands.

The same theme is found in Wolfgang Leonhard's biography *Child of the Revolution*, in which he, originally a German citizen, describes the indoctrination he received in the Soviet Union when he went there as a child with his mother, a devoted Communist. Leonhard subsequently became disillusioned and left the Soviet orbit. He writes:

My mother had been arrested, I had witnessed the arrest of my teachers and friends, and it goes without saying that I had long since realized that reality in the Soviet Union was completely different from the picture presented in *Pravda*. But somehow I dissociated these things, and even my personal impressions and experiences, from my fundamental political conviction. It was almost as if there were two separate levels—one of everyday events and experiences, which I found myself often criticising; the other that of the great Party line which at this time, despite many hesitations, I still regarded as correct, from the standpoint of general principle.²⁹

8. The Party principle that the end justifies the means is often proved unworkable, unreasonable, and contradictory. It can have a boomerang effect. The very need to falsify and tell lies indicates a lack of correspondence between what a situation is and what people are supposed to believe the situation is; it reflects a weakness and a lack of surety; and it places Soviet leaders in the position of having to make concessions when other "truths" are learned from outside sources.

The case for the democratic philosophy and Western ethics was well phrased by Djilas.

If the end must be used to condone the means, then there is something in the end itself, in its reality, which is not worthy. That which really blesses the end, which justifies the efforts and sacrifices for it, is the means: their constant perfection, humaneness, increasing freedom.³⁰

An American expert on the Soviet Union has pointed out:

While professing faith in the invincibility of Marxism-Leninism, the Soviet leaders at the same time underscore their own lack of faith by their frantic efforts to exclude ideas which they apparently fear could subvert a citizenry which has been subjected to the most intensive indoctrination in history.³¹

Thus if Soviet leaders are to maintain the fiction that they are revolutionary, they must constantly drum up some enemy to overthrow or some cause to be revolutionary about. In this connection one recalls two lines from Wordsworth's poem on the French revolution:

Bliss was it in that dawn to be alive,
But to be young was very Heaven!

Because of their underlying anxiety, Soviet leaders seem to fear the consequences of freedom of communication even more than they value the propaganda advantages of appearing to allow some such freedom.

Various techniques are used by the Soviet regime in their attempt to present a consistent front: the technique of "de-emphasis," in which a fact is played down if it cannot be ignored; the technique of using "half-truths," in which a fact may be reported but the cause of the fact or the situation is concealed; the technique of "oversimplification," by means of which the complexities of economic or international situations are kept from the Soviet people; the technique of "creating myths," such as the myth that the World Peace Council is a more important organ than the United Nations because the former speaks for the "peoples" of the world rather than merely for the "governments."

It is revealing to observe how Soviet leaders handle important news events. We shall take two illustrations. The first concerns the reporting of de-Stalinization to the Soviet people when it became apparent to the leaders that the Soviet microcosm could no longer be shielded from knowledge that the larger world macrocosm had of what went on in the Twentieth Congress. One recalls that Khrushchev's speech at the Twentieth Congress occurred in February of 1956. The first news that most of the world had of this speech and of Stalin's downgrading was on June 5th and 6th of 1956 when the full text was published in the Western press. In February, the *Pravda* report of the activities of the Congress only mentioned Stalin casually and did not include any talk of the grief of the people or the loss the Party had sustained; in March, *Pravda* mentioned occasionally the way leaders are "explaining" the decisions of the Congress, but there was no indication of what this "explaining" consisted of. Stalin was mentioned by name and personally blamed for the evil effects of the cult of personality for the first time in

Pravda during March, but even then he was not given the personal blame for specific crimes and for the "infringement of socialist legality." It was not until July 2, 1956, nearly a month after the publication of Khrushchev's speech in the rest of the world and five months after the original speech, that the "resolution of the Central Committee of the Party" entitled "On Overcoming the Cult of Personality and Its Consequences" was published in the Soviet Union. This was apparently a concession that Party leadership had to make when discussions and criticism from the outside world could no longer be ignored. During the rest of July there was great discussion in *Pravda* of the reactions of the people to the resolution, indicating the enthusiastic approval of the masses, etc.

A second illustration is the controlled reporting of the news of the Hungarian revolt. Here Soviet leaders had to move fast in order to minimize the frustrations resulting from too strict a control of the people on both the material and the "spiritual" side. Every effort was made internally to distort the true events systematically and to hide the facts. The general line of the revolt was, of course, called "counterrevolutionary," an imperialistic adventure engineered pretty much from the United States with the Soviet army coming to the rescue at the request of the Hungarian people. One American observer reported that Polish students in the Soviet Union made considerable money by providing Russian translations of articles that appeared in the Polish press and told a more complete story.

Soviet people have, of course, long since made a huge propaganda discount of news which they feel is horribly dull and which they assume contains a good deal of falsification. Nearly all American tourists in the Soviet Union

have noticed that the hate campaigns against the United States have by no means taken hold on the Soviet people as reflected in their genuine friendliness. Furthermore, the official distortions about American life and its presumably shocking shortcomings have apparently not been believed even by the more ignorant and unsophisticated Soviet people. In reporting on his trip to the United States and saying that his opinions of the "decrepit capitalist system" remained unchanged, and in discussing the superiority of Soviet space science over that in America, Khrushchev said that the Soviet people did not need to have as many automobiles as Americans. As one American observer noted, "This makes one wonder whether or not Soviet boasting about achievements in outer space is not designed in part to stifle discontent about terrestrial shortcomings."³²

While the shifts in Soviet tactics, sometimes very dramatic, may be effective over a short range, they are likely to be seen even by the great masses of people in uncommitted and democratic areas for what they are. Nehru has written:

Communism has definitely allied itself to the approach of violence, even if it does not indulge normally in physical violence. . . . The basic thing I believe is that wrong means will not lead to right results, and that is no longer merely an ethical doctrine but a practical proposition.³³

9. A person's reality world can only be altered through experience, not through indoctrination and dictum alone.

While Soviet leaders also say this, they are often forced to slip into the assumption that dicta are in themselves enough to remedy situations that are not up to par.

There is much evidence from psychology to show that there can be no real and profound change in a person's assumptions and no alteration of his "character" through compulsion or the acceptance of an imposed absolute.

The religion of Marxism-Leninism is clearly one of "revealed truth" concerning the relationship of people to each other and to the state. It is not a religion of "discovered truth" which people can rediscover for themselves by experiencing the value satisfaction that comes from sensing the relationship of one's own individual action in the here and now to more or less transcendent and universal values not bounded by time and space. The mild schizophrenia apparent in many Soviet citizens that we have mentioned before comes in part from the fact that people think in terms of official patterns and slogans and do not think for themselves. They have had to learn and to mouth the words of the official ideology which, under its shell, hides the true human being. Although, as previously indicated, most people seem to believe the official patterns and slogans, their belief does not appear to carry much conviction—"belief beyond doubt," as Webster defines "conviction."

Since people in the Soviet Union have been propagandized and sloganized for so many years, the slogans have by now become empty. The people don't want empty slogans, and they know what they don't want, even though their experience has not yet been sufficient to give them a clear idea of what they do want.

10. The denial of the unpredictable, emergent nature of human progress creates a closed system which fosters careerism, obeisance, etc., of those now dependent on state machinery and the bureaucratic status quo.

The excitement, invigoration, and sense of personal reward that an individual experiences in the social, political, and cultural life of a society depends in large part on his feeling that he is an active participant in a process that is open to new developments, new expectations, new inquiries, new goals. By contrast, Soviet leaders maintain a "closed," rather than an "open," system—a system that is highly rationalized, planned, and directed, and in which the unexpected and the unpredictable are kept to a minimum. Such a system gives rise to the boredom and apathy so frequently reported among Soviet citizens, their craving for new sensations (i.e., the appeal of American jazz, of Paris fashions)—a trend not likely to be altered with increasing standardization through mass production, standardized literature, standardized art, etc.

As Nagy has pointed out, the utter dependence that a person is forced to have on the Party inevitably leads to the widespread development of the worst characteristics in people caught in a bureaucracy.

The most reprehensible procedure, the one most destructive of Communist morality and character is to exploit the existing material dependence of Party functionaries and members in order to influence their political views and personal behavior. . . . Another characteristic symptom of the deterioration of morality in public life, a symptom that has become actually epi-

democratic in social and Party life, is careerism, the pushing and elbowing for favors, even alms, from above. Opportunism is not an individual character deficiency but first and foremost a social symptom. . . .³⁴

Since Soviet citizens are being denied both the chance to make their own decisions as to what their own living should be for anyway and how the kind of living they choose can be best carried out, they are therefore being denied an opportunity to exercise and improve a whole range of value judgments. And the capacity to make value-judgments and to act on them and experience the consequences of one's action is a basic characteristic of human beings and the characteristic that must be exercised if an individual is to have a sense of his own dignity and worth.

11. The intense status consciousness of Soviet citizens contradicts socialist tenets and the idea of the importance of all workers whether intellectual, factory, or peasant.

Many observers have noted that the Soviet people still seem to have a long way to go before they treat each other, as individuals, with the democratic respect one tends to take for granted in the United States. Social stratification is clear-cut with wide gaps between the different layers. A tourist in the Soviet Union will frequently encounter a contempt for manual labor and lower status.

12. Since an individual is powerless to undertake any economic development on his own, to initiate improve-

ment within his neighborhood, etc., and may be in trouble if he does, there is resulting frustration, lethargy, irresponsibility.

The background of this situation was nicely described by Tucker after a recent extended trip. He reports the way in which Soviet attempts to do things in a big and dramatic way easily obscure the lack of uniform progress throughout the country:

Economic development in the Soviet Union is inherently a spotty affair. It does not move along a wide even front throughout the country but rather by a series of "break-throughs" at places where concentrated offensives are mounted by state directive. I say "inherently" because the nature of the Soviet system seems to be responsible for this peculiar situation. Economic development occurs in places where funds and men and materials are brought together in a concerted state-organized and state-directed effort to accomplish a particular objective. Other places tend to stagnate, become quiet backwaters of the great industrialization drive. For the individual himself is powerless to engage in "economic development." He may not even find it politic to give his house a new coat of paint if he can afford it, for that would be sure to raise questions in people's minds about his sources of income. The norm of life becomes inconspicuous consumption, and everything external goes on in the traditional way until or unless the bureaucrats in Moscow for one reason or another turn their attention to this particular spot.⁸⁵

13. Soviet ideology seems to have overemphasized the loyalty a person can have for an "international" class, a meaningless abstraction for most Soviet citizens.

In no instance in our own travels in the Soviet Union did anyone refer to himself as a "Soviet" man—people always identified themselves as "Russians," "Ukrainians," "Georgians," etc. A Marxian thesis that individuals would eventually identify themselves as members of an international proletariat seems to have overlooked the enormous strength and intensity of national and state loyalties that exist among the working people as well as among the so-called "bourgeois."

If Communist Party dogma were entirely fixed and inflexible, the Soviet system would not be the dangerous one that it is to those who believe in the virtues of democracy, for it would have smothered itself in many Marxist doctrines which have long since demonstrated their error and limitations. But, as everyone knows, especially since the death of Stalin, the Party has a built-in capacity to adapt itself quickly to new situations and to rationalize past mistakes and new courses of action. In the next chapter we review some of the changes that appear to have taken place in recent years as Soviet leaders have accommodated themselves to frustration.

6 || ACCOMMODATION AND RELAXATION

While Soviet leaders cling to their dogma, still they are willing, able, and often quick to see where conciliation will improve the likelihood of achieving their goals without compromise of basic tenets. Accommodation and relaxation since the death of Stalin have apparently been almost entirely in what would be called the area of implementation: over-all Party goals have kept the constancy of fixed stars. As Mosely has put it, "Basically the system remains unchanged. Both rulers and ruled know that the necessary instruments of power are there and will be used if the rulers believe they are necessary to perpetuate the system."¹

But as some philosophers have reminded us, the only permanence is change. In this chapter we review briefly a few of the changes that appear to have taken place in psychological strategy and tactics.

1. There is increasing expediency, adjustment, and opportunism on the part of Soviet leaders, and less concern with consistency and uniformity of policies, although there is a deliberately congruent pattern of relationships in policies.

It appears that Soviet leaders tend more and more to improvise assumptions concerning human nature as these are necessary to accommodate the interests of those in power and to meet new situations and new ambitions. More and more an "operational code of the Politburo" is that "the Party 'must not blindly worship the particular phase in which it may find itself at any particular time or place'; it must be ready to change its strategy, tactics, organization as changed conditions require it, without being hindered by 'the prejudices and memories of what was yesterday.' " ²

It seems clear that Communist ideology is no longer serving as the fixed blueprint that it was in the days when Bolshevik leaders were struggling for power. It is, rather, being used as a rationalization or dispensation to help bolster and get across any program or policy that appears to be expedient. Like the high command of an army, Soviet leaders adjust their strategy and tactics according to the terrain, are not guided by any "eternal principles," but adjust the meaning of "truth" and "justice" to fit the situation. In adjusting their ideology pragmatically and opportunistically, they are creating a political philosophy that will presumably better take into account the "new elements" introduced into the universe as a result of changes in technology, changes in aspirations with all the implications for the future which accumulating experience has demonstrated these new elements might have. Khrushchev is generally described by Westerners who have visited him as more of a politician than an ideological fanatic.

Julian Huxley has pointed out that "If knowledge is lacking on which to build a coherent and satisfying vision, imagination will almost universally be called on to pro-

vide mythical explanations and interpretative extrapolations of actuality.”³ In Stalin’s era there seems to have been a somewhat more coherent vision, the operation of a “law of uniformity of policy” in which there was supposed to be consistency between internal and external policies. With changes and the new possibilities now available this “law of uniformity” no longer seems to hold. Soviets can have both butter and guns; they can have a tough foreign policy together with a better standard of living. Furthermore, the present leadership is more concerned in creating a dictatorship that people will like rather than a dictatorship that will be consistent throughout.

2. There is a greater realization of the necessity of increasing the individual’s sense of “voluntary” participation as a means of inculcating and enforcing Communist morality; there is a greater attempt to woo people whose respect and liking are needed if terror is to be relinquished as a method of control.

An American student of Soviet affairs has written:

. . . the most difficult problem faced by the Stalin regime in the postwar years was the profound passivity of the Soviet populace, its failure to respond positively to the goals set before it . . . the root of the matter was not the incapacity of people to endure another season of starvation, but rather the meaninglessness of the sacrifices they were called upon to make, the pointlessness of Russia’s being in eternal conflict with the

rest of the world, the total lack of prospect for tranquility in their time. The result was widespread apathy, resignation, spiritual disengagement from the goals of the Stalin government.⁴

The imposition of an attitude of idealistic austerity by terror or any other means seems to have been considerably dissipated since the Stalin era. A trend toward economic expansion has gradually taken its place, and, as already pointed out, as long as this sense of improvement can be maintained, people will continue to be relatively satisfied.

Djilas believes that "the new class no longer needs the revolutionaries or dogmatists it once required; it is satisfied with simple personalities . . . whose every word reflects the average man. The new class itself is tired of dogmatic purges and timing sessions. It would like to live quietly."⁵ And there seems little doubt that the control Stalin maintained through terror has shifted to a control that depends chiefly on manipulation and persuasion and the maintenance of respect on the part of the people for their leaders. The charismatic type of leadership that Lenin and Stalin provided becomes ineffective and inoperable when conditions for high suggestibility are lacking.

It appears, then, that Soviet leaders want to be liked and need to be liked, especially because of their increasing dependence on the increasing number of persons in the intellectual and managerial elite. Khrushchev seems to sense that people who are educated and developed must like the dictatorship, not merely be respectful and fearful of it. But we must continually bear in mind that Khrushchev is the only second-generation dictator in his-

tory, and that there is so far no indication whatever of any modification of the basic principle that the masses must be governed by a trained elite whose selection, training, and testing are a major concern of the regime in its attempt to see that the idea of "the circulation of the elite" is accomplished in the most effective possible way for the continued good of the Party. Any trend toward a really "open" democratic society is certainly nowhere visible.

Tucker has pointed out that Khrushchev "has built up his internal political following not simply by persuading people he is the safer source to bet on (Stalin's method) but by recommending himself to them as one who has endured their experiences, knows and understands their problems, listens to their ideas, relies on their consultation and advice, and, in sum, is 'one of them.' " ⁶ Khrushchev's widely quoted remarks made to a group of people welcoming him to their city in July, 1957, are worth repeating here:

It is not bad if in improving the theory of Marx one throws in also a piece of bacon and a piece of butter. When you have a hungry stomach, it is sometimes very difficult to understand the theory of Marxism-Leninism. But if you can have a nice apartment and good food as well as cultural achievements, then surely everyone must say, "Certainly I'm for Communism." ⁷

The resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party concerning the ouster of Malenkov and others stated as major reasons the opposition of this group to the improvement in the standard of living of the "broad masses" and their opposition to "the possibilities of different ways of transition to socialism in different countries."

The communiqué also emphasized how members of the group were shackled by old notions and methods and how they failed "to see new conditions, the new situation."⁸

The extent to which local officials are being given more of an opportunity to play some individual role in the running of society was observed by Tucker in the trip he took with Adlai Stevenson throughout the Soviet Union in 1958. Here are a few of his observations: local officials are definitely given a sense of participation in the shaping of state policy:

[They have] a sense of belonging to the ruling authority . . . they are no longer surprised as they used to be by a sudden change in policy . . . the atmosphere in which the local official functions and what is called the "style of work" has changed significantly. The keynote of the style of work in the late Stalin period was mechanical execution of orders from above . . . especially under Khrushchev, these [the local officials] have been called upon to show initiative within certain limits, to act as a member of the ruling authority, and to think of himself as a political man. One aspect of this change is that the local official is now given the feeling of being "in on" the decisions of the regime on matters of high policy.⁹

During Stalin's era there was no real discussion of draft decisions, and there was voting only by telephone; whereas today committees meet, discuss, and function according to rules. It was Tucker's impression that the decision-making procedure now legitimizes real discussion and difference of opinion within a small authoritative body, but at the same time preserves "a front of unanimity so

far as final decisions are concerned and so far as the face the governmental authority presents to the people is concerned." ¹⁰

According to the *Great Soviet Encyclopaedia*, "production conferences" were instituted in Soviet factories as early as 1923. They fell into disuse for a number of years, but were re-activated in 1957 at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Party. Also described in the *Great Soviet Encyclopaedia* of 1957 are the "brigades of Communist toil" which the encyclopedia calls "a method of building socialism and Communism based on maximum activity and independent activity of the toilers." Within these brigades individuals compete for the title of "shock-worker of Communist toil," and a new feature is that workers not only have to try to improve production but now have to "live like Communists" and "learn like Communists" to gain the title. The title is presumably awarded by factory trade union committees and the administration of the factory with the advice and consent of Party and *Komsomol* authorities.

Another new organization to increase public participation in the development of morality is known as the "voluntary brigade of people's militia." This recent development is based on ideas expressed by Khrushchev in 1958, namely, that it was time the public took over some of the functions of the government and especially the prevention of infringements of Communist morality in public. Khrushchev said in his speech, "The voluntary detachment of people's militia must take upon themselves the insuring of public order in their settlements and be sure that the rights and interests of all citizens are preserved and observed." ¹¹ An article describing the People's Militia states:

Together with the social organizations, the volunteer detachments, the People's Brigades for the protection of public order must contribute to the development in Soviet people of Communist morality, the basis of which is the devotion to Communism and irreconcilability to its enemies, the consciousness of one's debt to society, active participation through toil, for the happiness of society, the voluntary observation of the basic rules of human living together, comradely mutual help, honor, and truthfulness, and the non-suffering of infringers of public order.¹²

One should note here the use of the word "voluntary."

Since the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956, there seems to have been renewed emphasis on "Leninist" principles—among other things an encouragement of the discussion of issues from the bottom even if within a strictly prescribed framework. In this connection excerpts from two editorials in *Kommunist* may be cited. The first, appearing in June, 1956 stated:

It is necessary not to administer unnecessarily, not to command, but to convince the non-Party people of the correctness of the policy of the Party to arouse the masses for the realization of this policy . . . commanding an unnecessary administrativeness is foreign to the whole spirit and character of the Party.¹³

A second article appearing in September, 1956, urges the need for patient education:

In putting into practice any great measure, the Party starts from the point of view that the toilers must under-

stand it, must be convinced of its necessity. This understanding does not come of itself. It is achieved by patient and all-sided explanatory educational work.¹⁴

3. There is apparently an increasing realization that the individual sense of dignity and freedom can no longer be so completely and easily violated and throttled; there is a restricted humanism seen most clearly in Soviet literature.

There seems little doubt that a liberalizing tendency has begun in the Soviet Union and that it may be an irreversible tendency. All observers who visit the Soviet Union now and compare it to the society they had known earlier are impressed by the increased frankness of the people in admitting their problems and by the increased relaxation of individuals both in their appearance and in their behavior, and their apparent freedom to live somewhat more by their own rules. Summing up his observations, Harrison Salisbury wrote:

Mr. Khrushchev's Russians are not afraid of one another. Not all terror and not all intimidation have vanished. But Russia is not being ruled by knout. . . . Alongside the brag and the big talk is a positive trait of importance. This is a freshness of approach, a receptivity to new sights, new sounds, new ideas, an open door to original concepts, a hostility to dogma and routine. In place of an empire of terror, Mr. Khrushchev has constructed a regime based on limited freedom, a freedom governed by what might be called the accordion principle. The Soviet leader gradually in-

creases freedoms, but from time to time, as for example after the Hungarian revolt, he tightens up a bit.¹⁵

After Khrushchev's downgrading speech in 1956, the rift between the individual and society could no longer be easily explained away merely by talking about the "remnants of the past." While the essential machinery of Soviet society may not have changed dramatically in its organizational setup, without Stalin's terror and use of secret police, various state controls have lost some of their former effectiveness in enforcing an intellectual conformity. According to a student of Soviet literature, Vera S. Dunham, Soviet fiction of 1959 reveals a growing separation between noncompromising writers and the more numerous writers still submissive to official ideology; people in novels and poems are ridiculed if they slavishly follow State directives; writers speak of the need for elbow room for individual development; characters are portrayed as determined to push aside the ready made, paternal ethics, determined to find their own convictions. For example, a Soviet writer who is also a professor of literature says in one novel, "Truth does not follow one road. . . . Truth is multifaceted."¹⁶ And in the same novel one character says, "He is good who is good with his whole heart, all by himself!"¹⁷ There is an implicit accusation in this novel that the state is presumptuous in trying to impose an ideology and that in its attempts to shape the individual it is only maiming and impairing the initial, potential good man is born with. Dunham believes that current Soviet literature reflects the feeling that "individual dignity can no longer be completely tampered with in the post-Stalin era and that no one is ever going to march collectively again in the same way as they used to. Life

roads will be traveled more one by one, and Statism has become more of a myth.”¹⁸ A few illustrations from Soviet poetry will show what is happening.

This excerpt of a poem by Oshanin appeared, significantly, in 1958, *after* Khrushchev in a speech in the fall of 1956 indicated his alarm about the liberties writers were taking.

My road is in the open.
Although just one, I shall travel it to the end.
Let there be just one woman
To carry love to me in her heart.
Let just one line of a poem
Shine into the unknown of a faraway year. . . .¹⁹

In the next excerpt of a poem by Evtushenko there is a dialogue with the “they” which reveals the poet as proud and articulate. This poem also appeared in 1958 and *after* the writer had been expelled from the *Komsomol* because of things he had written previously.

There are many who don't like me.
They accuse me of many things
and threaten me
with thunder and lightning.
They laugh at me
Grimly and nervously.
And their evil glance
I feel in my back.
But I like all this.
I am proud
because they are helpless.
They cannot do a thing to me.²⁰

In the following excerpt there is a debate between night, which represents the big oppression and the big lie, and human integrity, which values truth, both public and private, above all.

Darkness crawls into cellars,
Under doorways,
Into empty pockets.
She bends over the hours,
and stares with discolored eyes.
(This won't help anymore!)
And her voice is that
of those who cannot bear light.
First she speaks calmly
but then in a paroxysm
of fury:
"People" what's the matter with you?
Didn't you manage
under the rule
to distinguish
a thing or two?
You followed me
not quarreling with my truth
even if you moved slowly, cautiously,
I made myself
darker
on purpose
so that conscience shouldn't torment you,
so that you shouldn't see dirt,
so that you shouldn't blame yourselves. . . .
It wasn't so bad, was it?
Why didn't you raise
questions then?!

Night, be silent! You cannot outshout
dawn, growing through half of the sky.
Be quiet!
The morning will answer you!
Save yourself for your hypocrites
and don't give us your advice.
In the end of ends
 man perishes
if he hides from himself
 his diseases!
We want to turn back now and honor
those who safeguarded their songs
 until daybreak came.
You say, dirt is invisible under your reign?
We want to see it!
Do you hear?
It's time! . . .²¹

4. There is full awareness, however, by Soviet leaders that individualism and freedom must not be allowed to go too far.

Soviet leaders had an opportunity to see how potentially dangerous freedom could be during the period of the literary thaw (1955-1956), in the events in Hungary and Poland, etc. It can be taken for granted that as long as there is a gap between the "we" and the "they," Soviet people will be suspicious of their leaders. In general, it may be said that the Soviet people are as sophisticatedly suspicious as any people in the world.

What happens when the lid is taken off and freedom is

allowed to express itself is shown by a very brief chronology of occurrences resulting from the unfettered expression of many Soviet writers during the period of the thaw. The following are snatches of a history of the Party line after this period, taken from "Studies on the Soviet Union" published by the Institute for the Study of the U.S.S.R.

The year 1955 and nearly the whole of 1956 saw a series of courageous attempts by a number of writers to deal fairly and squarely with the problems of Soviet life. . . . These attacks against socialist realism and the emergence of groups of artists who thought that art ought to be free, gave rise to serious misgivings in Communist headquarters in Moscow. A "thaw" that showed every indication of intensifying was no part of the Party leaders' plan. . . . The Soviet leaders opened their attack on the champions of artistic freedom by coming out in defense of socialist realism, hoping thereby to slow down the growth of tendencies toward freedom of expression. . . . Later a heavy and systematic counterattack was launched against the champions of independence.

It is clearly significant that the attacks against the champions of freedom in the arts coincided with the events in Hungary. The connection between the suppression of the Hungarian uprising and the restoration of a Stalinist policy in the sphere of the arts is obvious. To all intents and purposes the discussions on Socialist realism came to an end with the publication of an article entitled "Freedom in Artistic Creation" in *Kommunist*, No. 15, 1956. The article denied that any genuine freedom for the artist exists or is even possible.

"Does indeed an 'absolute freedom of creation' exist, that freedom 'from everything,' of which the bourgeois ideologists prate? The facts show that it does not."

The events in Hungary and Poland and developments in the Soviet Union itself forced the Communist leaders to adopt even more stringent self-defensive measures. . . . Dissatisfaction with Communist doctrine was patent. . . . The following categorical warning was published in *Kommunist*, No. 1, 1957, in a leading article entitled "Raise Higher the Banner of Marxist-Leninist Ideology": "In the sphere of ideology, Communists must not have the least inclination towards reconciliation with hostile factions. A fierce struggle 'for the souls of people' is being waged throughout the world. . . . The socialist and bourgeois ideologies are therefore mutually exclusive; they do not, nor can they, peacefully coexist."

Between May and July, 1957, the group of recalcitrant writers was systematically crushed. . . . It was nevertheless Khrushchev's speeches that put an end to the "thaw" and again reduced art to the ancillary role it had always played in Soviet life. Khrushchev was quite explicit: "We have always opposed, and shall continue to oppose implacably and resolutely, biased, dishonest, and false interpretations in literature and art of life in our country." In order to drive his point home, Khrushchev argued somewhat curiously that the concepts "people" and "Party" are coterminous. Hence, he concluded, any writer who had the interests of the people at heart was bound to follow the directives of the Party (August, 1957).

In spite of the fact that the "mutiny of writers has now been quelled, the 'thaw' nevertheless showed how

powerful and vigorous is the potential strength of the intellectual opposition in the USSR." ²²

As a result of all this, Professor Dunham has written that when she reads good Soviet poetry now she

can hear between the lines and underneath the surface intent, the fear of the now again increasing threat to individual happiness, tenderness, and love. The threat is still implicit in the external forces and in a sense more so than ever before or at least more dramatically because in the meantime it has been permitted to state one's awareness of private values.²³

5. The time set for the achievement of aspirations and expectations seems to have been shortened to a future that is more foreseeable and immediate, less dim and distant, than in previous years.

Soviet leaders are increasingly aware that with the revolutionary élan nearly gone they can never expect to exact from their population the sacrifices that people made earlier. They are apparently sensing that it is impossible to keep people from having aspirations, from having hopes in a day and age when people somehow learn how individuals in other parts of the world are living and thereby learn what should be potentially available to them.

In his speech to the Twenty-first Party Congress, Khrushchev emphasized the need to continue and possibly to prolong the "socialist" stage of development toward Communism. He insisted that incentive pay, etc., will be needed to permit the development of Communist abun-

dance and that any countereffort "would mean doing damage to the building of Communism."

It may well be that as Khrushchev looks forward to the place he will occupy in history, he wants to be known as the leader who greatly increased the prosperity and standard of living of the Soviet people, with the important supplementary provision that if the Soviet people prosper and build up their economy, then Communism can carry on a more aggressive, nonmilitary economic conquest of the world.

6. There is an increasing recognition of the limitations of propaganda and of coercion.

Even though the decrees of January 10, 1960, were devoted to ways and means of increasing the effectiveness of Soviet propaganda, it is clear that Soviet leaders realize that "indoctrination" alone is by no means a pragmatic approach and must continually be supported by an improvement in the "objective conditions" if a favorable public opinion is to be maintained and respect for the leadership solidified.

7. There is more tactical stress on the "gentle," "spiritual" side of human nature.

Evidence of this tendency is seen in many of the statements of Soviet leaders, especially of Khrushchev, over the past few years. In a discussion of the Soviet "image of America," Barghoorn notes how Khrushchev

. . . has sought to place the West at a disadvantage by resurrecting demagogic but, to the unwary at least, appealing Soviet proposals for "total disarmament." One of the advantages gained by his trip to the United States was the opportunity to reassert this ancient Soviet propaganda demand in an address to the General Assembly of the United Nations. Having created fresh international tensions by his threat to Berlin in 1958, Khrushchev was in a good position in 1959 to attempt to win the gratitude of mankind by appearing to promise a relaxation of tensions.²⁴

The Soviet peace offensive, with all its blandishments for the consumption of underdeveloped peoples, has become a familiar theme. In a 1957 address celebrating the revolution, Khrushchev stated: "The peoples of Asia and Africa possess disinterested friends in the Soviet Union, and all socialist countries who are persistently pursuing a just policy corresponding to the interests of all peace-loving peoples."²⁵ And in a speech at the Supreme Soviet Session of December, 1957, he said, "The history of a social system will be decided not by rockets, not by atomic and hydrogen bombs, but by the fact of which system insures greater material and spiritual benefits to man."²⁶

Appealing to people of different religious faiths, Shepilov said in a speech to the Twentieth Party Congress:

In the struggle against social oppression and against colonialism, in the struggle for peace and democracy, the great aspirations of all the oppressed people, whether of the Arab, Asian and Latin American countries, and of all the working people, whether Catholics or Protestants, Buddhists or Moslems, will find their fulfillment.²⁷

8. There is less fear of foreigners and of their influence, which undoubtedly reflects an increase in Soviet self-confidence.

The conspicuous increase in the travelings of Soviet leaders as well as of Soviet citizens, together with the visits to the Soviet Union of people from the Western world, is obviously helping to eradicate to some extent the fears that Stalin had inculcated concerning contacts with foreigners.

While all this may be merely a change in tactics, at least it is a change and a change that is bound to have lasting consequences. A trivial but significant example of the change was described by Salisbury, who reported that "Cola had been a dirty word in the Soviet Union, a manifestation of decadent American capitalism."²⁸ And yet at the Moscow Fair, Khrushchev had three cups and liked it, presumably changing his assumptions as he experienced the consequence of his action and possibly seeing in "cola" a drink that might help in his campaign to reduce the consumption of alcohol.

In the press conference Mikoyan held in Moscow on his return from the United States, he told Soviet journalists of the desire of the American people for friendship with the Soviet people, the interests of American labor and business in normalizing relations between the two countries, and his own desire to return to wartime cooperation.

Both the words and actions of Soviet leaders reflect an increased confidence on their part in the validity of their operational assumptions and an increased smugness and certainty of the rightness of their cause and its eventual success. In reporting on a conversation with a local official who was an ardent Communist, Tucker writes:

Marxism, whether Marx's own or Lenin's, is essentially a revolutionary creed, and the mentality of this man is not even remotely revolutionary. One of the most noticeable traits is a respectful attitude toward state authority as such. He probably takes it as axiomatic that the social-economic system in "capitalist" countries is historically doomed—but I doubt that he has any strong genuine feelings about it.²⁹

9. Although the leaders still condemn any revisionism, there is an increased tactical stress on nationalism and on the tactical role to be played by national loyalties within different countries.

It seems that at the beginning of his regime, Khrushchev may have underestimated the appeal of nationalism as an identification which cuts across, and therefore weakens, Party identification. But in his report to the Twenty-first Party Congress, Khrushchev ridicules those who claim the Soviet Union is trying to dominate Communist parties in other countries. In summarizing Khrushchev's report of January 27, 1959, a bulletin from the Embassy of the USSR states:

Imperialist ideologists and the revisionists who take their cue from them strive in every way to undermine the growing influence of the Communist Parties and spread the spurious tale about the Communist movement being "made in Moscow" and about the Communist and Worker's Parties being dependent upon the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. It is

ridiculous to think, Khrushchev stated, that a political party of the working class, which often has hundreds of thousands and sometimes millions of members, could be organized in any country from the outside. . . . The Soviet Union does not control any other country. There are no "superior" and "subordinate" parties in the Communist movement.³⁰

But in reading such an account one recalls the constant stress on the "inner unity of all Communist Parties" and—the point we emphasized earlier—that, from the point of view of Soviet leaders, the Party is always above the State, with the machinery of the State carrying out the will of the Party. One recalls what happened in Tibet as well as what happened in Hungary. But if Communist parties in different nations appear to favor sovereignty and independence, the people in those countries may be led to the mistaken perception that the delusion is the reality.

We turn next to a brief review of what the relationship seems to be now between the Party and the people.

7 || HOW THINGS STAND

Since a good deal of wish-fulfillment seems to go on in the West from time to time about the "restlessness" of the Soviet people because they do not have freedom and liberty as we understand the meaning of these words, a brief characterization of the situation as it stands now is in order.

First of all, it definitely appears that for a large number of people in the Soviet Union, the Communist ideology does function effectively enough to play the role of giving meaning and significance to many daily routines and tasks, to events, to changes, and to policies. No matter what the inconsistencies, inadequacies, and falsities of the ideology may be, it does "exist" as a working and meaningful reality for many, many people and provides an apocalyptic vision for an appreciable number. Soviet leaders do seem to have provided for their people a "vision of destiny," a belief in their own idealistic aims which, in themselves, often sound quite noble—for example, "to end the exploitation of man by man." In this sense, then, the Soviet philosophy of materialism takes on a certain "spiritual" quality in so far as it ministers to the needs of the people.

The ideology becomes important to Soviet leaders and to the Soviet people in the sense that *they need an ideology*: the Soviet Union has gone so suddenly from a peasant

economy to a new economy of industrialization that from the leaders' point of view a politico-economic superstructure *must* be superimposed and perpetuated. Otherwise, politico-economic forms which have demonstrated their usefulness and value in more advanced countries in the West (such as labor unions, cooperatives, and the like) might win adherence within the Soviet state.

The strength of Communist ideology today within the Soviet Union is clearly due, not to any logical or rational characteristics, but to the fact that there is now in the Soviet Union an ongoing, functioning organization run by the Party bosses who must depend on experts in making their decisions. The Soviet system is shaped by the top leadership in response to the exigencies of the current situation with a view of maximizing the power of the regime and its leaders.

Ideology serves the important function of giving a comprehensive frame of reference within which the Soviet citizen is supposed to behave and function; it articulates a set of myths meant to bind Soviet society together. By relating all of its activities to these ideological assumptions, the regime attempts to find for its acts a source of legitimacy and to provide an all-important sense of continuity.

Once the ideology of Communism is accepted or successfully indoctrinated, it forms the basic link in a long chain of assumptions. There is no breaking of the chain once the first assumption has been accepted. These assumptions are believed. They are "real." Hence, the utterances of Party leaders and Party members are not "make-believe" or always "mere propaganda." The ideology becomes more or less accepted by people as the matrix within which specific personal aspirations are fulfilled.

The strength of the ideology lies in its all-encompassing

nature, leaving an individual no alternatives, no other choices to go to. Many observers have told about Soviet friends of theirs who have spent years in labor camps and returned even more staunch supporters of the system than when they were condemned. Apparently the reason is that they know no alternative ideology and they now want to start a clean slate, to prove both to themselves and to others that they are good followers of the Party line. One reason why so many Soviet refugees find it difficult to adjust to the West is obviously that they feel lonely and isolated outside the system they have got used to and in a situation where their fate is much more up to themselves.

An American observer who has spent many years in the Soviet Union and traveled extensively (R. C. Tucker) has noted that because Soviet citizens and officials have essentially been brought up in a rigidly bounded microcosm, it is practically impossible for them to imagine a government acting in a way different from that of the Soviet Union. Hence, they become skeptical and incredulous when other political forms are described. They project their own assumptions on the rest of the outside world, and if they are told "facts" that contradict their assumptions, they either dismiss or disbelieve the "facts" or are highly skeptical of them.¹

The great psychological asset Soviet leaders have created is the notion they keep drilling into people that they are striving to achieve the perfect state. They are orienting their people toward a future—and a future which is much more extended in time than people in Western democracies are likely to envision for themselves with their periodic changes in leaderships, their annual budgets, etc. Furthermore, in this regard, Soviet leaders frankly and frequently admit that the Soviet state is now far from perfect, but

that it is on its way and is making progress. In so far as this notion can be successfully indoctrinated into Soviet citizens, it is perhaps the most powerful asset the regime now has. By portraying to underdeveloped areas the "ideal society" as the Communists see it, Soviet leaders can continually raise native expectations of what life should be and can point to the gap between such expectations and the current state of affairs, no matter how much the West gives to these people. By contrast, our own ideology based on the Ten Commandments, the Sermon on the Mount, the Declaration of Independence, the Bill of Rights, etc., is often, but by no means always, adequate in providing precepts for individual or group behavior under the conditions of modern complex national and international organizations and in giving people in Western democracies a clear sense of direction and a definite notion of what future changes are going to mean to them personally. Describing Western democracy and its reform capitalism, Nehru pointed out that "there is a basic lack of something vital."

In discussing the current role of the official ideology, especially as it affects the younger generation, one observer concludes:

Three decades ago, this ideology was supported by a distinct vision of Utopia; now that it has been at least partially realized in relatively stable institutions, it has become largely indistinguishable from the diffuse ethos in which the members of this generation have been inextricably absorbed since childhood. While this transformation undoubtedly made them more prone to accept the ideology, it has also made them likely to give it a personal interpretation. Since it no longer rests on

an abstract vision of the future but is merged with concrete and differentiated current perceptions, it no longer can be the same sort of guardian of the thoughts and feelings. . . . What does all this portend for the future? With all the urgency of their desire for some personal autonomy, most of these young people, it must be recalled, continue to feel loyal to the foundations of their social order—to socialism and its values, as they variously choose to define them. . . . A sense of loyalty often represents the only real alternative to the almost intolerable bitterness and loneliness that come from a feeling of total alienation.²

The condition within the Soviet Union is such that dissatisfaction is neither sufficiently widespread nor sufficiently intense within any single effective grouping of people to goad them to question the basic tenets of the Party and the State with their controls, power, etc. What criticism there is of policies and procedures is generally within the larger ideological framework. For most people in the Soviet Union, there is enough of a sense of participation, identification of personal and social goals, State support and care for the individual, pride of accomplishment, and effective guidance to give living a feeling of worthwhileness and satisfaction. A visitor who has had an opportunity to know some of the Soviet people as individuals quickly senses how real and deep is their pride in the accomplishments of the State. It is an almost childish pride, open and unabashed.

It should be borne in mind that the economic, political, and cultural backwardness in which the vast majority of people in the present land area comprising the Soviet Union have lived for centuries has acted psychologically

as a most important drive to spur them on to the efforts they have made to improve their lot. The backwardness of people in greater Russia had long been brought home to the people. It was particularly stressed by Lenin and has been a recurring theme ever since. Hence, the pride of the people in their demonstrated accomplishments becomes very easy to understand. And it should be pointed out in this connection that any people who have had to suffer and sacrifice so long by being denied immediate privileges and opportunities for the sake of achieving long-range goals never want to believe that this has all been for nothing and eagerly look for symbols of accomplishment with which to identify themselves.

The overriding desire to improve the standard of living and to overtake the United States provides the greatest bond between the State and the people today. Although a great gap still separates the "State" and the "people," the trend toward a better life now makes the "State" seem somewhat more benevolent. An important aspect of this interrelation is the identification people make of socialism (a term the Soviet people use interchangeably with "Communism") with the Soviet Union *as a nation*. The situation was reflected in a conversation held with a young engineer in Leningrad:

Under Capitalism, Russia was weak, was under the influence of other nations, was economically poor, and a third- or fourth-rate power. Under Socialism, Russia has become a great power and the great majority of people here attribute their own greater well-being and, above all, the increased prestige of Russia in the world to Socialism. Despite the terror and bloodshed by which all of this was achieved, the terror and blood-

shed take second place to the achievement itself. World War II was a mathematical proof of the soundness of the Socialist system for Russia. Only a few unimportant people oppose Socialism and they do so for special selfish reasons that are not shared by the overwhelming majority in the country. It follows that when a foreigner insults Socialism (Communism), it is equivalent in the minds of the Soviet people to insulting Russia as a nation and therefore the Russian people.³

From a psychological point of view, the *trend* that living is taking in terms of an individual's own aspirations is obviously much more important than the absolute position he may be holding at the moment. While by American standards almost everything in the Soviet Union looks crude, cheap, and of inferior quality—the hotels, the roads, the cars, the clothes, the apartments, the skyscrapers—an American visitor senses the feeling on the part of nearly everyone he meets that things are better for them than they had been and are getting better all the time.

The Soviet citizen realizes the extent to which the State either is taking care of him or will take care of him in time of need. The basic security felt by Soviet citizens was reflected over and over again in conversations as people implicitly expressed gratitude to the State which always finds them employment, gives them free medical care and education and paid vacations, and provides for them in their old age. The security guaranteed by all this must never be overlooked.

Mention should also be made here of the special pride taken by the Soviet people in the spectacular symbols of accomplishment that the regime has deliberately engineered—satellites, jet planes, skyscrapers, subways, etc. One

can recall the salutation of Khrushchev to Soviet scientists on the occasion of the launching of their first Lunik and the glory he said this reflected on the Soviet Union.

Although a "new class" may have arisen, the fact that Soviet society long ago sloughed off many class distinctions based on heredity or social position enables them to reward individuals plausibly and publicly for their demonstrated initiative and usefulness to the State.

With respect to Soviet foreign policy, the average Soviet citizen, of course, knows relatively little of what is going on. He seems, however, to have no great difficulty in believing the official interpretation of events and believing that, while people in all countries want peace, the governments in some countries would be willing to launch another war to defend the interests of the exploiting class.

In discussing the critical moods of university students, a *New York Times* correspondent points out:

. . . students seem to take exception to this or that policy or law without questioning the Government's and Party's right to impose it. Some may feel, for instance, that they should have access to this or that Western newspaper or book, but most do not question the Government's right to prescribe controls in this domain.⁴

The discipline and regimentation imposed on children in the school are deliberately and quite effectively relieved by the freedom of choice and activity allowed them outside the schoolroom, especially in the Young Pioneers, in which there is a good deal of individual competition and of planned activity that is definitely regarded as play and

bolstered by competent teaching staffs and increasing facilities.

It must also be acknowledged that by and large the sense of direction and of participation in the conduct of the State that the *Komsomol* organization provides is effective. Young people are repeatedly told that the Soviet system is the only one that offers them any real chance of advancement irrespective of the position of their parents, etc. They are told that the Communist paradise is not too far beyond the horizon and within the realm of realization by their own generation. In turn speakers at *Komsomol* Congresses express the gratitude of the *Komsomols* to the Communist Party and the Soviet government for their manifestations of concern for the growing generation.

Moreover, most people in the Soviet Union seem to be self-confident. The higher standard of living in the Soviet Union and the continuation of the trend to more consumer goods and better housing has given people clear evidence to justify their faith in Communism and its leadership and increasing confidence in themselves. There is a strong conviction that the country can and will constantly build itself up through industrialization and through new construction which is so widespread.

The self-confidence of the Soviet citizen seems to explain in large part his very great and genuine friendliness toward American visitors and the American people in general. For unlike people in most countries of the world whose standard of living is to a greater or less extent lower than that of America, the attitudes and feelings of the Soviet citizen toward Americans appears relatively free of jealousy or contempt. This attitude would seem to be due to the following complex of interdependent reasons: the frank admission that the American standard of living is

higher and that it is something to be desired; the deliberate, planned, highly publicized effort that makes the increase of the standard of living the primary target both for the State and for the individual; the relentless criticism of those who fail to achieve their quotas and the praise of those who exceed their quotas without any rationalization or excuses in terms of having "higher cultural" or "higher spiritual" values; and, of the utmost importance, the apparent confidence most Soviet citizens have that they will, without any question, raise their standard of living quickly and that they will do this themselves. Hence, unlike so many people in the world, they have no feeling of "dependence" upon the United States for economic or military aid with all the potential feelings of resentment, jealousy, apathy, ingratiating, anxiety, or affectation that the sense of dependence—whether of a nation or an individual—is likely to engender. ("I never gave you anything, so why do you hate me?" asked Confucius.)

The close association Soviet citizens have of Communism and the construction of a better world is revealed in the conversation an American visitor had in the summer of 1959 when, in reply to the Soviet citizen's criticism of American bases, the American said the Soviets did not need foreign bases because they had foreign Communists working for them within so many countries, the Soviet man answered, "What is wrong with that? The Communists are working for the good of mankind."

By and large, past and present Soviet regimes have demonstrated that they can manipulate people's attitudes successfully. It is important to underscore again the important difference between "manipulation" as practiced by Soviet leaders as contrasted to education, persuasion

or advertising as these are known to us in Western democracies.

For when manipulation is combined with a monopoly of power and supported by any means deemed effective, it does facilitate remarkable results. A highly centralized government which knows what it wants to achieve, which makes a great effort to inform itself about the aspirations and grievances of the target population, which is dealing with a population that is ignorant of the long-range intentions and values of the leaders is in a very good position indeed to achieve impressive results, particularly when the target population can be kept relatively insulated from any conflicting information or knowledge.

An American expert on Soviet diplomacy has pointed out:

Optimism about the contagiousness of freedom should not blind us to the perception of the formidable strength, both defensive and offensive, of Soviet cultural diplomacy. . . . We are not very well prepared to cope with the mixture of science and cunning the Soviet leaders represent for a good part of the time we often do not know what is being done to us. Hence their methods are often highly successful in critical situations before we know what is happening.⁵

This constant shift in Soviet tactics builds up the notion of the Soviet "enigma," since just about the time some people may feel they have a basis for making reliable guesses as to what Soviet leaders will do next, tactics are changed, the basis for prediction is shattered and the observer is in a new state of frustration and lack of under-

standing. Soviet propaganda aimed at the Western world seems especially to make systematic use of the method developed by Pavlov to produce experimental neuroses in his dogs.⁶ An animal learns that if he responds to certain signals, he will be rewarded with food while other signals produce no food. The dog builds up apparently reliable assumptions of how to behave successfully. Then comes the time when the usual food signal produces no food while other signals do. Through the use of deliberate confusion, the dog becomes tense and neurotic. And so with much Soviet propaganda. Just as people feel they have reliable assumptions to predict what will come next, tactics are changed and assumptions are proved wrong. The process is repeated over and over again in a variety of contexts with little regard for facts, evidence, or truth. Those who attempt to make consistency out of this planned inconsistency can readily become baffled and anxious. For events do not follow each other in any "logical" sequence. On the other hand, if people learn to disregard the confused signals, just as did some of Pavlov's independent dogs who remained calm, the propaganda fails in its effort to produce bewilderment, tension and anxiety. Furthermore, unlike the dogs in the physiological laboratory, people can quickly understand that the Party leadership (the experimenter in this case) is doing all this for a definite purpose—mastery over man.

The major current revolutionary weapon of the regime seems to be an aggressive stress and emphasis on the efficacy of helping people in other nations raise their standards of living to achieve material aspirations and thereby be wooed into the Soviet orbit. A close observer of Soviet affairs has pointed out:

. . . whereas Lenin thought of Communism as coming by proletarian revolution, Stalin added another method—Soviet military occupation followed by “people’s democratic governments.” Khrushchev has gone further with his theory of Soviet economic penetration backed by the performance of Communism in the Soviet Union itself and the peaceful “victory” of Communism.⁷

And the launching of the new “University of the Friendship of People” symbolized the aggressive campaign to be waged in the cultural area.

While the increasing political power and military might of the Soviet Union, together with the increasing confidence of the leaders, obviously point to their capability of launching a war, it does appear that there is somewhat of a shift from the point of view that the West *should* want war and *should* strive toward war together with a shift from the former unquestioned assumption that any peaceful words or gestures of Western leaders were merely a reflection of their duplicity. It may be that the current strategy of economic and cultural penetration followed by patient political conquest will, in the minds of current Soviet leaders, make Lenin’s prediction of “frightful collisions between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois states” less inevitable.

Soviet leaders basically continue to maintain that co-existence is impossible although they place a tactical emphasis on co-existence. John Scott seems to reflect the consensus of many knowledgeable observers of the Soviet scene when he writes that “for Khrushchev and his colleagues, co-existence is but a step on the road to world communism, which they hope to dominate and control

. . . for them, co-existence can only be a tactical maneuver . . . a temporary deal to gain time.”⁸

A clear warning was sounded in *Kommunist* (1957) in a leading article entitled “Raise Higher the Banner of Marxist-Leninist Ideology,” in which it was stated that “the socialist and bourgeois ideologies are therefore mutually exclusive; they do not, nor can they, peacefully co-exist.”⁹

In this connection, it is sobering to recall some familiar words: Lenin said, “Promises are like piecrust, made to be broken. He would be mad who binds himself to any agreement”; Stalin said, “Sincere diplomacy is no more possible than dry water or wooden iron”; and Khrushchev has said he intends to bury us.

What does it all add up to, especially vis-à-vis the future of the democratic way of life? The note that follows attempts no predictions, but does try to point to a few of the more basic psychological problems likely to be of concern both to Communist Party leaders and to citizens of any democracy.

EPILOGUE

Whatever else one may say about the Soviet Union and the assumptions concerning the nature of man involved in the thought and action of its leaders, one thing seems certain: Soviet society has developed into something that is new under the sun. Just as the world had never before known the type of society formally launched with our own Declaration of Independence, so the world has never before known the type of society that began with the Bolshevik Revolution.

To keep some perspective on the Soviet scene, it is important to remember that the Soviet Union is coming into its own at a period in human history when great technological advancement and industrial know-how create a range of both problems and potentialities concerning man's social, economic, and political life undreamt of in the eighteenth century. Such developments, for example, as the use of atomic energy and automation foreshadow an era of further profound and unpredictable social change which will likely occur with unprecedented speed and sweep and which will involve a flood of unprecedented social, economic, psychological, and political complexities.

It has often been noted that a little liberty makes people want more liberty. Freedom as an aspiration, just like an improved standard of living as an aspiration, is a spiraling

process where one goal leads to another goal. And as the situation improves in the Soviet Union from the point of view of the individual, it is likely to create a demand for more rapid improvement as new and increasing potentialities are foreseen and as new frustrations will certainly be bred if repression, force, or terror return on any larger scale. We must recall in this connection that people who were born into a Communist regime and know nothing else, and who have been told repeatedly of the glories of Communism, are bound to expect great benefits from it.

And the more people in the Soviet Union learn about the West, with its freedoms and standards of living and the wide range of inquiries possible—in short, learn that in the West people “live better than we do,” the more likely these people are to feel at home as they talk and are with individuals from the West, and the less likely they are to feel at home as they are with and talking to rigid Communist Party members.

Soviet complaints of lack of discipline result essentially from a lack of a sense of responsibility to official social values. And, in turn, the lack of a sense of responsibility often results from a lack of opportunity to act effectively on one's own choices within the framework of personally accepted social values. Any reported restlessness, dissatisfaction, and inner rebellion of trained people in the Soviet Union who hold responsible positions (such as factory managers and the intellectual elite) would seem due, more or less, to the inevitable, interdependent relationship between responsibility and freedom of choice; if a person has prolonged responsibility thrust on him, he feels he has a right to have his say about what responsibility is *for* and the direction it should take.

As higher education proceeds, even with its rigid controls, people who are taught thoughts are very likely to learn something about the process and products of thinking. And the desire to obtain an education is perhaps even more intense in the Soviet Union than in many other parts of the world, for by acquiring some middle or higher specialized education one can avoid becoming a permanent member of the proletariat. Clearly a problem for the Party is the problem of getting people to want to work.

The backwardness of Russia prior to the Revolution has acted ever since as a spur for Soviet leaders and has provided their people with clear incentives. By now the earlier feelings of inferiority and humiliation are being mixed with a sense of worthwhileness and pride as the terror of a police state gradually diminishes. Early Bolshevik leaders came into power by filling a vacuum of despair and helplessness. Now that the atmosphere of crisis has passed, a major problem of the self-perpetuating leadership in the Soviet Union is that of keeping up with the growing aspirations of the people and improving the correspondence between the abstract vision of a new society and the reality of that society as experienced in the daily lives of ordinary people.

The gulf between the assumptions concerning the nature of man made by our own founding fathers and the assumptions made by Bolshevik leaders is a wide one indeed, reflecting fundamental differences concerning the purposes for which any society exists. The men in the Presidium believe the masses of people must be guided by a trained elite, since most people have neither the capacity nor the understanding to make effective political decisions. The bold assumption on which the American

democracy was founded is that ordinary citizens *do* have the capacity and both can and will acquire the understanding to make the political decisions required in the process of ceaseless change. The Soviet citizen has no such burdens imposed upon him.

These contrasting assumptions must be viewed very soberly indeed in a day and age when major issues on which the fate of people and nations depend are becoming extremely complex. Anyone concerned with the future of democracy can hardly be complacent when he observes the widespread ignorance and the lack of interest in "public" and international affairs of so many of the citizens to whom the welfare of the country has been entrusted. Many people do not even bother to vote and, if they do, frequently have only a fuzzy notion of what major issues, if any, are involved in the struggle for power.

The question of whether or not citizens of a democracy can rise to the occasion and exercise the intelligent political judgment and responsibility on which their form of government rests is being challenged as never before. In this connection it gives one pause to read a letter written by Thomas Jefferson to John Adams in 1813 in which he states:

I agree with you that there is a natural aristocracy among men. The grounds are virtue and talents. Formerly, bodily powers gave place among the aristoi. But since the invention of gunpowder has armed the weak as well as the strong with missile death, bodily strength, like beauty, good humor, politeness and other accomplishments, has become but an auxiliary ground for distinction. . . . The natural aristocracy I consider as the most precious gift of nature, for the instruction,

the trusts, and government of society. And indeed, it would have been inconsistent in creation to have formed man for the social state, and not to have provided virtue and wisdom enough to manage the concerns of the society. May we not even say, that that form of government is the best, which provides the most effectually for a pure selection of these natural aristoi into the offices of government? ¹

The "natural aristocracy" that Soviet leadership is so self-consciously developing shows little sign of relinquishing Party control and allowing the emergence of an open, democratic society of the type foreseen by the writer of the famous words that men "are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights" and that "to secure these rights Governments are instituted, deriving their power from the consent of the governed." Yet it is clear that no small group of people can entirely tailor human nature and society to suit its fancy, since human beings will, in one way or another, eventually bring about transformations in the society they themselves compose as they strive, like all other people in the world, to create an environment within which they can more effectively exercise the capacities, aspirations, and purposes basic and unique in the human design.

We have noted that the Soviet regime attained its present strength because its methods were primitive, dogmatic, not at all subtle. The effectivity of methods well suited to capture underdeveloped peoples will likely wane or be drastically revised as the people advance; for the evidence of history seems to indicate that whenever an ideology gets in the way of more effective, satisfying living, the ideology will *in time* give way, as did the shifts and revisions that

took place in Christianity. Lenin himself said, "Our teaching is not dogma. . . . Life will show us. . . . We know the direction. . . . But only the experience of millions, as they move to the task, will discover the road." ²

There seems considerable indication that developments in the Soviet Union represent developments that are likely to take place in any modern industrial society and that bring about certain social and psychological aspirations regarding the acquisition of material goods, culture, leisure, and everything else associated in so many cultures with "superior status." It would appear that the present two great industrial powers, the United States and the USSR, will face increasingly common problems and increasingly common potentialities as time moves on—such problems and potentialities as housing, the health and welfare of all citizens, population growth, mass education, and the use of leisure time. It can be taken for granted that the standard of living will continue to rise in industrial countries and that presently underdeveloped peoples will in one way or another and for one reason or another be aided by more highly developed states.

But while the revolution in aspirations for higher standards of living must, of course, be accommodated and cultural roadblocks to that end overcome, the longer range and much more fundamental problem involved in the human situation on the planet will be that of providing social orders which will continually enable people to extend the range and quality of the type of experience human beings are inherently capable of and by means of which they, and they alone, judge the satisfaction and worthwhileness of living. Long ago one of Russia's most perceptive observers, Feodor Dostoevski, wrote: "For the

secret of man's being is not only to live but to have something to live for. Without a stable conception of the object of life, man would not consent to go on living, and would rather destroy himself than remain on earth, though he had bread in abundance. That is true." ³

NOTES *

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

1. V. I. Lenin, *Selected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1937), Vol. VI, p. 17.
2. Philip Mosely, "Two Worlds—and the World Between," *An Outline of Man's Knowledge of the Modern World*, ed. Lyman Bryson (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960), Ch. 23, p. 493.
3. I. V. Stalin, *Voprosy Leninizma* (10th ed.; Moscow, 1934), p. 445.
4. V. I. Lenin, *op. cit.*, Vol. VII, pp. 294-295.
5. Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America* (New York: Knopf, 1945), Vol. I, p. 434.
6. Konstantin Simonov, "Drama, Theatre, and Life," *Sovetskoi Iskusstvo*, Nov. 23, 1948.

Chapter 1. THE GOALS OF MANIPULATION

1. *Pravda*, February 16, 1958.
2. *Short Philosophical Dictionary* (4th ed., 1955), pp. 214, 216, 217.
3. *Great Soviet Encyclopaedia* (2nd ed., 1954), Vol. XXX, p. 205.
4. *Ushakov* (1947), Vol. I, pp. 1217-1218.

* The Russian titles of books and articles are given in their English translation in order to provide non-Russian readers with a sense of their content.

5. *Ushakov* (1947), Vol. I, p. 685.
 6. N. I. Boldyrev, "Bringing Up the Younger Generation in the Spirit of Soviet Patriotism," *Sovetskaia Pedagogika*, No. 2 (February, 1950), p. 103.
 7. I. A. Kairov (ed.), "Basic Principles in Developing Communist Morality," *Pedagogika* (2nd ed.; Moscow: Uchpedgiz, 1948), Ch. VIII, pp. 206-207.
 8. George S. Counts, *Meeting the Soviet Challenge* (New York: Liberal Party Headquarters, 1958), p. 5.
 9. N. I. Boldyrev, *Developing Communist Morality in School Children* (2nd ed.; Moscow: Uchpedgiz, 1956), p. 6.
 10. I. A. Kairov, *op. cit.*
 11. P. F. Kolonitskii, *Communist morality and religious morality* (Moscow: Znanie, 1952), pp. 7, 17.
 12. *Short Philosophical Dictionary*, *op. cit.*, p. 209.
 13. *Great Soviet Encyclopaedia*, *op. cit.*, 205.
 14. B. P. Yesipov and N. K. Goncharov, *Pedagogika* (1947), as translated in *I Want to Be Like Stalin*, George S. Counts and Nucia P. Lodge (New York: John Day Company, 1947), p. 62.
 15. *Ushakov* (1947), Vol. IV, pp. 95-96.
 16. *Great Soviet Encyclopaedia* (2nd ed., 1955), Vol. XXXII, p. 409.
 17. N. K. Goncharov and B. P. Yesipov, "Developing Collectivism," *Pedagogika* (5th ed.; Moscow: Uchpedgiz, 1950), Ch. 14, p. 274.
 18. N. B. Andrianova, "The sense of duty in younger school children," *Nachal'naia Shkola*, No. 2 (1957).
 19. M. A. Mel'nikov, "Problems and Ways of Upbringing Work in the Elementary Classes," *Nachal'naia Shkola* (Moscow: Uchpedgiz, 1950), Part III.
 20. A. V. Zosimovskii, "On the Development of the Independence of a Collective," *Nachal'naia Shkola*, No. 12 (1957).
 21. B. P. Yesipov and N. K. Goncharov, "Basic Content and Methods of Moral Upbringing," *Pedagogika* (5th ed.; Moscow: Uchpedgiz, 1950), Ch. 12.
-

22. M. A. Mel'nikov, *op. cit.*, Part III.
23. Ralph Talcott Fisher, Jr., *Pattern for Soviet Youth* (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1959), p. 45.
24. *Short Philosophical Dictionary*, *op. cit.*, pp. 210, 213.
25. "Text of the Amended Rules of the Party," *Gospolitizdat* (Moscow, 1952).
26. A. S. Makarenko, "The Psychology of the Soviet Woman," *Réalités*, September, 1958, pp. 52-53.
27. V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works* (3rd ed.), Vol. XII, pp. 378-389. Contained in B. D. Wolfe, *Khrushchev and Stalin's Ghost* (New York: Praeger, 1957), pp. 288-289.
28. *Uchitel'skaia Gazeta* (Moscow, Jan. 24, 1953). Quoted in George S. Counts, *The Challenge of Soviet Education* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1957), p. 123.
29. G. Wetter, "The Soviet Concept of Coexistence," *Soviet Survey*, No. 30 (October-December, 1959), pp. 22, 34.
30. *Promise of Young Pioneer* copied from a bulletin board in the pioneer room of a Soviet school by Ina Schlesinger.
31. *Komsomolskaia Pravda*, "Is It Necessary to Interfere in Private Life?" Jan. 4, 1958.
32. V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works* (1st ed.; Moscow, 1923), Vol. XVII, p. 145.
33. George S. Counts, *The Challenge of Soviet Education* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1957), p. 36.
34. N. Khrushchev, "Speech to the 21st Party Congress," *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Vol. XI, No. 3 (Feb. 25, 1959).
35. Cyril Black, Hedley Donovan, and Richard Scammon, *New York Times*, Mar. 19, 1958, p. 5.

Chapter 2. THE RATIONALE OF MANIPULATION

1. George S. Counts, *Personal report of a conversation in the U.S.S.R.*, 1927.
2. B. M. Teplov, "The Teaching of Types of Higher Nerve

Activity in Psychology," quoted in article by Zhukovskaia, "The Development in Preschool Children of Confidence in Their Capabilities," *Sovetskaia Pedagogika*, No. 1 (1958).

3. N. Khrushchev, "Speech to the 21st Party Congress," *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Vol. XI, No. 3 (Feb. 25, 1959), p. 8, No. 2 (Feb. 18, 1959), pp. 15-16.

4. Robert C. Tucker, "Stalin and the Uses of Psychology," *World Politics*, Vol. VIII, No. 4 (July, 1956), p. 473.

5. Bertram D. Wolfe, *Khrushchev and Stalin's Ghost* (New York: Praeger, 1957), p. 286.

6. *Great Soviet Encyclopaedia* (2nd ed., 1954), Vol. XXIX, pp. 164-165.

7. Robert C. Tucker, *The Image of Dual Russia* (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, Jan. 29, 1958). (For discussion of background.)

8. A. K. Uledov, "Public Opinion as the Subject of Social Science Research," *Voprosy Filosofii*, No. 3 (1959), pp. 40-53. Translated and published in *Prod Translations*, Vol. III, No. 6 (Feb., 1960), pp. 21-31.

9. George S. Counts, *The Challenge of Soviet Education* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1957), Ch. 2. (For background discussion.)

10. John Gunther, *Inside Russia Today* (New York: Harper, 1957), p. 250.

11. *Short Philosophical Dictionary* (4th ed., 1955), p. 143. The definitions of "objectivism" in S. I. Ozhegov, *Dictionary of the Russian Language* (2nd ed.; Moscow, 1952), p. 393, are also relevant.

12. F. Dostoevski, *Diary of a Writer* (New York: Scribner, 1949), Vol. II, p. 780. For an historical survey of this important influence on Soviet mentality see Hans Kohn, *Pan-Slavism: Its History and Ideology* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1953).

13. *Great Soviet Encyclopaedia* (2nd ed., 1957), Vol. XLVI, pp. 66-67.

14. *Short Philosophical Dictionary*, *op. cit.*, p. 153.
15. M. P. Lebedev, "Matter and Consciousness," *Voprosy Filosofii* No. 5 (1956), pp. 70-84.
16. A. G. Kovalev and B. N. Miasishchev, *The Characteristics of Man* (Leningrad: University of Leningrad, 1957), pp. 129, 151.
17. *Great Soviet Encyclopaedia* (2nd ed., 1954), Vol. XXX, p. 206.
18. D. Fedotov, "Freudianism: a reactionary manifestation of bourgeois ideology," *Meditinskii Rabotnik* (Nov. 25, 1958).
19. *Short Philosophical Dictionary*, *op. cit.*, p. 527.
20. Robert C. Tucker, *Impressions of Russia in 1958: A Trip Report* (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, Nov. 30, 1958), p. 162.
21. Gerhart Niemeyer, *An Inquiry into Soviet Mentality* (New York: Praeger, 1956). (For an extended discussion of this point.)
22. *Short Philosophical Dictionary*, *op. cit.*, p. 60.

Chapter 3. THE RATIONALE OF MANIPULATION (Continued)

1. George S. Counts, *The Challenge of Soviet Education* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1957), p. 171.
 2. N. Khrushchev, "Speech to the 21st Party Congress," *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Vol. XI, No. 3 (Feb. 25, 1959).
 3. B. P. Yesipov and N. K. Goncharov, "Developing Conscious Discipline," *Pedagogika* (5th ed.; Moscow: Uchpedgiz, 1950), Ch. 15.
 4. Ralph Talcott Fisher, Jr., *Pattern for Soviet Youth* (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1959). (For a thorough discussion of the Komsomols.)
 5. V. Golovinsky, "Pages of One Life," *Komsomol'skaya Pravda* (Mar. 29, 1959).
 6. L. S. Kubie, "Pavlov, Freud and Soviet Psychiatry," *Monthly Review*, Vol. IX, No. 11 (1958).
-

7. *Great Soviet Encyclopaedia* (2nd ed., 1955), Vol. XXXII, pp. 409-410.
8. Fisher, *op. cit.*, pp. 285-286.
9. *Great Soviet Encyclopaedia* (2nd ed., 1950), Vol. V, p. 278.

Chapter 4. THE PROCESS OF MANIPULATION

1. Ralph Talcott Fisher, Jr., *Pattern for Soviet Youth* (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1959).
2. *Resoliutsii i Dokumenty*, 12th Congress Vsesoiuznii Leninskii Kommunisticheskii Soiuz Molodezhi (trans. All-Union Leninist Communist Union of Youth) (Molodaia Gvardiia, Moscow, 1954).
3. B. P. Yesipov and N. K. Goncharov, *Pedagogika* (5th ed.; Moscow: Uchpedgiz, 1950), Ch. 15, pp. 283-284.
4. *Interview Report No. 21*. Washington: Department of State, External Research Division, Mar. 1959, p. 1.
5. Robert C. Tucker, "Stalin and the Uses of Psychology," *World Politics*, Vol. VIII, No. 4 (July, 1956), p. 473.
6. George S. Counts, *Khrushchev and the Central Committee Speak on Education* (Pittsburgh: Univ. Pittsburgh Press, 1959), p. 2.
7. S. Dorbin, "Forty Years of Soviet Legal Thinking: The Law of Economic Administration v. Civil (Private) Law," *Soviet Survey*, No. 21-22 (November-December, 1957), p. 13.
8. S. S. Leibowitz, "The Two Faces of Justice in Russia," *Life*, June 8, 1959, p. 151.
9. A. G. Kovalev and B. N. Miasishchev, *The Characteristics of Man* (Leningrad: University of Leningrad, 1957), pp. 110-111.
10. V. I. Lenin, "The Party Organization and Party Literature," 1905. Quoted in Max Hayward, "Controls in Literature," *Soviet Survey*, No. 21-22, Part I (November-December, 1957).

11. N. A. Mikahailov, *New York Times*, Oct. 24, 1958.
12. *Komsomol'skaia Pravda*, April 11, 1958, "We are for discussions."
13. N. Khrushchev, "Speech to the 21st Party Congress," *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Vol. XI, No. 3 (Feb. 25, 1959), p. 8; No. 2 (Feb. 18, 1959), pp. 15-16.
14. A. R. Luriia, "Role of speech in the formation of conditioned connections in man," *Vopr. Psikhol.*, 1, No. 1 (1955), pp. 73-86; also A. R. Luriia and O. S. Vinogradova, "An objective investigation of the dynamics of semantic systems," *British Journal of Psychol.*, Vol. 50, Part 2 (1959), pp. 89-105.
15. *Short Philosophical Dictionary* (4th ed., 1955), p. 202.
16. *Kommunist*, No. 2, February, 1956.
17. N. Khrushchev, *op. cit.*, (Feb. 23, 1959), p. 16.
18. V. I. Lenin, *What and How to Learn* (Moscow, 1925), pp. 7-8 as quoted in George S. Counts, *The Challenge of Soviet Education* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1957), p. 63.
19. N. Khrushchev, *op. cit.*, p. 9.
20. *The Pioneer Organization Named after V. I. Lenin* (a handbook for pedagogical schools, textbook for the new course for senior pioneer leaders), Ch. 3, "The Pioneer Organization—The Leader's Helper in the Struggle for Firm Knowledge and Conscious Discipline," (Moscow: Uchpedgiz, 1950), p. 55.
21. George S. Counts, *Khrushchev and the Central Committee Speak on Education*, *op. cit.*, p. 5.
22. A. Inkeles, "Social Stratification and Mobility in the Soviet Union: 1940-1950," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 15, No. 4 (1950), pp. 465-479; and M. G. Field, "Soviet Science and Some Implications for American Science and Society," *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 13, No. 1 (1959), pp. 19-33.

Chapter 5. TROUBLES ENCOUNTERED

1. Wolfgang Leonhard, *Child of the Revolution* (Chicago: Regnery, 1958), p. 373.

2. *Ibid.*, pp. 374f.
3. Ivan London, "The Soviet Propaganda Image of the West," *Psychological Reports*, Monog. Supplement 1, Vol. 3 (1957), pp. 19-57.
4. *Pravda*, Feb. 25, 1955.
5. *Great Soviet Encyclopaedia* (2nd ed., 1952), Vol. XV, p. 343.
6. Sir Winston Churchill, *Memoirs of the Second World War* (with Epilogue) (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1959), p. 1008.
7. G. Medynsky, *Honesty*, in *Moskva*, 5 (1959), pp. 138-139.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 147.
9. N. Ivanter, *August Again*, in *Novii Mir*, 8, 9 (1959), pp. 38-39.
10. Czeslaw Milosz, *The Captive Mind* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1953), p. 36.
11. *New York Times*, July 1, 1959.
12. R. C. Tucker, *The Image of Dual Russia* (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, Jan. 30, 1958), pp. 36f.
13. V. Golovinsky, "Pages of One Life," *Komsomol'skaya Pravda*, Mar. 29, 1959.
14. Vera S. Dunham, *Communications to the writer*, 1959-1960.
15. E. Evtushenko, "Station Winter," *Oktiabr'*, 10, 1956, pp. 26-47.
16. S. Kirsanov, "Seven Days of the Week," *Novii Mir*, 9 (1956), pp. 16-32.
17. *Ibid.*
18. J. Macmurray, *The Self as Agent* (London: Faber & Faber, 1957), pp. 29f.
19. Milovan Djilas, *The New Class: An Analysis of the Communist System* (New York: Praeger, 1957), p. 145.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 132, p. 98.
21. Max Hayward, "Controls in Literature," *Soviet Survey*, No. 21-22, Part I (November-December, 1957), p. 28.

22. Imre Nagy, *On Communism* (New York: Praeger, 1957), pp. 55f.
23. Aldous Huxley, *Brave New World Revisited* (New York: Harper, 1958), p. 56.
24. Max Hayward, "Looking Back on an Epoch: 'Dr. Zhigvago' and the Soviet Intelligentsia," *Soviet Survey*, No. 24 (April-June, 1958), p. 66.
25. L. H. Haimson, "Three Generations of the Soviet Intelligentsia," *Foreign Affairs*, No. 2, Vol. 37 (January 2, 1959), p. 238f.
26. Moscow, *Soviet Home Service*, Jan. 10, 1960.
27. R. C. Tucker, *op. cit.*
28. Vera S. Dunham, *Communication to the writer*, August, 1959.
29. Wolfgang Leonhard, *op. cit.*, p. 81.
30. Milovan Djilas, *op. cit.*, p. 162.
31. F. Barghoorn, *Communication to the writer*, October, 1959.
32. *Ibid.*
33. J. Nehru, *New York Times Magazine*, September 7, 1958, p. 110.
34. Imre Nagy, *op. cit.*, pp. 59f.
35. R. C. Tucker, *Impressions of Russia in 1958: A Trip Report* (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, Nov. 30, 1958), pp. 125f.

Chapter 6. ACCOMMODATION AND RELAXATION

1. Philip E. Mosely, "Two Worlds—and the World Between," *An Outline of Man's Knowledge of the Modern World*, ed. Lyman Bryson (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960), Ch. 23, p. 498.
2. Nathan Leites, *The operational code of the Politburo* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1951), p. 33.
3. Sir Julian Huxley, "Cultural process and evolution," *Be-*

havior and Evolution, ed. Anna Roe and George Gaylor Simpson (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1958), p. 453.

4. Robert C. Tucker, "Stalin and the Uses of Psychology," *World Politics*, No. 4, Vol. VIII (1956), p. 462.

5. Milovan Djilas, *The New Class: An Analysis of the Communist System* (New York: Praeger, 1957), p. 52.

6. Robert C. Tucker, *Impressions of Russia in 1958: A Trip Report* (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, Nov. 30, 1958), p. 36.

7. *New York Times*, July 14, 1957.

8. *New York Times*, July 4, 1957.

9. Robert C. Tucker, *Impressions of Russia in 1958: A Trip Report* (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, Nov. 30, 1958), p. 80.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 130.

11. N. S. Khrushchev, "On the Control Figures for the Development of the Economy of the U.S.S.R. for the Years 1959-1965," *Gospolitizdat*, 1959, p. 121.

12. V. Surov, "The People's Brigades Protecting Public Order," *Molodoi Kommunist*, No. 3 (1959), p. 90.

13. *Kommunist*, No. 9 (June, 1956) (editorial) "On the Ideological content of Communism."

14. S. Mezentsev, "Persuasion—the Basic Method of Party Leadership of the Masses," *Kommunist*, No. 13 (September, 1956).

15. *New York Times*, Sept. 10, 1959.

16. G. Medynsky, *Honesty*, in *Moskva*, 5 (1959), p. 132.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 116.

18. Vera S. Dunham, *Communication to the writer*, January, 1960.

19. L. Oshanin, "Meditations," *Den' Russkoi Poezii* (Moscow, 1958), p. 79.

20. E. Evtushenko, as quoted by V. Soloukhin in "Without a Clear Position," *Literaturnaya Gazeta* (April 8, 1958).

21. R. Rozhdestvensky, "Morning," *Literaturnaya Moskva*, 1 (1956).

22. A. Gaev, "Return to Stalinism in Soviet Art and Literature," *Studies on the Soviet Union* (Institute for the Study of the U.S.S.R., Munich), No. 2 (February, 1958), pp. 55-68.
23. Vera S. Dunham, *Communication to the writer*, February, 1960.
24. Frederick C. Barghoorn, "America in 1959—As Seen from Moscow," *Review of Politics*, Vol. 2, No. 2 (April, 1960), pp. 245-254.
25. N. S. Khrushchev, *New York Times*, November 7, 1957.
26. N. S. Khrushchev, *New York Times*, December 22, 1957.
27. *Pravda*, February 17, 1956.
28. H. Salisbury, *New York Times*, July 27, 1959.
29. Robert C. Tucker, *Impressions of Russia in 1958: A Trip Report* (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, Nov. 30, 1958), p. 81.
30. *Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*, Bulletin No. 19 (Jan. 28, 1959), pp. 11f.

Chapter 7. HOW THINGS STAND

1. Robert C. Tucker, *The Image of Dual Russia* (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, Jan. 29, 1958).
 2. L. H. Haimson, "Three Generations of the Soviet Intelligentsia," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 37, No. 2 (1959), pp. 242-246.
 3. *Communication to the writer*, Feb., 1959.
 4. M. Frankel, *New York Times*, December 29, 1959.
 5. Frederick C. Barghoorn, *Communication to the writer*, 1959.
 6. W. Sargent, "A Lesson from Pavlov," *London Times*, May 18, 1960.
 7. John Scott, "The Soviet Empire," a personal report to *Time's* publisher (October 30, 1959), pp. 43f.
 8. *Ibid.*, p. 91.
 9. *Kommunist*, No. 1, 1957.
-

EPILOGUE

1. Paul Leicester Ford, *The Writings of Thomas Jefferson* (New York: Putnam, 1898), Vol. IX, p. 425.
 2. Sir John Maynard, *The Russian Peasant: and other studies* (London: Gollancz, 1947), p. 12.
 3. Feodor Dostoevski, *The Brothers Karamazov* (New York: Modern Library, n.d.), p. 312.
-

INDEX

- August Again*, 88-89
 "aristocracy," 53
 Barghoorn, Frederick C., x, 96, 132-133
 Bauer, Raymond, xi
 boarding schools, Soviet, 17, 59-60
 Bolshevik revolution, xvii, 33
 "bourgeoisie," 54
Brave New World Revisited, 97
 "brigades of Communist toil," 122
Captive Mind, The, 90
 censorship, Soviet, 68
 "character," 32-33
Characteristics of Man, The, 33-34, 66
 "charity," 52
Child of the Revolution, 106
 Churchill, Winston, 86
 civil law, Soviet, 64-65
 co-existence, 15, 149-150
Communism, On, 96-97
 Communist morality, 15-16
 comradely courts, 71
 "Conscious Discipline, Developing," 45-46
 Counts, George S., xii, 69
 "criticism and self-criticism," 11-12
 de-Stalinization, 108-109, 125
 Dewey, John, in *Great Soviet Encyclopaedia*, 84
 Djilas, Milovan, 95, 107, 119
 Dostoevski, Feodor, 31-32, 156-157
 Dudintsev, v, 104
 Dunham, Vera, xii, 105, 125, 131
 East Berlin, 46
 education, Soviet, 10-11, 13, 17, 42, 43, 57-60, 62-64, 153
 elections, Soviet, x
 "eternal truths," 39
 Evtushenko, E., 93, 126
 fear, as means of social control, 67
 Fischer, Louis, xii
 Frankel, M., 144
 Franklin, Benjamin, v, xviii
 Free, Lloyd, xiii
 freedom, 70, 151-152
 Golovinski, V., 46-47, 91-92
 history, rewriting of, 69
 Holmes, Oliver Wendell, xii
Honesty, 86-89
 honorifics, system of, 74-75
Human Nature: The Marxian View, xi
 human nature, Soviet view of, 23-25
 Hungarian revolt, x, 99, 109
 Hungary, 46, 128, 136
 Huxley, Aldous, 97
 Huxley, Julian, 117-118

- idealized goals of Soviet leaders, vi
ideiinost, 8-9
 illusion of choice, 72
 independent thinking, 101-106
 "individualism," 8-9
 "initiative," 58-60
 Institute for the Study of the U.S.S.R., 129-131
 "intelligentsia," 54
 invasion of privacy, 59
 Ivanter, Nina, 88-89
- Jefferson, Thomas, vi, 154-155
- Khrushchev, Nikita, x, 2, 19-20, 22-23, 25, 31, 44-45, 70-71, 73-74, 76-77, 84, 91, 108, 110, 117, 119, 120, 121, 122, 125, 131, 132, 133, 135, 144, 149, 150
- Kirsanov, S., 93-94
- Kolkhoz*, 92
- Kollektiv*, 96
- Kommunist*, 72-73, 123, 124, 150
- Komsomols*, x, 11, 45-46, 58, 87, 91, 145
- Labor Psychology, Bureau of, 4-5
- language, function of, 65-66
- law, Soviet, x, 31
- legal thinking, Soviet, 65
- Lenin, V. I., vii, xvii, xviii, 3-4, 5, 6, 8, 11, 14, 16, 18, 25, 26-27, 67-68, 76-77, 78, 80, 119, 142, 149, 156
- Leonhard, Wolfgang, 83-84, 106
- "Levers, The," 104-105
- "liberty," 27, 28-29
- literature, Soviet, x, 17, 103-106, 125,
 control of, 67-68
 London, Ivan, xii, 84
 London, Maria, xii
 "lumpen proletariat," 54
- Malenkov, Georgi, x, 30
- Marxism-Leninism, vi, 3, 24, 30-31, 111, 150
- masses, relationship of, to Party, 1-20
- material rewards, 78-80
- May, Mark, xiii
- Medynsky, G., 86-88
- "middle-of-the-room technique," 59-61
- Mikoyan, A. I., 134
- Milosz, Czeslaw, 90
- Molotov, V. M., x
- "morality," Soviet, 3, 5, 6, 7, 34, 80-81
- Mosely, Philip, xii, xvii-xviii, 116
- Murray, Henry A., xii
- Nagy, Imre, 96-97, 112-113
- "natural aristocracy," 154-155
- nature of man, assumptions concerning, 21-39
- Navon, Anita, xii
- Nehru, Jawaharlal, 110-140
- Neurveld, Mark, xii
- New Soviet Man, The*, xi
- "new Soviet man," 22
- Not by Bread Alone*, 104
- October Revolution, 21-22
- On Communism*, 96-97
- Oshanin, L., 126
- "Palace Revolution," 29
- participation, sense of, 72-74, 75-76
- partiinnost*, 52-53
- Pasternak, Boris, 99
- Pavlov, I. V., 66, 148

- People's Militia, 122-123
 "petit bourgeoisie," 54
 Poland, 46, 128
Popular Masses, The, 25-26
Pravda, 84, 100, 108-109
pravda, 37-39, 89-90
 "production conferences," 122
 "proletariat," 54
 psychology, Soviet, x, xi

 religion, 50-51
 "Remnants of Capitalism in the
 Consciousness of the People,
 The," 48-49
 Ruggles, Melville, xii
rukovoditel, 24-25
 "ruling circles" and "people" dis-
 tinguished in Western democ-
 racies, 84
 Russian Revolution, 27-28

 Salisbury, Harrison, 124-125, 134
 Schopenhauer, Arthur, vii
 Schlesinger, Ina, xii
 Scott, John, x, 149-150
 "self-discipline," 71-72
 Senior Pioneers, 77
 Shepilov, D., 133
 Simonov, Konstantin, xix-xx
 Slavophile doctrine, 31-32
 Sobolev, L., vii
 "socialist cultures," 2-3
 social classes in Soviet Union, 80
 Soviet "enigma," 147-148
 Soviet ideology, attitude of peo-
 ple toward, 84-89

 Soviet leaders, vi, vii, viii, ix,
 x, xi
 "Soviet technomania," 96
 special days, 75
 Stalin, I. V., x, xviii, 69, 115,
 116, 118, 119, 149, 150
Station Winter, 93
 "status consciousness" of Soviet
 citizens, 113
 standard of living, improving,
 142-144

 "thaw," 92-94, 104-105, 126, 128-
 129, 136
 Tkachev, Peter, 26
 Tocqueville, Alexis de, xvii-xix
 toil, 77
 "toilers" and "toiling masses,"
 41, 43
 "trained elite," principle of, 120
 Tucker, Robert C., xii, 104-105,
 114, 120, 121, 134-135, 139
 Twentieth Party Congress, 25,
 108-109
 Twenty-first Party Congress, 19,
 22, 44, 70-71, 73-74, 76-77, 131

 United Nations, 108

 Venable, Vernon, xi

 World Peace Council, 108
 writers, Soviet, 103-106

 Yanshin, A., 104
 Young Pioneers, x, 11, 16, 58,
 144-145

1
